lessdazed comments on Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament Results - Less Wrong
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This has the problem that, since most strategies will eval twice (to check both the C and D cases) you can be reasonably sure that if both calls return the same result you are being simulated.
Edit: Although it doesn't fully fix the problem, this is better: eval takes a function that takes the function the other agent will call eval with as its argument and returns C or D.
There are still detection problems here (you could add checks to see if the function you passed to the function eval passed to you was invoked), but the fact that some strategies wouldn't do overly ambitious recursion at least downgrades the above approach from obvious information leak to ambiguous information leak
Shouldn't it be, at most: you can be reasonably sure that you are being simulated either a) after both calls return C or b) after you formally choose D having already seen that both calls return D?
If a simulation chooses C after seeing both results D, then the simulator might as well actually defect, so it does, and the non-simulation chooses C, just like the simulation.
If an agent strongly prefers not to be a simulation and believes in TDT and is vulnerable to blackmail, they can be coerced into cooperating and sacrificing themselves in similar cases. Unless I'm wrong, of course.
One really ought to make anti-blackmail resolutions.