All of Andrew_Critch's Comments + Replies

The evidence you present in each case is outputs generated by LLMs.

The total evidence I have (and that everyone has) is more than behavioral. It includes

a) the transformer architecture, in particular the attention module,

b) the training corpus of human writing,

c) the means of execution (recursive calling upon its own outputs and history of QKV vector representations of outputs),

d) as you say, the model's behavior, and

e) "artificial neuroscience" experiments on the model's activation patterns and weights, like mech interp research.

When I think about how... (read more)

A patient can hire us to collect their medical records into one place, to research a health question for them, and to help them prep for a doctor's appointment with good questions about the research. Then we do that, building and using our AI tool chain as we go, without training AI on sensitive patient data. Then the patient can delete their data from our systems if they want, or re-engage us for further research or other advocacy on their behalf.

A good comparison is the company Picnic Health, except instead of specifically matching patients with clinical trials, we do more general research and advocacy for them.

Do you have a mostly disjoint view of AI capabilities between the "extinction from loss of control" scenarios and "extinction by industrial dehumanization" scenarios?

a) If we go extinct from a loss of control event, I count that as extinction from a loss of control event, accounting for the 35% probability mentioned in the post.

b) If we don't have a loss of control event but still go extinct from industrial dehumanization, I count that as extinction caused by industrial dehumanization caused by successionism, accounting for the additional 50% probabilit... (read more)

I very much agree with human flourishing as the main value I most want AI technologies to pursue and be used to pursue.

In that framing, my key claim is that in practice no area of purely technical AI research — including "safety" and/or "alignment" research — can be adequately checked for whether it will help or hinder human flourishing, without a social model of how the resulting techologies will be used by individuals / businesses / governments / etc..

I may be missing context here, but as written / taken at face value, I strongly agree with the above comment from Richard.  I often disagree with Richard about alignment and its role in the future of AI, but this comment is an extremely dense list of things I agree with regarding rationalist epistemic culture.

That is, norms do seem feasible to figure out, but not the kind of thing that is relevant right now, unfortunately.

From the OP:

for most real-world-prevalent perspectives on AI alignment, safety, and existential safety, acausal considerations are not particularly dominant [...].  In particular, I do not think acausal normalcy provides a solution to existential safety, nor does it undermine the importance of existential safety in some surprising way. 

I.e., I agree.

we are so unprepared that the existing primordial norms are unlikely to matter

For 18 examples, just think of 3 common everyday norms having to do with each of the 6 boundaries given as example images in the post :)  (I.e., cell membranes, skin, fences, social group boundaries, internet firewalls, and national borders).  Each norm has the property that, when you reflect on it, it's easy to imagine a lot of other people also reflecting on the same norm, because of the salience of the non-subjectively-defined actual-boundary-thing that the norm is about.  That creates more of a Schelling-nature for that norm, relative to... (read more)

To your first question, I'm not sure which particular "the reason" would be most helpful to convey.  (To contrast: what's "the reason" that physically dispersed human societies have laws?  Answer: there's a confluence of reasons.).  However, I'll try to point out some things that might be helpful to attend to.

First, committing to a policy that merges your utility function with someone else's is quite a vulnerable maneuver, with a lot of boundary-setting aspects.  For instance, will you merge utility functions multiplicatively (as in Nas... (read more)

This is cool (and fwiw to other readers) correct. I must reflect on what it means for real world cooperation... I especially like the A <-> []X -> [][]X <-> []A trick.

I'm working on it :) At this point what I think is true is the following:

If ShortProof(x \leftrightarrow LongProof(ShortProof(x) \to x)), then MediumProof(x).

Apologies that I haven't written out calculations very precisely yet, but since you asked, that's roughly where I'm at :)

Based on a potential misreading of this post, I added the following caveat today:

Important Caveat: Arguments in natural language are basically never "theorems".  The main reason is that human thinking isn't perfectly rational in virtually any precisely defined sense, so sometimes the hypotheses of an argument can hold while its conclusion remains unconvincing.  Thus, the Löbian argument pattern of this post does not constitute a "theorem" about real-world humans: even when the hypotheses of the argument hold, the argument will not always play out... (read more)

Thanks!  Added a note to the OP explaining that hereby means "by this utterance".

Hat tip to Ben Pace for pointing out that invitations are often self-referential, such as when people say "You are hereby invited", because "hereby" means "by this utterance":
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rrpnEDpLPxsmmsLzs/open-technical-problem-a-quinean-proof-of-loeb-s-theorem-for?commentId=CFvfaWGzJjnMP8FCa

That comment was like 25% of my inspiration for this post :)

I've now fleshed out the notation section to elaborate on this a bit.  Is it better now?

In short, $⊢$ is our symbol for talking about what PA can prove, and $\square$ is shorthand for PA's symbols for talking about what (a copy of) PA can prove.

• "$⊢$ 1+1=2" means "Peano Arithmetic (PA) can prove that 1+1=2".  No parentheses are needed; the "$⊢$" applies to the whole line that follows it.  Also, $⊢$ does not stand for an expression in PA; it's a symbol we use to talk about what PA can prove.
• "$\square \left(\text{1+1=2}\right)$" basically means the sam

Well, the deduction theorem is a fact about PA (and, propositional logic), so it's okay to use as long as $⊢$means "PA can prove".  

But you're right that it doesn't mix seamlessly with the (outer) necessitation rule.  Necessitation is a property of "$⊢$", but not generally a property of "$X⊢$".  When PA can prove something, it can prove that it can prove it.  By contrast, if PA+X can prove Y, that does mean that PA can prove that PA+X can prove Y (because PA alone can work through proofs in a Gödel encoding), but it doesn't mean that PA+... (read more)

Well, $A\to B$ is just short for $\neg A\vee B$, i.e., "(not A) or B".  By contrast, $A⊢B$ means that there exists a sequence of (very mechanical) applications of modus ponens, starting from the axioms of Peano Arithmetic  (PA) with $A$ appended, ending in $B$.  We tried hard to make the rules of $⊢$ so that it would agree with $\to$ in a lot of cases (i.e., we tried to design $⊢$ to make the deduction theorem true), but it took a lot of work in the design of Peano Arithmetic and can't be taken for gr... (read more)

It's true that the deduction theorem is not needed, as in the Wikipedia proof.  I just like using the deduction theorem because I find it intuitive (assume $A$, prove $B$, then drop the assumption and conclude $A\to B$) and it removes the need for lots of parentheses everywhere.

I'll add a note about the meaning of $⊢$ so folks don't need to look it up, thanks for the feedback!

I agree this is a big factor, and might be the main pathway through which people end up believing what people believe the believe.  If I had to guess, I'd guess you're right.

E.g., if there's a evidence E in favor of H and evidence E' against H, if the group is really into thinking about and talking about E as a topic, then the group will probably end up believing H too much.

I think it would be great if you or someone wrote a post about this (or whatever you meant by your comment) and pointed to some examples.  I think the LessWrong community is somewhat plagued by attentional bias leading to collective epistemic blind spots.  (Not necessarily more than other communities; just different blind spots.)

Ah, thanks for the correction!  I've removed that statement about "integrity for consequentialists" now.

Thanks for raising this!  I assume you're talking about this part?

They explore a pretty interesting set-up, but they don't avoid the narrowly-self-referential sentence Ψ:

So, I don't think their motivation was the same as mine.  For me, the point of trying to use a quine is to try to get away from that sentence, to create a different perspective on the foundations for people that find that kind of sentence confusing, but who find self-referential documents less confusing.  I added a section "Further meta-motivation (added Nov 26)" about this ... (read more)

Noice :)

At this point I'm more interested in hashing out approaches that might actually conform to the motivation in the OP.  Perhaps I'll come back to this discussion with you after I've spent a lot more time in a mode of searching for a positive result that fits with my motivation here.  Meanwhile, thanks for thinking this over for a bit.

True!  "Hereby" covers a solid contingent of self-referential sentences.  I wonder if there's a "hereby" construction that would make the self-referential sentence Ψ (from the Wikipedia poof) more common-sense-meaningful to, say, lawyers.

this suggests that you're going to be hard-pressed to do any self-reference without routing through the nomal machinery of löb's theorem, in the same way that it's hard to do recursion in the lambda calculus without routing through the Y combinator

If by "the normal machinery", you mean a clever application of the diagonal lemma, then I agree.  But I think we can get away with not having the self-referential sentence, by using the same y-combinator-like diagonal-lemma machinery to make a proof that refers to itself (instead of a proof about sentences t... (read more)

Thanks for your attention to this!  The happy face is the outer box.  So, line 3 of the cartoon proof is assumption 3.

If you want the full []([]C->C) to be inside a thought bubble, then just take every line of the cartoon and put into a thought bubble, and I think that will do what you want. 

LMK if this doesn't make sense; given the time you've spent thinking about this, you're probably my #1 target audience member for making the more intuitive proof (assuming it's possible, which I think it is).

ETA:  You might have been asking if th... (read more)

Yes to both of you on these points:

• Yes to Alex that (I think) you can use an already-in-hand proof of Löb to make the self-referential proof work, and
• Yes to Eliezer that that would be cheating wouldn't actually ground out all of the intuitions, because then the "santa clause"-like sentence is still in use in already-in-hand proof of Löb.

(I'll write a separate comment on Eliezer's original question.)

That thing is hilarious and good!  Thanks for sharing it.  As for the relevance, it explains the statement of Gödel's theorem, but not the proof it.  So, it could be pretty straightforwardly reworked to explain the statement of Löb's theorem, but not so easily the proof of Löb's theorem.  With this post, I'm in the business of trying to find a proof of Löb that's really intuitive/simple, rather than just a statement of it that's intuitive/simple.

Why is it unrealistic?  Do you actually mean it's unrealistic that the set I've defined as "A" will be interpretable at "actions" in the usual coarse-grained sense?  If so I think that's a topic for another post when I get into talking about the coarsened variables $V^c,A^c,P^c,E^c$...

Going further, my proposed convention also suggests that "Cartesian frames" should perhaps be renamed to "Cartesian factorizations", which I think is a more immediately interpretable name for what they are.  Then in your equation $S=A\times E$, you can refer to $A$ and $E$ as "Cartesian factors", satisfying your desire to treat $A$ and $E$ as interchangeable.  And, you leave open the possibility that the factors are derivable from a "Cartesian partition" $r=a\bigsqcup e$ of the world into the "Cartesian parts" $a$&n... (read more)

Scott, thanks for writing this!  While I very much agree with the distinctions being drawn, I think the word "boundary" should be usable for referring to factorizations that do not factor through the physical separation of the world into objects.  In other words, I want the technical concept of «boundaries» that I'm developing to be able to refer to things like social boundaries, which are often not most-easily-expressed in the physics factorization of the world into particles (but are very often expressible as Markov blankets in a more abstract ... (read more)

Thanks, Scott!

I think the boundary factorization into active and passive is wrong. 

Are you sure?  The informal description I gave for A and P allow for the active boundary to be a bit passive and the passive boundary to be a bit active.  From the post:

the active boundary,  A — the features or parts of the boundary primarily controlled by the viscera, interpretable as "actions" of the system— and the passive boundary, P — the features or parts of the boundary primarily controlled by the environment, interpretable as "perceptions" of the

Thanks, fixed!