To have an opinion about free will, you must first observe the existence of the issue.

There needs to be a prima facie case. I don't think it is restictied to intospection though.

Most people do this with introspection: The world outside you seem to conform to \<physical discipline of your choice\>

Which could include nondeterminism. It is not as though anybody can predict evey physical occurence.

while inside you, it seems that indeed you control every movement and thought.

Movements occur on the outside.

Lord Kelvin has voiced the above statement quite poetically.

Where?

Now, the keyword here is 'seem'. Your argument hitches on an anecdote from your own, non-optimal cognitive machinery.

I didn't base my agument solely on introspection. In fact, very little of the quoted passage leans on introspective evidence. And everything hinges on non-optimal congitive machinery, including what you are saying.

What EY did was point at this 'seem' and explain it.

Things would seem the way they seem if what he says is correct, and they would seem the way they seem if what I say is correct. You have no grounds for saying that he has the explanation other than that you happen to like it.

He did not point at free will and explained it, he explained why the cognitive machinery hands you the anecdote. And then from there you can crank the handle of modus ponnens and conclude that 'free will' goes in the same category as 'redness of red'.

Whatever that is. I'm a qualiaphile, BTW.

Also on a technical note you forego that you live 80 milliseconds in the past (sensory lag to synch toe-tips to retinas) and you have more subconscious processes than conscious ones, processes you can only rarely consciously affect.

I need an argument agains that, and I have one.

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