Peterdjones comments on Train Philosophers with Pearl and Kahneman, not Plato and Kant - Less Wrong
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Our de facto reasoing is wrong. Either it is not leading to wrong predictions, or it is not easy to see something is wrong.
In any case, the world is not the only standard rationality can be compared to. We can spot the incoherence of bad rationality by theoretical investigation.
And yet a paperclipper has perfectly coherent preferences. Without direct access to some source-of-morality that somehow supersedes mere human ethics, how can we judge our morality except by it's own standards? If you have such a source, it would make an excellent top-level post, of perhaps even a sequence.
But not coherent moral preferences. It doesn't care if its paperclipping infinges on other's preferences.
By coherence, and by its ability to actually be morality, which paperclipping isn't.
Could you taboo "morality" for me, please? I suspect we are talking at cross-purposes.
You think paperclipping is morality?
As I said, I suspect we are using different definitions of "morality"; could we proceed without using the term?
It would have helped if you had said why you think we have differnt definitions. I don't think I am asserting anything unsual (as far as the wider world is concerned) when I say morality is principallly about regulating interactions between people so that one persons actions take the interests of affected parties into account. Since, to me, that is a truism, it is hard for me to guess why anyone would demur. Other LWers have defined morality as decision theory, as something that just guides their actions, without necessarily taking others into account. I think that is clearly wrong because it suggests that a highly effective serial killer is "good", since they are maximising their own value. But now I am struggling to guess something you could easily just tell me.
You stated that there was some way to determine the validity of our ethics - by which I meant the moral preferences humans hold, as distinct from whatever source may have given them to us, be tit prisoner's dilemmas or the will of God - without recourse to those same ethical intuitions.
When challenged on this assertion, you stated that our preferences may be revealed as incoherent by logic; yet, as I pointed out, an agent's preferences may be perfectly coherent without being anything we would regard as "right".
So either there has been some misunderstanding, or ... show us this mysterious method of determining the Rightness of something without recourse to our ethical intuitions.
I stated:
emphasis added. Your counterexample was paperclipping, which you say is coherent. My response was:
So you still need an example of coherent morlaity that is somehow readically different from ours, showing that coherent morality doens't converge enought to be called objective (or at least EDIT: intersubjective).
May I refer you to the Chanur series, by C.J. Cherryh? Depicted in that series are several alien species along with alien modes of thought and alien moralities.
Consider for a moment the Kif. The Kif are a race of carnivores; they lack the internal wiring to appreciate emotions (as you and I understand the term "emotion") and eat their food live (the notion of eating dead carrion disgusts them, no matter whether it's been cooked in the meantime). Their terminal value is to maximise a quantity that they refer to as sfik, which has the following properties, among others:
It's a radically different form of morality; murder is not considered a crime in Kifish society; but it's also coherent (though more complex than paperclipping). I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "it's ability to actually be morality", though; that looks like a circular definition to me.
How do you identify morality without simply comparing it to your own intuitions?
Why not?
So 'morality'='caring about other people's preferences'?
Caring about other people's preferences is a necessary but insufficient part of morality.
So Hedonistic Egoism, for example, doesn't count as morality?
It may be advertised as such, but I don't have to buy that.