Is it reasonable to talk like this, if talking about an implicit optimization algorithm? Especially if fitness is determined by environment and is evaluated immediately ( as in if a negative threshhold is passed, which is the complete absence of all instacnes of a gene, then the gene is out, until/if it remerges ), is my reasoning wrong?
Is there a reason that people often use sex or sexual selection as an example, I have seeen this quite some times now? Why is that important here? I am asking because it is used in "newcomer posts"/entry posts too, as in is it about mesa-optimization or crossover? Or is that rhetorical to achieve more exposure? I am asking because it is somewhat hard to interpret this pattern in a meaningful way, maybe there is no meaningful way.
I like the differentiation when explaining why evolution could be viewed as either efficient or inefficient.
Could you explain to me how that resource helps to understand? I am afraid I can't see any proofs, so how is this post different in terms of truthfulness or reasoning than this one?
I am quite interested in a proof regarding the you can't do X by definition (as that sounds like axiomatic reasoning ) , and a showcase of why the axioms are reasonable, if that is possible? Alternatively may I request a link to where the statement comes from, as I am new to the site.
It is to note that evolutionary genetical optimization -> genotype -> phenotype, I am saying this as you extrapolate based on the bug study and metazoa are usually rather complex system, your argument is, as far as I know, sound, but a such a broad loss function might result in a variety of other behaviours, different from the intended purpose as well, what I am trying to do is expand on your point as it allows for a variety of interesting scenarios.
The post you linked contains a reference to the mathematical long-term fitness advantage of certain altruism types, I will add a later date edit this post to add some experimental studies that show, that it is "relatively easy" to breed altruism into certain metazoa ( same as above holds of course it was easy in these given the chosen environment ). If I remember correctly the chicken one is even linked on lesswrong.
I would like to ask whether it is not more engaging if to say, the caring drive would need to be specifically towards humans, such that there is no surrogate?
In regards to ducks is that an intelligence or perception problem? I think tose two would need to be differentiated as they add another layer of complexity, both apart and together, or am I missing something?