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Can you clarify what you mean by phenomenological and existentialist stances, and what you mean by saying that there is no true ontology? I agree that we could use somewhat different models of the world. For example, we don't have to divide between dogs and wolves, but could just call them one common name. I don't see what difference this makes. Dogs and wolves still exist in the world and would be potentially distinguishable in the way that we do, even if we did not distinguish them, and likewise the common thing would still exist even if we did explicitly think of it.
Many opinions that are not normally counted as moral realism are in fact forms of moral realism, if moral realism is understood to mean "moral statements make claims about the facts in the world, and the ones that people accept normally make true claims." For example, if someone says that saying that it is good to do something means that he wants to do it, and saying that something is bad means that he doesn't want to do it or want other people to do it, then when he says, "murder is bad," he is making a true claim about the world, namely that he does not want to murder and does not want other people to murder. Likewise, Eliezer's theory is morally realist in this sense. However there other opinions which say that moral statements are either meaningless or false, like error theory, which would say that they are false. It was my impression that you were denying moral realism in this stronger sense.
I think that moral realism is true and in a stronger sense than in Eliezer's theory, but the facts a statement would depend on in order to be true in my theory are very much like the facts that make such statements true according to him.
Pointing to some aspects where my theory is different from his:
By the phenomenological stance I mean that I believe the world is only known through experience. This reduces down in terms of physics to something like "all information is generated by observation" where "observation" is the technical term used to mean the sort of physical measurement we encounter in quantum physics where entropy is generated. If there is anything more going on that's fine, but we still won't know about it except through the standard process by which classical information is generated.
By the existential stance I mean s... (read more)