Eugine_Nier comments on What is Metaethics? - Less Wrong

31 Post author: lukeprog 25 April 2011 04:53PM

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Comment author: Eugine_Nier 27 April 2011 10:48:07PM *  3 points [-]

Why do you believe there exists a Correct Theory of Physics?

As Constant points out here all the arguments based on reductionism that you're using could just as easily be used to argue that there is no correct theory of physics.

One difference between physics and morality is that there is currently a lot more consensus about what the correct theory of physics looks like then what the correct theory of morality looks like. However, that is a statement about the current time, if you were to go back a couple centuries you'd find that there was as little consensus about the correct theory of physics as there is today about the correct theory of morality.

Comment author: Amanojack 27 April 2011 11:40:17PM 3 points [-]

It's not an argument by reductionism...it's simply trying to figure out how to interpret the words people are using - because it's really not obvious. It only looks like reductionism because someone asks, "What is morality?" and the answer comes: "Right and wrong," then "What should be done," then "What is admirable"... It is all moralistic language that, if any of it means anything, it all means the same thing.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 12:15:31AM *  2 points [-]

Well the original argument, way back in the thread, was NMJablonski arguing against the existence of a "Correct Theory of Morality" by demanding that Peter provide "a clear reductionist description of what [he's] talking about" while "tabooing words like 'ethics', 'morality', 'should', etc.

My point is that NMJablonski's request is about as reasonable as demanding that someone arguing for the existence of a "Correct Theory of Physics" provide a clear reductionist description of what one means while tabooing words like 'physics', 'reality', 'exists', 'experience', etc.

Comment author: Amanojack 28 April 2011 12:41:55AM 2 points [-]

Fair enough, though I suspect that by asking for a "reductionist" description NMJablonski may have just been hoping for some kind of unambiguous wording.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 12:57:53AM 1 point [-]

My point, and possibly Peter's, is that given our current state of knowledge about meta-ethics I can give no better definition of the words "should"/"right"/"wrong" than the meaning they have in everyday use.

Note, following my analogy with physics, that historically we developed a systematic way for judging the validity of statements about physics, i.e., the scientific method, several centuries before developing a semi-coherent meta-theory of physics, i.e., empiricism and Bayseanism. With morality we're not even at the "scientific method" stage.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 April 2011 01:48:24AM 3 points [-]

My point, and possibly Peter's, is that given our current state of knowledge about meta-ethics I can give no better definition of the words "should"/"right"/"wrong" than the meaning they have in everyday use.

This is consistent with Jablonski's point that "it's all preferences."

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 01:57:04AM *  0 points [-]

This is consistent with Jablonski's point that "it's all preferences."

In keeping with my physics analogy, saying "it's all preferences" about morality is analogous to saying "it's all opinion" about physics.

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 02:19:45AM *  7 points [-]

Clearly there's a group of people who dislike what I've said in this thread, as I've been downvoted quite a bit.

I'm not perfectly clear on why. My only position at any point has been this:

I see a universe which contains intelligent agents trying to fulfill their preferences. Then I see conversations about morality and ethics talking about actions being "right" or "wrong". From the context and explanations, "right" seems to mean very different things. Like:

"Those actions which I prefer" or "Those actions which most agents in a particular place prefer" or "Those actions which fulfill arbitrary metric X"

Likewise, "wrong" inherits its meaning from whatever definition is given for "right". It makes sense to me to talk about preferences. They're important. If that's what people are talking about when they discuss morality, then that makes perfect sense. What I do not understand is when people use the words "right" or "wrong" independently of any agent's preferences. I don't see what they are referring to, or what those words even mean in that context.

Does anyone care to explain what I'm missing, or if there's something specific I did to elicit downvotes?

Comment author: wedrifid 28 April 2011 03:29:55AM 3 points [-]

Does anyone care to explain what I'm missing, or if there's something specific I did to elicit downvotes?

You signaled disagreement with someone about morality. What did you expect? :)

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 03:42:40AM 1 point [-]

Your explanation is simple and fits the facts!

I like it :)

Comment author: Perplexed 01 May 2011 06:11:16PM 2 points [-]

What I do not understand is when people use the words "right" or "wrong" independently of any agent's preferences. I don't see what they are referring to, or what those words even mean in that context.

Does anyone care to explain what I'm missing, or if there's something specific I did to elicit downvotes?

I don't know anything about downvotes, but I do think that there is a way of understanding 'right' and 'wrong' independently of preferences. But it takes a conceptual shift.

Don't think of morality as a doctrine guiding you as to how to behave. Instead, imagine it as a doctrine teaching you how to judge the behavior of others (and to a lesser extent, yourself).

Morality teaches you when to punish and reward (and when to expect punishment and reward). It is a second-order concept, and hence not directly tied to preferences.

Comment author: XiXiDu 01 May 2011 06:39:55PM 2 points [-]

I do think that there is a way of understanding 'right' and 'wrong' independently of preferences...Morality teaches you when to punish and reward (and when to expect punishment and reward). It is a second-order concept, and hence not directly tied to preferences.

Sociology? Psychology? Game theory? Mathematics? What does moral philosophy add to the sciences that is useful, that helps us to dissolve confusion and understand the nature of reality?

Comment author: NMJablonski 01 May 2011 06:16:47PM 1 point [-]

imagine it as a doctrine teaching you how to judge the behavior of others (and to a lesser extent, yourself).

Which metrics do I use to judge others?

There has been some confusion over the word "preference" in the thread, so perhaps I should use "subjective value". Would you agree that the only tools I have for judging others are subjective values? (This includes me placing value on other people reaching a state of subjective high value)

Or do you think there's a set of metrics for judging people which has some spooky, metaphysical property that makes it "better"?

Comment author: AlephNeil 01 May 2011 10:13:13PM *  1 point [-]

Don't think of morality as a doctrine guiding you as to how to behave. Instead, imagine it as a doctrine teaching you how to judge the behavior of others (and to a lesser extent, yourself).

Yes! That's a point that I've repeated so often to so many different people [not on LW, though] that I'd more-or-less "given up" - it began to seem as futile as swatting flies in summer. Maybe I'll resume swatting now I know I'm not alone.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 02:45:40AM *  0 points [-]

In keeping with my analogy let's translate your position into the corresponding position on physics:

I see a universe which contains intelligent agents with opinions and/or beliefs. Then I see conversations about physics and reality talking about beliefs being "true" or "false". From the context and explanations, "true" seems to mean very different things. Like:

"My beliefs" or "The beliefs of most agents in a particular place" or "Those beliefs which fulfill arbitrary metric X"

Likewise, "false" inherits its meaning from whatever definition is given for "true". It makes sense to me to talk about opinions and/or beliefs . They're important. If that's what people are talking about when they discuss truth, then that makes perfect sense. What I do not understand is when people use the words "true" or "false" independently of any agent's opinion. I don't see what they are referring to, or what those words even mean in that context.

Do you still agree with the changed version? If not, why not?

(I never realized how much fun it could be to play a chronophone.)

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 02:53:02AM *  4 points [-]

Based upon my experiences, physical truths appear to be concrete and independent of beliefs and opinions. I see no cases where "right" has a meaning outside of an agent's preferences. I don't know how one would go about discovering the "rightness" of something, as one would a physical truth.

It is a poor analogy.

Edit: Seriously? I'm not trying to be obstinate here. Would people prefer I go away?

New edit: Thanks wedrifid. I was very confused.

Comment author: Marius 28 April 2011 02:47:05AM 1 point [-]

I don't understand what you mean by preferences when you say "intelligent agents trying to fulfill their preferences". I have met plenty of people who were trying to do things contrary to their preferences. Perhaps before you try (or someone tries for you) to distinguish morality from preferences, it might be helpful to distinguish precisely how preferences and behavior can differ?

Comment author: Amanojack 28 April 2011 03:14:24AM *  3 points [-]

Example? I prefer not to stay up late, but here I am doing it. It's not that I'm acting against my preferences, because my current preference is to continue typing this sentence. It's simply that English doesn't differentiate very well between "current preferences"= "my preferences right this moment" and "current preferences"= "preferences I have generally these days."

Seinfeld said it best.

Comment author: Marius 01 May 2011 05:47:42PM 0 points [-]

What I do not understand is when people use the words "right" or "wrong" independently of any agent's preferences

Assuming Amanojack explained your position correctly, then there aren't just people fulfilling their preferences. There are people doing all kinds of things that fulfill or fail to fulfill their preferences - and, not entirely coincidentally, which bring happiness and grief to themselves or others. So then a common reasonable definition of morality (that doesn't involve the word preferences) is that set of habits that are most likely to bring long-term happiness to oneself and those around one.

Comment author: NMJablonski 01 May 2011 06:01:03PM *  1 point [-]

there aren't just people fulfilling their preferences.

You missed a word in my original. I said that there were agents trying to fulfill their preferences. Now, per my comment at the end of your subthread with Amanojack, I realize that the word "preferences" may be unhelpful. Let me try to taboo it:

There are intelligent agents who assign higher values to some futures than others. I observe them generally making an effort to actualize those futures, but sometimes failing due to various immediate circumstances, which we could call cognitive overrides. What I mean by that is that these agents have biases and heuristics which lead them to poorly evaluate the consequences of actions.

Even if a human sleeping on the edge of a cliff knows that the cliff edge is right next to him, he will jolt if startled by noise or movement. He may not want to fall off the cliff, but the jolt reaction occurs before he is able to analyze it. Similarly, under conditions of sufficient hunger, thirst, fear, or pain, the analytical parts of the agent's mind give way to evolved heuristics.

definition of morality (that doesn't involve the word preferences) is that set of habits that are most likely to bring long-term happiness to oneself and those around one.

If that's how you would like to define it, that's fine. Would you agree then, that the contents of that set of habits is contingent upon what makes you and those around you happy?

Comment author: Peterdjones 28 April 2011 01:17:53PM 0 points [-]

Clearly there's a group of people who dislike what I've said in this thread, as I've been downvoted quite a bit.

Same here.

"Those actions which I prefer" or "Those actions which most agents in a particular place prefer" or "Those actions which fulfill arbitrary metric X"

It doesn't mean any of those things, since any of them can be judged wrong.

Likewise, "wrong" inherits its meaning from whatever definition is given for "right". It makes sense to me to talk about preferences. They're important. If that's what people are talking about when they discuss morality, then that makes perfect sense.

Morality is about having the right preferences, as rationality is about having true beliefs.

What I do not understand is when people use the words "right" or "wrong" >independently of any agent's preferences. I don't see what they are referring to, or >what those words even mean in that context.

Do you think the sentence "there are truths no-one knows" is meaningful?

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 04:41:51PM *  0 points [-]

Morality is about having the right preferences, as rationality is about having true beliefs.

I understand what it would mean to have a true belief, as truth is noticeably independent of belief. I can be surprised, and I can anticipate. I have an understanding of a physical world of which I am part, and which generates my experiences.

It does not make any sense for there to be some "correct" preferences. Unlike belief, where there is an actual territory to map, preferences are merely a byproduct of the physical processes of intelligence. They have no higher or divine purpose which demands certain preferences be held. Evolution selects for those which aid survival, and it doesn't matter if survival means aggression or cooperation. The universe doesn't care.

I think you and other objective moralists in this thread suffer from extremely anthropocentric thinking. If you rewind the universe to a time before there are humans, in a time of early expansion and the first formation of galaxies, does there exist then the "correct" preferences that any agent must strive to discover? Do they exist independent of what kinds of life evolve in what conditions?

If you are able to zoom out of your skull, and view yourself and the world around you as interesting molecules going about their business, you'll see how absurd this is. Play through the evolution of life on a planetary scale in your mind. Be aware of the molecular forces at work. Run it on fast forward. Stop and notice the points where intelligence is selected for. Watch social animals survive or die based on certain behaviors. See the origin of your own preferences, and why they are so different from some other humans.

Objective morality is a fantasy of self-importance, and a hold-over from ignorant quasi-religious philosophy which has now cloaked itself in scientific terms and hides in university philosophy departments. Physics is going to continue to play out. The only agents who can ever possibly care what you do are other physical intelligences in your light cone.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 28 April 2011 05:19:27PM 2 points [-]

For the record, I think in this thread Eugine_Nier follows a useful kind of "simple truth", not making errors as a result, while some of the opponents demand sophistication in lieu of correctness.

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 05:29:16PM 1 point [-]

I think we're demanding clarity and substance, not sophistication. Honestly I feel like one of the major issues with moral discussions is that huge sophisticated arguments can emerge without any connection to substantive reality.

I would really appreciate it if someone would taboo the words "moral", "good", "evil", "right", "wrong", "should", etc. and try to make the point using simpler concepts that have less baggage and ambiguity.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 28 April 2011 05:32:58PM 1 point [-]

Clarity can be difficult. What do you mean by "truth"?

Comment author: JGWeissman 28 April 2011 02:49:41AM 0 points [-]

saying "it's all preferences" about morality is analogous to saying "it's all opinion" about physics.

No matter what opinions anyone holds about gravity, objects near the surface of the earth not subject to other forces accelerate towards the earth at 9.8 meters per second per second. This is an empirical fact about physics, and we know ways our experience could be different if it were wrong. Do you have an example of a fact about morality, independent of preferences, such that we could notice if it is wrong?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 03:08:30AM -1 points [-]

No matter what opinions anyone holds about gravity, objects near the surface of the earth not subject to other forces accelerate towards the earth at 9.8 meters per second per second.

Do you have an example of a fact about morality, independent of preferences,

Killing innocent people is wrong barring extenuating circumstances.

(I'll taboo the "weasel words" innocent and extenuating circumstances as soon as you taboo the "weasel words" near the surface of the earth and not subject to other forces.

such that we could notice if it is wrong?

I'm not sure it's possible for my example to be wrong anymore then its possible for 2+2 to equal 3.

Comment author: NMJablonski 28 April 2011 03:48:59AM *  2 points [-]

What is the difference between:

"Killing innocent people is wrong barring extenuating circumstances"

and

"Killing innocent people is right barring extenuating circumstances"

How do you determine which one is accurate? What observable consequences does each one predict? What do they lead you to anticipate?

Comment author: JGWeissman 28 April 2011 03:15:32AM 2 points [-]

I'm not sure it's possible for my example to be wrong anymore then its possible for 2+2 to equal 3.

What would it take to convince you your example is wrong?

Note how "2+2=4" has observable consequences:

Suppose I got up one morning, and took out two earplugs, and set them down next to two other earplugs on my nighttable, and noticed that there were now three earplugs, without any earplugs having appeared or disappeared - in contrast to my stored memory that 2 + 2 was supposed to equal 4. Moreover, when I visualized the process in my own mind, it seemed that making XX and XX come out to XXXX required an extra X to appear from nowhere, and was, moreover, inconsistent with other arithmetic I visualized, since subtracting XX from XXX left XX, but subtracting XX from XXXX left XXX. This would conflict with my stored memory that 3 - 2 = 1, but memory would be absurd in the face of physical and mental confirmation that XXX - XX = XX.

Does your example (or another you care to come up with) have observable consequences?

Comment author: prase 28 April 2011 03:26:38PM 1 point [-]

What is weasel-like with "near the surface of the earth"?

Comment author: Amanojack 28 April 2011 02:40:14AM 0 points [-]

I don't think you can explicate such a connection, especially not without any terms defined. In fact, it is just utterly pointless to try to develop a theory in a field that hasn't even been defined in a coherent way. It's not like it's close to being defined, either.

For example, "Is abortion morally wrong?" combines about 12 possible questions into it because it has a least that many interpretations. Choose one, then we can study that. I just can't see how otherwise rationality-oriented people can put up with such extreme vagueness. There is almost zero actual communication happening in this thread in the sense of actually expressing which interpretation of moral language anyone is taking. And once that starts happening it will cover way too many topics to ever reach a resolution. We're simply going to have to stop compressing all these disparate-but-subtly-related concepts into a single field, taboo all the moralist language, and hug some queries (if any important ones actually remain).

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 03:40:43AM 1 point [-]

I don't think you can explicate such a connection, especially not without any terms defined. In fact, it is just utterly pointless to try to develop a theory in a field that hasn't even been defined in a coherent way. It's not like it's close to being defined, either.

In any science I can think of people began developing it using intuitive notions, only being able to come up with definitions after substantial progress had been made.

Comment author: TimFreeman 28 April 2011 02:49:02AM 2 points [-]

...given our current state of knowledge about meta-ethics I can give no better definition of the words "should"/"right"/"wrong" than the meaning they have in everyday use.

You can assume that the words have no specific meaning and are used to signal membership in a group. This explains why the flowchart in the original post has so many endpoints about what morality might mean. It explains why there seems to be no universal consensus on what specific actions are moral and which ones are not. It also explains why people have such strong opinions about morality despite the fact that statements about morality are not subject to empirical validation.

Comment author: TimFreeman 28 April 2011 02:55:22AM 1 point [-]

My point is that NMJablonski's request is about as reasonable as demanding that someone arguing for the existence of a "Correct Theory of Physics" provide a clear reductionist description of what one means while tabooing words like 'physics', 'reality', 'exists', 'experience', etc.

No, the reductionist description of the Correct Theory of Physics eventually involves pointing at lab equipment. There is no lab equipment for morality, so the analogy is not valid.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 28 April 2011 03:11:53AM 0 points [-]

No, the reductionist description of the Correct Theory of Physics eventually involves pointing at lab equipment. There is no lab equipment for morality, so the analogy is not valid.

I could point a gun to your head and ask you to explain why I shouldn't pull the trigger.

Comment author: TimFreeman 28 April 2011 03:27:49AM *  5 points [-]

I could point a gun to your head and ask you to explain why I shouldn't pull the trigger.

That scenario doesn't lead to discovering the truth. If I deceive you with bullshit and you don't pull the trigger, that's a victory for me. I invite you to try again, but next time pick an example where the participants are incentivised to make true statements.

ETA: ...unless the truth we care about is just which flavors of bullshit will persuade you not to pull the trigger. If that's what you mean by morality, you probably agree with me that it is just social signaling.

Comment author: Desrtopa 01 May 2011 09:33:50AM 2 points [-]

And if he gave a true moral argument you would have to accept it?

How would you distinguish a true argument from a merely persuasive one?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 01 May 2011 06:54:32PM *  3 points [-]

Like I mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the "No Universally Compelling Argument" post you site applies equally well to physical and even mathematical facts (in fact that was what Eliezer was mainly referring to in that post).

In fact, the main point of that sequence is that just because there are no universally compelling arguments doesn't mean truth doesn't exist. As Eliezer mentions in where recursive justification hits bottom:

Now, one lesson you might derive from this, is "Don't be born with a stupid prior." This is an amazingly helpful principle on many real-world problems, but I doubt it will satisfy philosophers.

Comment author: Desrtopa 01 May 2011 07:19:02PM 3 points [-]

A formal proof is still a proof though, although nothing mandates that a listener must accept it. A mind can very well contain an absolute dismissal mechanism or optimize for something other than correctness.

We can understand what sort of assumptions we're making when we derive information from mathematical axioms, or the axioms of induction, and how further information follows from that. But what assumptions are we making that would allow us to extrapolate absolute moral facts? Does our process give us any way to distinguish them from preferences?

Comment author: Peterdjones 28 April 2011 01:49:18PM -1 points [-]

That morality is not straightforwardly empirical is part of why it is inappropriate to demand concrete definitions.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 April 2011 02:07:07PM 0 points [-]

Do you believe in God? If I defended the notion of God in a similar way -- it is not straightforwardly empirical, it's inappropriate to demand concrete definitions, it's not under the domain of science, just because you can't define it and measure it doesn't mean it doesn't exist -- would you find that persuasive?

Comment author: Peterdjones 28 April 2011 02:11:17PM 0 points [-]

But I am only defending the idea that morality means something. Atheists think "God" means something. "uncountable set" means something even if the idea is thoroughly non-concrete.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 April 2011 02:23:15PM 1 point [-]

Sure, but few-to-no atheists would say something like "'God' means something, but exactly what is an open problem."

The idea of someone refusing to say what they mean by "uncountable set" is even stranger.

Comment author: Peterdjones 28 April 2011 02:31:40PM -1 points [-]

All atheists have to adopt a broad definition of God, or else they would only be disbelieving in the 7th day adventist God, or whatever...ie they would believe in all deities except one, which is more than the average believer.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 28 April 2011 03:07:20PM 4 points [-]

This gets silly.

"Do you believe in woojits?" Well, no, I don't.

"Ah, well, if you disbelieve in woojits, then you must know what woojits are! So, what are woojits?" I have no idea.

"But how is that possible? If you don't have a definition for woojits, on what basis do you reject belief in them?" Having a well-defined notion of something is a prerequisite for belief in it; I don't have a well-defined notion of woojits; therefore I don't believe in woojits.

"No, no. You're confused. All woojit-disbelievers have to adopt a broad definition of woojits in order to disbelieve in them; otherwise they would merely disbelieve in a specific woojit." (shrug) OK, if you like, I have a broad definition of woojit... so broad, in fact, that it is effectively identical to my definition of all the other concepts I don't believe in and haven't thought about, which is the overwhelming majority of all possible concepts. For my part, I consider this equivalent to not having a definition of woojit at all.

As I say, this gets silly. It's just arguing about definitions of words.

Now, I would agree that atheists who grow up in theist cultures do have a definition of God, though I disagree with you that it's necessarily broad: I know at least one atheist who was raised Roman Catholic, for example, and the god he disbelieves in is the Roman Catholic god of his youth, and the idea that "God" might conceivably refer to anything else just doesn't have a lot of meaning to him.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 April 2011 02:39:23PM -1 points [-]

I probably don't understand what you mean.

I think that it's easy to be an atheist -- i.e. one doesn't have to make any difficult definitions or arguments to arrive at atheism, and those easy definitions and arguments are correct. If you think it's harder than I do, that would be interesting and could explain why we have such different opinions here.

Comment author: NMJablonski 27 April 2011 10:52:34PM 1 point [-]

A correct theory of physics would inform my anticipations.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 27 April 2011 10:54:09PM 1 point [-]

Please, taboo "anticipations".

Comment author: NMJablonski 27 April 2011 10:57:20PM 0 points [-]

Replace anticipations with:

My ability, as a mind (subjective observer), to construct an isomorphism in memory that corresponds to future experiences.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 27 April 2011 11:00:06PM *  -1 points [-]

What's an "isomorphism in memory"? What are "future experiences"? And what does it mean for them to "correspond"?

Comment author: NMJablonski 27 April 2011 11:04:50PM 1 point [-]

I would be happy to continue down this line a ways longer if you would like, and we could get all the way down to the two of us in the same physical location rebuilding the concept of induction. I am confident that if necessary we could do that for "anticipations" and build our way back up. I am not confident that "morality" as it has been used here actually connects to any solid surface in reality, unless it ends up meaning the same thing as "preferences".

Do you disagree?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 27 April 2011 11:14:02PM -1 points [-]

I am confident that if necessary we could do that for "anticipations" and build our way back up.

In that case maybe we should continue a bit longer until you're disabused of that belief. What I suspect will happen is that you'll continue to attempt to define your words in terms of more and more tenuous abstractions until the words you're using really are almost meaningless.