Wei_Dai comments on Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality - Less Wrong
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Well, why would it be easier to locate some events or universes than others, unless they have more reality-fluid?
Why is it possible to describe one mathematical structure more concisely than another, or to specify one computation using less bits than another? Is that just a property of the mind that's thinking about these structures and computations, or is it actually a property of Reality? The latter seems more likely to me, given results in algorithmic information theory. (I don't know if similar theorems has been or can be proven about set theory, that the shortest description lengths in different formalizations can't be too far apart, but it seems plausible.)
Also, recall that in UDT, there is no epistemic prior. So, the only way to get an effect similar to EDT/CDT w/ universal prior, is with a weighting scheme over universes/events like I described.
I can sort of buy the part where simple universes have more reality-fluid, though frankly the whole setup strikes me as a mysterious answer to a mysterious question.
But the part where later events have less reality-fluid within a single universe, just because they take more info to locate - that part in particular seems really suspicious. MPF-ish.
I'm far from satisfied with the answer myself, but it's the best I've got so far. :)