Far future people will likely be able to and want to create simulated realities

What about people from universes that are wildly different to our own? I don't think the simulation hypothesis is restricted to far-future simulators. An entity with the power to simulate our reality with the level of fidelity I perceive is so wildly powerful that I would be surprised if I could comprehend it and its motivations. I always picture the simulating entity as just a stand-in for God. It sits in its heaven, a level of reality above our own, and no matter what we do we can't understand God's motivations or perceive his reality. The simulation hypothesis is just intelligent design the same as biblical creationism.

We have very little evidence as to what the reality of the entity simulating us looks like. The concept of dimensions themselves could be foreign to the entity. As an analogy, a self-reflective Sim thinking about the reality that creates and runs him might automatically assume the presence of some tile grid when of course there's no such concept in our world.

The lack of Spider-Man in any Sims game is evidence Spider-Man doesn’t exist.

A somewhat similar statistical reasoning can be done to argue that the abundance of optional complexity (things could have been similar but simpler) is evidence against the simulation hyphotesis.

See https://philpapers.org/rec/PIETSA-6  (The Simplicity Assumption and Some Implications of the Simulation Argument for our Civilization)

This is based on the general principle of computational resources being finite for any arbitrary civilisations (assuming infinities are not physical) and therefore minimised when possible by the simulators. In particular one can use the simplicity assumption: If we randomly select the simulation of a civilization in the space of all possible simulations of that civilization that have ever been run, the likelihood of picking a given simulation is inversely correlated to the computational complexity of the simulation. 

It is hard to argue that a similar general principle can be found for something being "mundane" since the definition of mundane seems dependent on the simulators point of view. Can you perhaps modify this reasoning to make it more general?    

You're right and all the other commenters and downvoters are wrong -- the absence of spider-man or other locally-physics-defying phenomena is obviously evidence against a simulation. To all of them -- think about it -- if we saw people magically levitating or controlling the weather or whatever, that would clearly be strong evidence that we were simulated, so not seeing those things has to be evidence against. Sad!

Now that being said I don't think it's very strong evidence, since in a large future there would be many, many simulations run for a variety of purposes, so there would still likely be a vast number of realistic simulations even if they weren't the most popular(I also don't think we have strong reason to believe they wouldn't be popular since it's hard to predict what use-case for simulations would be the most common, what people's taste in entertainment would be like, etc.)

If compute is limited in the universe, we can expect that civilizations or agents with access to it will only run simulations strategically, unless running simulations is part of their value function. Simulations according to a value function would probably be more prevalent, and would probably have spiderman or other extreme phenomena. 

However, we can't discount being in one of those information gathering simulations. If for some reason you needed to gather information from a universe, you'd want to keep everything as simple as possible, and only tune up the things you care about. That does seem very similar to our universe, with simple physical laws, no real evidence of extraterrestrial life, and simply emerging dynamics. 

Also keep in mind that it's possible that simulations are extremely expensive in some universes: when you think of the actually expensive simulations that humans run, it's all physics and earth models on supercomputers. 

Mostly though I think that using games as your reference class for the types of simulations a developed civilization would run is reductive and the truth is probably more complex.