I've absolutely no clue about computation but I have been told quite a few times that it doesn't matter how the brain works if you accept the Church–Turing thesis. It doesn't matter insofar as "everything computable is computable by a Turing machine." But as far as I can tell, that is purely theoretical. Theoretical in the sense that it works but that it could be unusably inefficient. If our brains make use of some novel physical processes, if indeed general intelligence demands (Church–Turing–Deutsch principle) to be run on quantum computers, then we might still be able to 'upload' ourselves into some crude mechanical device but it won't be efficient. Substrate-neutrality is likely factual but might be inefficient.
Neurons aren't simple little machines, axons talk to each other.
The original article (paywall).
Assuming this is all true, how does it affect the feasibility of uploading? Anyone want to bet on whether things are even more complicated than the current discoveries?
ETA: It seems unlikely to me that you have to simulate every atom to upload a person, and more unlikely that it's enough to view neurons as binary switches. Is there any good way to think about how much abstraction you can get away with in uploading?
Yes, I know it's a vague standard. I'm not sure how good an upload needs to be. How good would be good enough for you?