I've been watching with interest the debates around how good minicamp was. I think we need to distinguish between two hypotheses:
A) Minicamp was well-run, the participants enjoyed it and subjectively estimated it was helpful, and it made everyone involved much more enthusiastic about rationality and motivated to pursue positive self-change.
B) Minicamp had objective effects on measurable rationality parameters like calibration, and objective long-term effects on things like lifetime success, tendency to help rationality-related causes, and ability of participants to enjoy their life.
Everyone who's talking about how obvious it is that minicamp was a stupendous success is talking about A, and everyone who's saying they're not convinced is talking about B.
Most self-help doesn't work - so with zero background information about a camp, our prior probability of B is low. That this is a rationalist camp is extra information: P(B|Rationality_Camp) is greater than P(B) alone if we believe rationality is a more effective self-help strategy than average. But this just brings us to where we were before the camp started; to say the evidence in the post above increases that estimate we've got to investigate P (B|A) - the probability that, given a camp gets glowing reviews and everyone loved it and thinks it changed their life, the it really is effective.
But A is a common feature of almost all self-help camps - googling "Christian retreat testimonial" can be very enlightening (add the phrase 'changed my life' to the query for best results). I think most rationalists would be very skeptical of most of the camps that manage to get such glowing reviews from their participants. So P(B|A) - the probability that data shows a real long-term effect given that everyone loved it and is wildly enthusiastic - may not be much higher than P(B).
So if you're trying to prove A - that the camp was successful and everyone loved it and felt very motivated - you've more than succeeded by now. If you're trying to prove B, keeping on giving more and more evidence for A isn't really the way to go.
A better suggestion might be to tell people "We have strong evidence you'll love the camp and feel transformed and enlightened, and we have some evidence that it will help because rationality is teachable and we're trying to gather more specific evidence as the program continues."
To be clear, I'm saying that minicamp had more of what you call B-type effect on me (so far) that many other such events. So I'm talking about B, not just A. From the OP:
Note that mini-camp was far from the first time I've travelled to an event to surround myself with like-minded peers working toward common goals. [...] I've been to many such workshops, inside and outside academia (~3 per year for the past 10 years). [...] Yet mini-camp is still topping my charts.
In particular, I'm saying that in my experience it was much more effective, B-wise, tha...
Yep, I'm saying that without hard data. But I was there. So let me say it again, in response to numerous comments I've seen complaining that no judgement should be passed until a quantitative analysis confirms it:
Mini-camp was awesome. Note that mini-camp was far from the first time I've travelled to an event to surround myself with like-minded peers working toward common goals... I find such events events extremely motivating and enjoyable, which is why I've been to many such workshops, inside and outside academia (~3 per year for the past 10 years).
Yet mini-camp is still topping my charts. Specifically, the camp is tied for the title of the most life-altering workshop-like event of my life, and the tie is with the workshop that got me onto my PhD topic (graphical causal modelling), so that's saying something.
In particular, I've been visibly-to-myself-and-others more motivated and hard-working since the camp. I've had more energy for learning and adaptation, and I find Luke to have been a highly inspiring input to that result.
(I'm talking about Luke because his position is the one being discussed right now, but I got a lot of really inspiring ideas and motivation from Anna before, during, and after the camp as well.)
Hard data will be great to have, but it's hard to get, especially certifiably causal data (though the prospect is not hopeless, with enough conditional independence tests), especially since the camp was planned and executed on short notice.
In the meantime, let's do a little Bayes. First, assign priors to how well you expect a week-long sustained interaction between growth-oriented rationalists to go. (If your prior is something like 80%[failure], I'd like to know where you're getting your growth-oriented rationalists). Now which of the following theories, "failure" or "success", assigns a higher likelihood to the following observations?
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1. People wrote these:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0AnoM_ZsIBBwEdGNicUMzRkNJNzRKLVpEb2RxZzU3V0E
In particular,
2. I wrote this post.
3. Eliezer wants to keep Luke as a permanent hire.
4. Whatever other comments you've seen/heard about the camp from people who attended.
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Is this a biased sample? Probably. Is it hard data? Easy to quantify? Not so much. Might this be a big conspiracy by Luke-originating ninja bloggers? Perhaps. But really... which theory assigns the higher likelihood here? Success, or failure?
Lets allow the arguments that can be made about the minicamp be made, rather than ritualistically abstaining from decision-making until numbers show up.
That, and I really hope Luke stays with SingInst :)