Thane Ruthenis

Wiki Contributions

Comments

Sorted by

Sure. But if you know the bias is 95/5 in favor of heads, and you see heads, you don't update very strongly.

And yes, I was approximately that confident that something-like-MCTS was going to work, that it'd demolish well-posed math problems, and that this is the direction OpenAI would go in (after weighing in the rumor's existence). The only question was the timing, and this is mostly within my expectations as well.

It is if you believe the rumor and can extrapolate its implications, which I did. Why would I need to wait to see the concrete demonstration that I'm sure would come, if I can instead update on the spot?

It wasn't hard to figure out how "something like an LLM with A*/MCTS stapled on top" would look like, or where it'd shine, or that OpenAI might be trying it and succeeding at it (given that everyone in the ML community had already been exploring this direction at the time).

~No update, priced it all in after the Q* rumors first surfaced in November 2023.

This is actually likely more expensive than hiring a domain-specific expert mathematician for each problem

I don't think anchoring to o3's current cost-efficiency is a reasonable thing to do. Now that AI has the capability to solve these problems in-principle, buying this capability is probably going to get orders of magnitude cheaper within the next five minutes months, as they find various algorithmic shortcuts.

I would guess that OpenAI did this using a non-optimized model because they expected it to be net beneficial: that producing a headline-grabbing result now will attract more counterfactual investment than e. g. the $900k they'd save by running the benchmarks half a year later.

Edit: In fact, if, against these expectations, the implementation of o3's trick can't be made orders-of-magnitude cheaper (say, because a base model of a given size necessarily takes ~n tries/MCTS branches per a FrontierMath problem and you can't get more efficient than one try per try), that would make me do a massive update against the "inference-time compute" paradigm.

Counterpoints: nuclear power, pharmaceuticals, bioengineering, urban development.

If we slack here, China will probably raise armies of robots with unlimited firepower and take over the world

Or maybe they will accidentally ban AI too due to being a dysfunctional autocracy, as autocracies are wont to do, all the while remaining just as clueless regarding what's happening as their US counterparts banning AI to protect the jobs.

I don't really expect that to happen, but survival-without-dignity scenarios do seem salient.

I actually think doing the former is considerably more in line with the way things are done/closer to the Overton window.

I agree that this seems like an important factor. See also this post making a similar point.

I'm going to go against the flow here and not be easily impressed. I suppose it might just be copium.

Any actual reason to expect that the new model beating these challenging benchmarks, which have previously remained unconquered, is any more of a big deal than the last several times a new model beat a bunch of challenging benchmarks that have previously remained unconquered?

Don't get me wrong, I'm sure it's amazingly more capable in the domains in which it's amazingly more capable. But I see quite a lot of "AGI achieved" panicking/exhilaration in various discussions, and I wonder whether it's more justified this time than the last several times this pattern played out. Does anything indicate that this capability advancement is going to generalize in a meaningful way to real-world tasks and real-world autonomy, rather than remaining limited to the domain of extremely well-posed problems?

One of the reasons I'm skeptical is the part where it requires thousands of dollars' worth of inference-time compute. Implies it's doing brute force at extreme scale, which is a strategy that'd only work for, again, domains of well-posed problems with easily verifiable solutions. Similar to how o1 blows Sonnet 3.5.1 out of the water on math, but isn't much better outside that.

Edit: If we actually look at the benchmarks here:

  • The most impressive-looking jump is FrontierMath from 2% to 25.2%, but it's also exactly the benchmark where the strategy of "generate 10k candidate solutions, hook them up to a theorem-verifier, see if one of them checks out, output it" would shine.
    • (With the potential theorem-verifier having been internalized by o3 over the course of its training; I'm not saying there was a separate theorem-verifier manually wrapped around o3.)
  • Significant progress on ARC-AGI has previously been achieved using "crude program enumeration", which made the authors conclude that "about half of the benchmark was not a strong signal towards AGI".
  • The SWE jump from 48.9 to 71.7 is significant, but it's not much of a qualitative improvement.

Not to say it's a nothingburger, of course. But I'm not feeling the AGI here.

But yeah, personally, I think this is all a result of a kind of precious view about experiential continuity that I don't share

Yeah, I don't know that this glyphisation process would give us what we actually want.

"Consciousness" is a confused term. Taking on a more executable angle, we presumably value some specific kinds of systems/algorithms corresponding to conscious human minds. We especially value various additional features of these algorithms, such as specific personality traits, memories, et cetera. A system that has the features of a specific human being would presumably be valued extremely highly by that same human being. A system that has fewer of those features would be valued increasingly less (in lockstep with how unlike "you" it becomes), until it's only as valuable as e. g. a randomly chosen human/sentient being.

So if you need to mold yourself into a shape where some or all of the features which you use to define yourself are absent, each loss is still a loss, even if it happens continuously/gradually.

So from a global perspective, it's not much different than acausal aliens resurrecting Schelling-point Glyph Beings without you having warped yourself into a Glyph Being over time. If you value systems that are like Glyph Beings, their creation somewhere in another universe is still positive by your values. If you don't, if you only value human-like systems, then someone creating Glyph Being bring no joy. Whether you or your friends warped yourself into a Glyph Being in the process doesn't matter.

A dog will change the weather dramatically, which will substantially effect your perceptions.

In this case, it's about alt-complexity again. Sure, a dog causes a specific weather-pattern change. But could this specific weather-pattern change have been caused only by this specific dog? Perhaps if we edit the universe to erase this dog, but add a cat and a bird five kilometers away, the chaotic weather dynamic would play out the same way? Then, from your perceptions' perspective, you wouldn't be able to distinguish between a dog timeline and a cat-and-bird timeline.

In some sense, this is common-sensical. The mapping from reality's low-level state to your perceptions is non-injective: the low-level state contains more information than you perceive on a moment-to-moment basis. Therefore, for any observation-state, there are several low-level states consistent with it. Scaling up: for any observed lifetime, there are several low-level histories consistent with it.

Load More