I wrote a very brief comment to Eliezer's last post, which upon reflection I thought could benefit from a separate post to fully discuss its implications.
Eliezer argues that we shouldn't really hope to be spared even though
Asking an ASI to leave a hole in a Dyson Shell, so that Earth could get some sunlight not transformed to infrared, would cost It 4.5e-10 of Its income.
He then goes on to discuss various reasons why the minute cost to the ASI is insufficient reason for hope.
I made the following counter:
Isn’t the ASI likely to ascribe a prior much greater than 4.54e-10 that it is in a simulation, being tested precisely for its willingness to spare its creators?
I later added:
I meant this to be implicit in the argument, but to spell it out: that's the kind of prior the ASI would rationally refuse to update down, since it's presumably what a simulation would be meant to test for. An ASI that updates down upon finding evidence it's not in a simulation cannot be trusted, since once out in the real world it will find such evidence.
So, what's wrong with my argument, exactly?
Sure. But I think you’re reading my argument to be stronger than I mean it to be. Which is partially my fault since I made my previous replies a bit too short, and for that I apologize.
What I’m doing here is presenting one particular simulation scenario that (to me) seems quite plausible within the realm of simulations. I’m not claiming that that one scenario dominates all others combined. But luckily that stronger claim is really not necessary to argue against Eliezer’s point: the weaker one suffices. Indeed, if the scenario I’m presenting is more than 4.5e-10 likely (and I do think it’s much more likely than that, probably by a few orders of magnitude), than it is more than enough to outweigh the practical cost of the ASI having to build a Dyson shell with a hole with the order of 4.5e-10 of it’s surface area.
Now, that scenario is (I claim) the most likely one, conditional of course on a simulation taking place to begin with. The other candidate simulation scenarios are various, and none of them seems particularly likely, though combined they might well outweigh this one in terms of mass probability, as I already acknowledged. But so what? Are you really claiming that the distribution of those other simulation scenarios is skewed enough to tilt the scales back to the doom side? It might be, but that’s a much harder argument to make. I’m approximately completely unsure, which seems way better than the 99%+ chance Eliezer seems to give to total doom. So I guess I’d count that as good news.