It seems that your implicit question is, "If rationality makes people more effective at doing things that I don't value, >then should the ideas of rationality be spread?" That depends on how many people there are with values that are >inconsistent with yours, and it also depends on how much it makes people do things that you do value. And I would >contend that a world full of more rational people would still be a better world than this one even if it means that there >are a few sadists who are more effective for it. There are murderers who kill people with guns, and this is bad; but >there are many, many more soldiers who protect their nations with guns, and the existence of those nations allow >much higher standards of living than would be otherwise possible, and this is good. There are more good people >than evil people in the world. But it's also true that sometimes people can for the first time follow their beliefs to their >logical conclusions and, as a result, do things that very few people value.

Excellent answer! Yes, you deducted the implicit question right. I also agree that this is a rather abstract field of moral philosophy, though i did not see that at first. Although I don't think that your argument for the world being a better place with everyone being rational holds up, especially this point

There are more good people than evil people in the world.

Even if there are, there is no proof that after becoming "rational" they will not become "bad" (apostrophes because bad is not defined sufficiently, but that'll do.). I can imagine some interesting prospect for experiments in this field by the way. I also think that the result will vary if the subject is placed in society of only-rationalists vs usual society - with "bad" actions carried out more in the second example, as there is much less room for cooperation.

But of course that is pointless discussion, as the situation is not really based on reality in any way and we can't really tell what will happen. :)