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JGWeissman comments on What is Metaethics? - Less Wrong
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No matter what opinions anyone holds about gravity, objects near the surface of the earth not subject to other forces accelerate towards the earth at 9.8 meters per second per second. This is an empirical fact about physics, and we know ways our experience could be different if it were wrong. Do you have an example of a fact about morality, independent of preferences, such that we could notice if it is wrong?
Killing innocent people is wrong barring extenuating circumstances.
(I'll taboo the "weasel words" innocent and extenuating circumstances as soon as you taboo the "weasel words" near the surface of the earth and not subject to other forces.
I'm not sure it's possible for my example to be wrong anymore then its possible for 2+2 to equal 3.
What is the difference between:
"Killing innocent people is wrong barring extenuating circumstances"
and
"Killing innocent people is right barring extenuating circumstances"
How do you determine which one is accurate? What observable consequences does each one predict? What do they lead you to anticipate?
Moral facts don't lead me to anticipate observable consequences, but they do affect the actions I choose to take.
Preferences also do that.
Yes, well opinions also anticipate observations. But in a sense by talking about "observable consequences" your taking advantage of the fact that the meta-theory of science is currently much more developed then the meta-theory of ethics.
But some preferences can be moral, just as some opinions can be true. There is no automatic entailment from "it is a preference" to "it has nothing to do with ethics".
The question was - how do you determine what the moral facts are?
Currently, intuition. Along with the existing moral theories, such as they are.
Similar to the way people determined facts about physics, especially facts beyond the direct observation of their senses, before the scientific method was developed.
Right, and 'facts' about God. Except that intuitions about physics derive from observations of physics, whereas intuitions about morality derive from observations of... intuitions.
You can't really argue that objective morality not being well-defined means that it is more likely to be a coherent notion.
My point is that you can't conclude the notion of morality is incoherent simple because we don't yet have a sufficiently concrete definition.
Technically, yes. But I'm pretty much obliged, based on the current evidence, to conclude that it's likely to be incoherent.
More to the point: why do you think it's likely to be coherent?
Mostly by outside view analogy with the history of the development of science. I've read a number of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (along with a few post-modernists) arguing against the possibility of a coherent theory of physics using arguments very similar to the ones people are using against morality.
I've also read a (much larger) number of philosophers trying to shoehorn what we today call science into using the only meta-theory then available in a semi-coherent state: the meta-theory of mathematics. Thus we see philosophers, Descartes being the most famous, trying and failing to study science by starting with a set of intuitively obvious axioms and attempting to derive physical statements from them.
I think people may be making the same mistake by trying to force morality to use the same meta-theory as science, i.e., asking what experiences moral facts anticipate.
As for likely I'm not sure how likely this is, I just think its more likely then a lot of people on this thread assume.
Which is true, and explains why it is a harder problem than physics, and less progress has been made.
I'm not sure I accept either of those claims, explanation or no.
Yes, but we've already determined that we don't disagree - unless you think we still do? I was arguing against observing objective (i.e. externally existing) morality. I suspect that you disagree more with Eugine_Nier.
What would it take to convince you your example is wrong?
Note how "2+2=4" has observable consequences:
Does your example (or another you care to come up with) have observable consequences?
What is weasel-like with "near the surface of the earth"?
In this context, it's as "weasel-like" as "innocent". In the sense that both are fudge factors you need to add to the otherwise elegant statement to make it true.