I've been recently been obsessing over the risks of quantum torment, and in the course of my research downloaded this article: https://philpapers.org/rec/TURFAA-3
Here's a quote:
"4.3 Long-term inescapable suffering is possible
If death is impossible, someone could be locked into a very bad situation where she can’t die, but also can’t become healthy again. It is unlikely that such an improbable state of mind will exist for too long a period, like millennia, as when the probability of survival becomes very small, strange survival scenarios will dominate (called “low measure marginalization” by (Almond 2010). One such scenario might be aliens arriving with a cure for the illness, but more likely, the suffering person will find herself in a simulation or resurrected by superintelligence in our world, perhaps following the use of cryonics.
Aranyosi summarized the problem: “David Lewis’s point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment” (Aranyosi 2012; Lewis 2004). The idea of outcomes infinitely worse than death for the whole of humanity was explored by Daniel (2017), who called them “s-risks”. If MI is true and there is no high-tech escape on the horizon, everyone will experience his own personal hell.
Aranyosi suggested a comforting corollary (Aranyosi 2012), based on the idea that multiverse immortality requires not remaining in the “alive state”, but remaining in the conscious state, and thus damage to the brain should not be very high. It means, according to Aranyosi, that being in the nearest vicinity of death is less probable than being in just “the vicinity of the vicinity”: the difference is akin to the difference between constant agony and short-term health improvement. However, it is well known that very chronic states of health exist which don’t affect consciousness are possible, e.g. cancer, whole-body paralysis, depression, and lock-in syndrome. However, these bad outcomes become less probable for people living in the 21st century, as developments in medical technology increase the number of possible futures in which any disease can be cured, or where a person will be put in cryostasis, or wake up in the next level of a nested simulation. Aranyosi suggested several other reasons why eternal suffering is less probable:
1) Early escape from a bad situation: “According to my line of thought, you should rather expect to always luckily avoid life-threatening events in infinitely many such crossing attempts, by not being hit (too hard) by a car to begin with. That is so because according to my argument the branching of the world, relevant from the subjective perspective, takes place earlier than it does according to Lewis. According to him, it takes place just before the moment of death, according to my reasoning it takes place just before the moment of losing consciousness”
(Aranyosi 2012, p.255).
2) Limits of suffering. “The more damage your brain suffers, the less you are able to suffer”
(Aranyosi 2012, p.257).
3) Inability to remember suffering. “Emergence from coma or the vegetative state is followed by amnesia is not an eternal life of suffering, but rather one extremely brief moment of possibly painful self-awareness – call it the ‘Momentary Life’ scenario.” (Aranyosi 2012, p.257).
4.4 Bad infinities and bad circles
Multiverse immortality may cause one to be locked into a very stable but improbable world – much like the scenario in the episode “White Christmas” of the TV series “Black Mirror (Watkins 2014),” in which a character is locked into a simulation of a room for a subjective 30 million years. Another bad option is a circular chain of observer-moments. Multiverse immortality does not require that the “next” moment will be in the actual future, especially in the timeless universe, where all moments are equally actual. Thus a “Groundhog Day” scenario becomes possible. The circle could be very short, like several seconds, in which a dying consciousness repeatedly returns to the same state as several seconds ago, and as it doesn’t have any future moments it resets to the last similar moment. Surely, this could happen only in a very narrow state of consciousness, where the internal clock and memory are damaged."
Look, I'm not at all knowledgeable in these matter (besides having read Permutation City and The Finale of the Ultimate Meta Mega Crossover). Based on what I've read online on the possibility of quantum immortality, I don't think it is probable, and quantum torment less so. But there's something about a published article giving serious consideration to us suffering eternally or going through 'The Jaunt' from that Stephen King story which is creating a nice little panic attack (in addition to the already scary David Lewis article).
I plan to die and have no intention of signing up for cryonics. (EDIT: This meant die naturally. I have no desire to expedite the process, it's just that I'm not on board with the techno-immortalism popular around here.) All I want to know is, is this stuff just being pulled out of his butt? Like, an extremely unlikely hypothetical that nonetheless carries huge negative utility? I'd be okay with that, as I'm not a utilitarian. Or have these scenarios actually been considered plausible by AI theorists?
I'm also desperate to get in contact with someone who's studied quantum mechanics and can answer questions of this nature. An actual physicist (especially a believer in MWI) would be great. I'd think an understanding of neuroscience would also be very important for analyzing the risks, but how many people have studied both fields? With some exceptions, the only ones I do see discussing it are philosophers.
I'm in a bad place right now; any help would go a long way.
I read the first link, and to me it seems that the author actually stumbles upon the right answer in the middle of the paper, only to dismiss it immediately with "we have no good way to justify it" and proceed towards things that make less sense. I am talking about what he calls the "intensity rule" in the paper.
Assuming a non-collapse interpretation, the entire idea is that literally everything happens all the time, because every particle has a non-zero amplitude at every place, but it all adds up to normality anyway, because what matters is the actual value of the amplitude, not just the fact whether it is zero or non-zero. (Theoretically, epsilon is not zero. Practically, the difference between zero and epsilon is epsilon.) Outcomes with larger amplitudes are the normal ones; the ones we should expect more. Outcomes with epsilon amplitudes are the ones we should only pay epsilon attention to.
It is possible that the furniture in my room will, due to some very unlikely synchronized quantum tunneling, transform into a hungry tiger? Yes, it is theoretically possible. (Both in Copenhagen and many-worlds interpretations, by the way.) How much time should I spend contemplating such possibility? Just by mentioning it, I already spent many orders of magnitude more than would be appropriate.
The paper makes some automatic assumption about time, which I am going to ignore for the moment. Let's assume that, because of quantum immortality, you will be alive 1000000 years from now. Which path is most likely to get you from "here" to "there"?
In any case, some kind of miracle is going to happen. But we should still expect the smallest necessary miracle. In absolute numbers, the chances of "one miracle" and "dozen miracles" are both pretty close to zero, but if we are going to assume that some miracle happened, and normalize the probabilities accordingly, "one miracle" is almost certainly what happened, and the probability of "dozen miracles" remains pretty close to zero even after the normalization. (Assuming the miracles are of comparable size, mutually independent, et cetera.)
Comparing likelihoods of different miracles is, by definition, outside of our usual experience, so I may be wrong here. But it seems to me that the horror scenario envisioned by the author requires too many miracles. (In other words, it seems optimized for shock value, not relative probability.) Suppose that in 10 years you get hit by the train, and by a miracle, a horribly disfigured fragment of you survives in an agony beyond imagination. Okay, technically possible. So, what is going to happen during the following 999990 years? It seems that further surviving in this state would require more miracles than further surviving as a healthy person. (The closer to death you are, the more unlikely it is for you to survive another day, or year.) And both these paths seem to require more miracles than being frozen now, and later resurrected and made forever young using advanced futuristic technology. Even just dying now, and being resurrected 1000000 years later, would require only one miracle, albeit a large one. If you are going to be alive in 1000000 years, you are most likely to get there by a relatively least miraculous path. I am not sure what exactly it is, but being constantly on the verge of death and surviving anyway seems too unlikely (and being frozen and later unfrozen, or uploaded to a computer, seems almost ordinary in comparison).
Now, let's take a bit more timeless perspective here. Let's look at the universe in its entirety. According to quantum immortality, there are you-moments in the arbitrarily distant future. Yes; but most of them are extremely thin. Most of the mass of the you-moments is here, plus or minus a few decades. (Unless there is a lawful process, such as cryonics, that would stretch a part of the mass into the future enough to change the distribution significantly. Still not as far as quantum immortality, which can probably overcome even the death heat of the universe and get so far that the time itself stops making sense.) So, according to anthropic principle, whenever you find yourself existing, you most likely find yourself in the now -- I mean, in your ordinary human lifespan. (Which is, coincidentally, where you happen to find yourself right now, don't you?) There are a few you-moments at a very exotic places, but most of them are here. Most of your life happens before your death; most instances of you experiencing yourself are the boring human experience.
Then you dont need the lengthy detour about measure.
And consciousness isn't a common or hard higher level phenomenon. Again, the point of reductionism is to understand the higher level phenomena in terms of Lower level activity, not just to notice that big things are made of little things.