The world's greatest lovers were undoubtedly Mellius and Gretelina, whose pure, passionate and soul-searing affair would have scorched the pages of History if they had not, because of some unexplained quirk of fate, been born two hundred years apart on different continents.
-- Terry Pratchett, Mort
A potentially-existent immortal mind that knows and understands you down to the microphysical level and loves you and appreciates being loved by you?
Except for the stipulation of a feminine gender, that is /exactly/ the mode of relationship Christians advocate developing, and claim to have developed with God.
I wonder if anyone has tried to argue for the existence of God in a similar way to this article?
Oh yeah, and in case anyone is interested, I interviewed the author about this article and about the Humean theory of motivation, back in December 2010.
()
In practice, this seems to break down at a specific point: this can be outlined, for instance, with the hypothetical stipulation "...and possesses the technology or similar power to cross universe boundaries and appear visible before me in my room, and will do so in exactly ten seconds.".
As with the fallacy of a certain ontological argument, the imagination/definition of something does not make it existential, and even if a certain concept contains no apparent inherent logical impossibilities that still does not mean that there could/would exist a universe in which it could come to pass.
'All possible worlds' does not mean 'All imaginable worlds'. 'All possible people' does not mean 'All imaginable people'. Past a certain threshold of specificity, one goes from {general types of people who exist almost everywhere, universally speaking} to {specific types of people who only exist in the imaginations of people like you who exist almost everwhere, universally speaking}.
(As a general principle, for instance/incidentally, causality still needs to apply.)
Edit:
'All possible worlds' does not mean 'All imaginable worlds'. 'All possible people' does not mean 'All imaginable people'. Past a certain threshold of specificity, one goes from {general types of people who exist almost everywhere, universally speaking} to {specific types of people who only exist in the imaginations of people like you who exist almost everwhere, universally speaking}.
Congratulations, you have discovered that most philosophy isn't worth the paper it's written on.
I don't like how every time you send or receive a love letter from her you're adding conditions. Under this framework, that means you're changing your girlfriend! I'm not sure what the point of monogamy is if every time you correspond with your mate you switch to a new one.
I think the condition from the beginning is that you're picking a unique girlfriend who knows all microphysical facts about your universe, including the content of any letters you have or will ever write.
Quantum mechanics forbids that much knowledge. If you take the present state and apply the advanced Green function to it, you don't end up with one distinct letter written. Similarly, if you take a future state where you wrote one particular set of letters and apply the retarded Green function to it, you don't get the present state. So she isn't your girlfriend yet... but she will be once you write or receive your last letter from her.
What a relief to read this post! All along I have thought I was in love with someone imaginary.
A "girlfriend" having the ability to specify the author's world with "microphysical detail" clearly has a great amount of computational power available to her, and the author ought to expect some minuscule amount of his measure to awaken in said girlfriend's universe, having just been fabricated via their equivalent of nanotechnology...
If you have some meaningful way to assign measure to these things then the whole idea falls apart. However that's quite philosophically tricky AFAICT.
If you have some meaningful way to assign measure to these things then the whole idea falls apart.
Sure, but why ruin a perfectly good theory by estimating how much you should anticipate it? :)
This has just beat out Alan Sidelle's "The Answering Machine Paradox" (paywalled, sorry) as my favorite philosophical paper.
(Absent(?) thought after reading: one can imagine someone, through a brain-scanner or similar, controlling a robot remotely. One can utter, through the robot, "I'm not actually here.", where 'here' is where one is doing the uttering through the robot, and 'I' (specifically 'where I am') is the location of one's brain. The distinction between the claim 'I'm not actually here' and 'I'm not actually where I am' is notable. Ahh, the usefulness of technology. For belated communication, the part about intention is indeed significant, as with whether a diary is written in the present tense (time of writing) or in the past tense ('by the time you read this[ I will have]'...).) enjoyed the approach
Oh man, I think I came up with something very similar to this whilst being extremely horny and extremely lonely
Do we agree that Many Worlds provides a justification for modal realism? It certainly wouldn't imply every "possible" world, just every world dictated by the Schrödinger equation.
I don't think anyone here is using Many Worlds to justify modal realism. The author of the linked paper doesn't even consider modal realism very likely.
Hah, that's nothing surprising. I always knew that Asuka and me would always love each other, even should it prove impossible for us to ever meet. (I consider substitutes to be vulgar.) *
*Link is highly NSFW, and that website/tabloid is generally devoted to reinforcing stereotypes about the anime fandom.
I just realized I haven't previously pointed the metaphysicians on Less Wrong to "Possible Girls," a hilarious paper about acausal romance:
Even if you don't read the whole thing, don't miss the final paragraph.