trauma book I was reading had an interesting claim that indecision is often because the person looks for the approval of an internalized authority figure (the writer is a Jungian therapist so attributed it to looking for the approval of an internalized parent, but I think it can be broader) but is unable to predict what action they would approve of.

I feel like that has some intuitive truth to it, in that when I don’t care about anyone’s opinion (or if nobody ever finds out) then it’s much easier to just pick one action and commit to it even if it might go badly. But one of the main reasons why I might struggle with that is if I fear that anyone would judge me for doing things incorrectly.

Or it can be a conflict between different internalized authority figures. “If I do this then X will be angry at me but if I do the other thing, then Y will be angry at me”. Or just the expectation that X will be angry at me no matter what I do.

This also reminds me of the way I think a big part of the appeal of various ideologies and explicit decision-making systems is that they give people a clear external ruleset that tells them what to do. Then if things go wrong, people can always appeal (either explicitly or just inside their own mind) to having followed The Right Procedure and thus being free of blame.

The most obvious external example of this is people within a bureaucracy following the rules to the letter and never deviating from them in order to avoid blame. Or more loosely, following what feels like the common wisdom – “nobody ever got fired for buying IBM”.

But those are examples of people trying to avoid blame from an existing, external authority. I think people also do a corresponding move to avoid blame from internalized authority figures – such as by trying to follow a formalized ethical rule system such as utilitarianism or deontology.

Of course, if the system is one that easily drives people off a cliff when followed (e.g. extreme utilitarianism demanding infinite self-sacrifice), this isn’t necessarily helpful. Now what was supposed to give relief from the pressures of constant inner judgment, turns into a seemingly-rigorous proof for why the person has to constantly sacrifice everything for the benefit of others.

At one point I also wondered why it is that being very confident about what you say makes you very persuasive to many people. Why should it work that you can hack persuasiveness in that way, regardless of the truth value of what you’re saying?

Then I realized that extreme confidence signals social power since others haven’t taken you down for saying clearly wrong things (even if you are saying clearly wrong things). And that means that siding with the person who’s saying those things also shields others from social punishment: they’re after all just doing what the socially powerful person does. And given that people often project their internalized authority figures into external people – e.g. maybe someone really is trying to avoid their father’s judgment, but when seeing someone very confident they see that person as being their father – that allows them to avoid internalized blame as well.

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To me, "indecision results from sub-agential disagreement" seems almost tautological, at least within the context of multi-agent models of mind, since if all the sub-agents were in agreement, there wouldn't be any indecision. So, the question I have is: how often are disagreeing sub-agents "internalized authority figures"? I think I agree with you in that the general answer is "relatively often," although I expect a fair amount of variance between individuals.