There seem to be two meanings of honesty: the kind that's designed to help you (avoiding boastfulness and such), which was valued by the Greeks, vs. the kind that's designed to help other people at your expense, which comes more from Christian morality. Modern defenses of honesty usually equivocate between the two. Personally I think Odysseus was pretty cool, even though he lied a lot, so a list of virtues that says "you can't be Odysseus" is a no go for me.
I'm not per se disagreeing with your sentiment about Odysseus, but it would be helpful if you could model it more explicitly than "lies like he tells are okay". I can see why SPOILERS not telling Polyphemus your real name is potentially acceptable dishonesty, but Kant would disagree, I guess.
The problem with setting a fictional hero as your standard for any component of morality is that the omniscient narrator will often have your back in edge cases. The best example to me is Ender's Game, SPOILERS in which he kills two people without intending to, but also intends to attack them in potentially deadly ways and does so; yet in the next chapter, the literal adults in the literal next room are there to tell the audience, "If Ender hadn't killed Bonzo, Bonzo would have killed him, and we then wouldn't win the war, so it's fine." To me, their belief is maybe true but definitely not justified on the evidence. Bullies don't kill people all the time. Card is heavily motivated to protect Ender's morality for various reasons and builds the story around him for that particular goal.
Recall how he tricked Achilles into dropping his woman disguise (by sounding a war trumpet outside). That's a lie, but I can't seem to find anything wrong with it. It's not an edge case and doesn't need authorial fiat - many people have done similar tricks in reality, like the Sokal hoax.
Totally fair point. I agree that not all fictional heroes' possibly justifiable lies are subject to my "author writes the story to protect reader perception of hero" concept. Maybe narrow my comment to "When using a fictional character's lies as a model for when lying is acceptable, one should be alert for situations where the author has built the fictional world in such a way that Lie X is maybe justifiable in the fictional world but would not be in nearby counterfactual worlds."
Thanks for this - I think there's a related concept that would benefit from a similar analysis, which is "trust". In my mind, trust is the primary output of honesty, and it is trust which enables cooperation without perfect alignment. Both concepts can be modeled as (implicit) contracts, but I think it's more precise to think of them as agents predicting each other, and WANTING to be predictable, in the shared games of mutual option selection (for both fixed and variable-sum interactions).
Excellent post. I especially like how you stuck to a mostly neutral perspective throughout; it felt like you were aiming to inform rather than persuade. Most or all of the main points you covered are things that have been on my mind lately, but always in a piecemeal and disorganized way, so I'm really glad you made this overview. This is the kind of thing that makes me excited to share LW with others.
This post examines the virtue of honesty (a.k.a. “truthfulness,” “veracity”).[1] As with my other posts in this sequence, I’m less interested in breaking new ground and more in synthesizing whatever wisdom I could find on the subject. I wrote this not as an expert, but as someone who wants to learn. I hope it will help people who want to know more about this virtue and how to nurture it.
The topic is complex and it was hard for me to find the sweet spot between being too wordy and too superficial. People have written dense books to try to explain things I cheekily tried to summarize in a sentence or two.
Honesty and rationality
Much of LessWrong concerns how we can better approach knowing the truth. Honesty concerns an aspect of how we communicate truth. So I think of it as a social virtue rather than an intellectual virtue. Sometimes, however, expressions like “being honest with yourself” describe intellectual virtues.
Honesty requires at least a minimum exercise of intellectual virtues. If you do not exercise epistemological due diligence before you communicate your understanding of the world, you may tell the truth as you see it, but you fail to respect the virtue of honesty by not taking enough care to distinguish the false from the true.
For example, an acquaintance of mine is very woo. When she tells me of woo things that she thinks are important for me to learn about, I don’t think she’s lying to me, exactly, but she exercises such poor judgement about what to believe that I tend to think of her as being as much a dishonest person as a foolish one.
On the other hand, Scott Alexander warns against “lie inflation”[2] in which we accuse people of lying when they are merely honestly representing the poor results of their sloppy thinking. (His argument is something like this: if we expand our definition of dishonesty to cover mistaken sloppy thinking then we risk losing the ability to talk more precisely about deliberately deceptive dishonesty, and this lowers our defenses against just such liars.)[3]
Related virtues
Some other virtues are closely-related to honesty:
Chase Wrenn uses “truthfulness” to describe a virtue not primarily of truth-telling but of valuing and desiring truth.[4] It includes wanting to know the truth in spite of any tempting benefits of self-deception, ignorance, or illusion (it might also be an additional reason for valuing honesty in others).
Defining honesty
Honesty, as a virtue, is the habit of being honest—being honest characteristically. But it can be surprisingly tricky to define what being honest means.[5] Is it honest to express something false if you think it is true? to express something true if you think it is false? Is it honest to express something true that you know to be true if you also believe that by expressing it you will make the person to whom you express it believe something false?
The “wizard’s oath” (never say anything literally false) is one attractive facsimile of honesty. But on closer inspection it has “limited practical utility given the ubiquity of other kinds of deception.”[6] It is certainly not honest to deliberately create a false impression by means of selective or craftily-worded true statements. But the game of “technically” telling the truth[7] (“I never actually lied”) while deceiving people is a popular one.
Another complication is that people sometimes say what they know to be false with the intention of helping someone understand the truth. Consider the oversimplifications of physics we learn in high school or Physics 101. These are falsehoods of a sort, and the professors know this, but it would be too complex for the student to get the whole truth all at once, so placeholder-lies are used in the service of truth.
If you think about this sort of thing deeply enough you may start to go down the rabbit hole of wondering how any communication or even any conceptualization can be true: how does language work, what is “meaning” and “representation”, what is the relationship between the map and the territory, and so forth.[8]
In addition, truth-telling only sometimes is motivated by honesty. You might be truthful without being honest if the truth just happens to coincide with the most convenient and advantageous thing to say, for example. Or you might be truthful for other reasons (to be respectful to someone, out of love or duty, or out of a sense of fair play) without having the virtue of honesty per se.[9]
Honesty is highly esteemed
In 2016 researchers asked subjects to rank a set of sixty qualities in terms of which were “most characteristic of a person you would like,” “most characteristic of a person you would respect,” and “most informative toward feeling like you understand who someone really is.”[10] The qualities included things like honest, compassionate, fair, trusting, giving, kind, peaceful, mature, creative, experienced, assertive, wealthy, anxious, and possessive. “Honest” topped all three lists (like, respect, and understand) by a substantial margin.
A cross-cultural survey reported in 2023 asked three thousand people their religious faith or lack thereof, and asked them to choose the six most important virtues from a list of 24. The results were aggregated by faith-category. The only virtue in the resulting top-six lists in every faith-category was honesty.[11]
Bullshit
The philosopher Harry Frankfurt wrote the essay “On Bullshit” about a particular variety of dishonesty.[12]
“Bullshit” is indifference to the truth. A bullshitter goes through the motions of saying something factual but without any effort to check what they say against reality. It differs from “lies” in part because the liar does care about what the facts are (in order to misrepresent them advantageously). Frankfurt believes that of the two, bullshit is more dangerous to the enterprise of truth-seeking. It also seems to have become especially prominent lately.
Contexts designed to contain dishonesty safely
In some contexts saying untrue things is arguably unobjectionable. For example, if you tell a joke, although you describe a scenario in a way that superficially resembles how you describe something that really happened, nobody with a mature understanding of conversation expects that you are expressing something that is literally true. If you are an actor delivering a soliloquy, it requires a willing suspension of disbelief—a sort of mutual agreement to temporarily play in a dishonest sandbox—for the audience to think that you are speaking sincerely of your own thoughts.
That convention, however, creates a grey area in which actually deceptive dishonesty thrives. An actor in a lab coat in an advertisement tells you that Miraclon-X™ has transformed the lives of her patients. That actor is doing something superficially no more dishonest than what Laurence Olivier did when he complained about his uncle shacking up with his mom in Hamlet. But the advertisement was crafted to give the impression that an actual medical doctor with expertise in a certain area has become enthusiastic about the efficacy of a certain drug. It is not meant to be seen as fiction, but to leave a deceptive impression.
There are other areas in which dishonesty may be considered acceptable or even appropriate. “Fish stories” for example, in which the point is to entertain or pass the time rather than to convey information—in such stories, exaggerations or even falsehoods that make the story more entertaining are often considered unobjectionable or even admirable.
Common verbal handshakes (“How you doin’?” “Fine.”) have the superficial appearance of a conveyance of information but mostly have a different purpose, so people rarely concern themselves with their truthfulness.[13]
If I read someone’s résumé, I think they step over the line if they lie about having some degree, or having had some job title, or something like that. But I also expect that their résumé “puts their best foot forward.” I don’t expect them to be fully candid about their flaws, foibles, and failures but to selectively present attractive parts of their histories.
Another way we carve out space for dishonesty is with verbal envelopes in which we put untrue things to insulate them from being taken as literally true: “Once upon a time…”, “Consider this counterfactual scenario…”, “Imagine for a moment that…”, “If we were to assume X…”, and so forth.
People also use irony and sarcasm, understatement and hyperbole, parody and caricature, modest proposals and other such rhetorical devices to say what is not literally true but also not meant to be interpreted literally. These techniques expand our expressive and communicative repertoire but at the cost of playing fast and loose with truth-telling. I mention things like these (and this is not meant to be an exhaustive list) because sometimes they are overlooked by people who recommend a literal and thorough honesty.
Collateral damage of “harmless” dishonesty
In addition to such ways in which tales are told in a way that warns recipients that they are likely to be a shade or two off from the truth, lies may also be justified in a more ad hoc way but one that preserves their status as actual dishonesty.
Most tempting to consequentialists are lies that are justified by what appears to be a greater good: Giving a placebo to a patient, but telling them it’s the real deal in the hopes of making the placebo work better. Telling the Gestapo that actually Anne Frank moved out of the attic some time ago and didn’t leave a forwarding address. Not telling your spouse about the fling you had on that business trip because you think the truth would harm your marriage more than a lie would. Recognizing when “does this make me look fat?” is not a request for a candid and literal answer. “Little white lies” that protect someone’s feelings.[14]
Sissela Bok argued, in her book Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, that when people justify dishonesty, they tend to focus too narrowly—in their little white lies and fish stories as well as their big important utilitarian deceptions.[15] If we look only at the immediate effects of the lie, and on the harm to those lied to, we miss some important terms in the calculation. Other things to consider are how the lie affects the character of the liar (eroding that person’s habits of truth-telling, or reinforcing their habits of lying), how the lie might influence bystanders (by communicating something about the culture of truth-telling they belong to), and how the lie might erode future trust between the parties.
“Fish stories,” for example, can reinforce habits of embellishment that spill over into other contexts where they aren’t as harmless—“we’re not talking about grotesque major falsehoods—but the first words off my tongue sometimes shade reality, twist events just a little toward the way they should have happened…”[16] If we develop the habit of seeking for words that make us interesting to hear or that meet people’s expectations, without sufficient regard for their veracity, it can be easy to slip into that habit when we don’t intend to lie but aren’t paying attention. And it can take a lot of attention to hit the truth precisely; it is so much easier to just aim in its general direction.
Here’s another example of how innocent-seeming lies cause collateral damage: imagine that in your subculture friends always answer “you look beautiful in that” because that’s what is expected of friends. You may then always be a little insecure about whether you look good or not because you cannot expect accurate feedback from your friends. This convention, rather than bolstering your self-esteem, instead leaves you in doubt. And if a friend is honest with you and tells you your clothing is not flattering, the convention may reasonably lead you to doubt their friendship! What if you “want to have friends you don’t need to second-guess” instead?[18]
People seem to overestimate how negatively others will respond to their honesty,[19] and to underestimate the harm of little-white-lies.[20]
Honest listening
In order for honest communication to take place, the speaker must speak honestly, and the listener must be prepared to hear honest speech. Some groundwork must have been established to indicate that the speech is meant to be honest, and not to be serving some other purpose. This might include trust between the parties, or a cultural expectation of honest communication.
The listener can help by signaling that honesty is what they expect and are prepared for. This can be done explicitly, for example:
Or you might invoke “Crocker’s Rules” in which you explicitly ask the speaker to prioritize honesty over other concerns like tact or respect for taboos.
Certainly if you want people to be honest with you, you should not disincentivize them by punishing them or getting angry at them for doing so.
The power of honesty
Some philosophers claim to have discovered unexpected powers in the virtue of honesty. Tolstoy, for example, thought that honesty was revolutionary: “No feats of heroism are needed to achieve the greatest and most important changes in the existence of humanity…. it is only needful that each individual should say what he really feels or thinks, or at least that he should not say what he does not think.”[22] He was followed in this by Solzhenitsyn (“Live Not By Lies”) and Václav Havel (“The Power of the Powerless”):
William Wollaston—a now mostly-forgotten philosopher who was important in the early enlightenment—defended a system in which all religion ultimately reduced to ethics and all ethics reduced to honesty (The Religion of Nature Delineated). “[E]very intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; …treat every thing as being what it is.”[24] All else follows from that.
When honesty is dangerous
It is dangerous to tell the truth when the truth is unwelcome to someone who is hostile when angered. This can suppress truth-telling of certain sorts, particularly when the hostile are organized into powerful institutions. Truths that are blasphemous, unpatriotic, or in other ways challenge the sacrosanct or privileged can be difficult to utter safely. “Cancel culture” and the shifting and unpredictable taboos that drive its piranhas into a frenzy can frighten people into being less candid or into saying things they do not honestly believe.
Strategies for honesty in such circumstances are varied. You might simply stay silent, picking your battles and being truthful elsewhere, accepting the passive falsehood of silence. You might use euphemism or other circumlocution to approach the truth at a safe distance without breaching the taboo. You might surround the truth so that its outline is clearly visible without stating it explicitly: engraving the first two lines of the syllogism in ten-foot-high letters and leaving the last line blank as an exercise for the reader.
Another strategy is esoteric communication—telling the truth in a between-the-lines way that is only obvious to people who are not among those who will be enraged by it.
Kant
Kant made the duty of honesty a showpiece of his impressive moral theory. I am no expert on Kant and am probably oversimplifying dangerously, so please take this with that caveat attached.
Kant asserted that lying is always wrong; you always have a duty to be truthful. One of his arguments was that dishonesty cannot be defended coherently. This is why: Say you believe that a person is justified in deceiving others because it can be useful to do so. But if everyone were deceitful whenever they thought it might be useful, then no expectation of honesty would survive. Everyone would just assume that everyone else might be lying at any time and so there is no good reason to believe anybody. But if that is the result, then dishonesty is no longer useful—nobody can be usefully deceived by your lies because nobody puts any stock in them. The supposed justification for dishonesty undermines itself.
Kant’s recommendation of absolute honesty without exceptions is a tempting target to consequentialists who are unconvinced by the Kantian moral system. Imagine you have seen where someone is hiding from a crazed murderer intent on killing them—must you refrain from lying to the murderer who asks you where they went? Kant’s answer to this objection (on first approximation: “yes you must”) was not very convincing, and has been subject to scorn ever since (perhaps unfairly[25]).
Philosophers sometimes suggest that contra Kant, there is a “universalizable maxim” that can allow for some dishonesty, if you draw it up skillfully. Something like: “Be honest except in rare and extreme situations in which a reasonable person would conclude that with a high likelihood dishonesty would clearly result in a much better outcome…” for some to-be-determined values of reasonable, high, clearly, and much better. (See Eliezer Yudkowsky’s discussion of meta-honesty for one possible formula.[26])
It occurs to me also that Kant’s argument lacks empirical support. Case in point: President Trump is notoriously dishonest. And rather than trying to project an air of reputability—trying to remain “technically true” and saving his lies for when they’re really necessary, as a more mundane politician would—he just starts making stuff up from word #1 and never bothers to touch down in the land of truth. Kant would predict that people would stop trying to evaluate his utterances for their meaning or to evaluate them against a standard of truth: that his lies would lose their effectiveness. But, four years into his first term, the New York Times assigned two reporters to go line-by-line through one of his 87-minute campaign speeches to highlight the falsifiable statements that were also false ones.[27] “Trump said X. Is that really true?” remains a common headline, and debates about the truthiness of whatever he said today continue to rattle the wires across the land.
Glomar response
The “Glomar response” (prototypically: “I can neither confirm nor deny X”) preserves your reputability while allowing you to conceal information that you do not want to be honest about: you refuse to answer rather than lying.
If you refuse to answer only when you do not want to tell the truth, this can leak the very information you want to hide, as it may be obvious which answer you would want to conceal, and your interrogator can just fill in the Glomar blank with the embarrassing answer. So for the Glomar response technique to work well, you must also deploy it on occasions when you would not ordinarily be bothered by speaking the honest truth. This means that you must anticipate ahead of time which class of questions might at some future time require an answer that you would prefer not to give, and begin Glomarizing them now. This is difficult as a general practice.[28]
Sometimes people suggest a Glomar-style response as a solution to the murderer-seeking-their-victim thought experiment. When asked “Where is that no-good so-and-so I want to kill?” you can honestly answer “I feel no inclination to share information of that nature with you.”
Radical honesty
Description pilfered from the LessWrong wiki:
Proponents say radical honesty has many benefits: It allows you to develop a deeper connection with other people rather than only connecting on a falsification-to-falsification basis. By atrophying the lie-telling part of your brain, it allows you to see the world more accurately. It shows respect for the people you communicate with. It promotes an ethos of honesty in society. In a sort of Zen way, it takes you out of the stories you tell yourself and back into the real world. And it cures insomnia & sexual dysfunction, saves marriages, makes you rich, and other pop-psych marketing points of that sort.
How do you go about being radically honest? In a nutshell:
Shallow and deep honesty
@Aletheophile asks us to consider Deep Honesty.[29] To a first approximation, shallow honesty is being merely truthful while at the same time trying to shepherd your audience with your communication in the direction you desire. It rules out actually lying, but may include selectively describing or revealing the truth. Deep honesty goes beyond that:
Deep honesty differs from radical honesty in several important ways (for one, it is meant as a context-specific strategy rather than a permanent stance). @Aletheophile give several examples and explain further in their post. They summarize the practice of deep honesty this way:
Honesty about future commitments
It is valuable to be able to make credible promises about your future actions. It is honest, having made such promises, to follow through on them. But such promises are problematic because the future is uncertain. You may die before you can fulfill your promise, or fate may make it impossible for you to do as you said you would or cause an unanticipated conflict between incompatible commitments.
Perhaps it is best to assume by convention that all such promises have a “but for unforeseen accidents of fate” clause attached to them.[30] However it can be tempting, when fulfilling a promise turns out to be harder or more costly than anticipated, to claim that this nullifies our promise under such an implicit clause. If we give in to such a temptation, we will not honor the virtue of honesty, so this should make us cautious when we make promises about our future acts.
Open-ended promises are especially concerning: Oaths of undying loyalty, pledges to obey future orders without specifying the content of those orders, and so forth. Something like 45% of marriages in the United States end in divorce, and most of them begin with a pledge to stay married “until death do us part.”
Oaths, pledges, and formal declarations of intent to honesty
Marriage vows are an example of a formal pledge, which, from its solemn and traditional format and context is supposed to give greater weight to the vows made. Deliberate attention to phrasing and ritual gives the pledger notice that they ought to carefully consider their vow and its implications. Other examples include oaths of office, pledges of allegiance, and swearings-in of witnesses. People more informally emphasize how much they intend to honor their promises by means of pinky-swears, “may God strike me down if I’m lying”, “I swear on the name of my mother,” and other such formulas.
None of these rituals seems to reliably compel truth-telling or promise-keeping. Worse, they also suggest that in the absence of such rituals people are not to be taken seriously, which is potentially erosive of any general tendency to truth-telling.
Some Christians for this reason eschew oath-giving, citing the advice in James 5:12 (“Above all, brothers and sisters, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or by any other oath, but let your ‘Yes’ be yes and your ‘No’ be no, so that you may not fall under condemnation.”)
On the other hand, some researchers found that asking people to take an honesty pledge before responding to questions does indeed make them more likely to answer those questions honestly.[31]
Contracts are another matter. They typically enforce promises and make them more reliable by providing for sanctions against promise-breaking. This then tends to leave the arena of honesty for the arena of material incentives.
Self-representation
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the virtue of honesty, but mostly in the context of self-representation:[32] Do people exaggerate their skills and experiences and credentials, or do they with false modesty self-deprecate, or do they straightforwardly share an honest self-assessment?
People use disguises, imposture, cosmetics, titles, credentials, and so forth to make an impression. Now that our social presence is often digitally mediated, this presents new possibilities—pseudonymous sock-puppetry, auto-suggested phrasing, AI-crafted rhetoric, catfishing, video filters, purchased “likes”, and so forth.
We can be more deliberate and selective about what we share about ourselves online than we can be in a face-to-face, real-world social context. If people are incentivized to filter what they share in a certain way—showing happy and exceptional moments and suppressing sad and mundane ones, for example—this creates a misleading impression, and maybe a harmful one if people compare their own real lives to the filtered lives of those in their virtually-social circle.
The pressure to “brand” your internet presence threatens authenticity. If much of what you are to other people is your mediated projection of yourself, and that projection represents your brand rather than your authentic person, do you risk atrophying your authentic social self or making it subservient to your brand? Might you wake up one day to discover that your brand is well-loved but you are still lonely, for instance?
Social media culture is still fairly new and in flux. The choices we make about how honestly to represent ourselves on-line help set a standard that will have long-lasting influence.
Spin/Framing
Spin or framing is the attempt to fit revealed or asserted facts into a rhetorical framework such that they lead people to desired conclusions or away from undesirable ones. Often this takes the form of seductively modeling the desired variety of motivated reasoning.
When this is called “spin” it usually implies purposeful dishonesty; when it is called “framing” its proponents sometimes claim it can serve clarity and honesty, or defend against spin. (Impartial rationality, or our best approximations to it, might be considered a variety of frame, for example.)
Lying to children
Adults frequently lie to children.[33] We answer evasively or dishonestly when children ask us questions the honest answers to which we are afraid they will misunderstand, be frightened by, or lack the tact to keep secret. We verbally provide security through certainty even when we know the facts are more ambiguous and uncertain. We oversimplify outrageously. We cajole by threatening consequences we know we would be unwilling to deliver. We attribute our expressions of delight to the quality of their creative output when really we only mean to be encouraging. We send them off on snipe hunts or other sorts of fool’s errands because it’s kind of funny.
We also tell them that lying is not acceptable and that honesty is the best policy.
What gives?
In some part, I think we are being genuinely considerate of the mental maturity of children when we do this. As mentioned above, honesty requires both an honest speaker and a listener who is receptive to honesty. Some varieties of honesty go over the heads of young children, and careful not-exactly-honest communication may better respect what they are capable of understanding. If a child is at an age when they cannot consistently separate reality and fantasy, to have a relationship with that child means to participate in that child’s fantasy world to some extent.
And in some part, we are being properly protective of children who would be hurt by the truth, or who would (because they are erratic and untutored) hurt others with it. It is paternalistic to hide the truth from someone in order to protect them, but our relationship with children is properly a paternalistic one, so our standard for truth-telling with children is in this way not the same as it is with other adults.
But in some part, I think we fail to properly respect children when we do this. This may be because we get in the habit of being dishonest to children occasionally for good reasons, or we see other people doing so and approve, and then this habit or this approval bleeds over into other cases in which dishonesty is unjustified.
Again, we need to consider not only the particular lie we tell and its consequence to the particular child we tell it to, but also such things as our effect on how that child develops the virtue of honesty, how we model adult behavior for children (and other adults), how our own virtue of honesty might be eroded, and how the lie will affect the relationship of trust between us and the child.
Consider the fool’s errand. What does a child who has been sent off on a snipe hunt learn, if not that it is acceptable to lie to someone if you think by doing so you will be entertained by the results of their foolish trust? Is that a good lesson?
I don’t think much of the excuse that we need to be dishonest to children from time to time in order to immunize them against deception (e.g. I taught my children to believe in Santa Claus so they’ll know better than to believe in Jehovah). There is plenty of deception to be found in the world that can be used for this purpose without us adding any more to the pile.
For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see Joseph Millum “Lying To Our Children” Journal of Practical Ethics (2024).
How to become more honest
The first prong of becoming more honest is to overcome ways of thinking that prevent one from approaching the truth in the first place. Learn to love truth and refuse to fear it. All of that is well-covered elsewhere on LW. The second prong is about communicating honestly, and that’s what I’ll concentrate on in this section.
One way to become more honest is to get in the habit of speaking truthfully even when it seems harmless to do otherwise. Tolstoy put it this way:
Another way is to direct more care and attention to the details of your communication. Lazy inattention can lead to falsehood when we sleepwalk through something we’re saying—spitting out phrases because the words sound right together because we’ve heard them that way before.
Although lies are often described as being delivered in fancy, honey-coated language, honesty may also be best served by sophisticated use of language: originality of metaphor, inventiveness in phrasing, a poet’s attention to precise word-use, a rich vocabulary, and a critical eye for ambiguity.
Avoid the use of “weasel words” that give the appearance of saying something truthful while actually throwing up an obscuring cloud of syllables around an absence of truth.
Finally, in spite of our best efforts we may nonetheless give an unintentionally mistaken impression. It can be valuable to check in with those we are communicating with to ask them to verify that their understanding of what we are saying matches what we mean to communicate. Adding “checksums” of some sort to our communication may enhance its integrity.
This could be a starting point for expanding the LessWrong Wiki entry on Honesty. (See also: Deception and Meta-Honesty)
Scott Alexander, “Against Lie Inflation” Slate Star Codex 16 July 2019
See “Maybe Lying Doesn’t Exist” for more discussion of this point, and “Rationalizing and Sitting Bolt Upright in Alarm” for a plea that we invent some epithet as strong and undesirable as “liar” to apply to people who, though they are not being dishonest, are recklessly misreasoning.
Chase Wrenn The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth (2023)
James Edwin Mahon, “The Definition of Lying and Deception” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
@Zack_M_Davis “Firming Up Not-Lying Around Its Edge-Cases Is Less Broadly Useful Than One Might Initially Think” LessWrong 27 Dec. 2019
@Psychohistorian “Not Technically Lying” LessWrong 4 July 2009
@Gordon Seidoh Worley “The Incoherence of Honesty” LessWrong 8 June 2018
Christian B. Miller “The virtue of honesty requires more than just telling the truth” Psyche 13 December 2021
Anselma G. Hartley, et al “Morality’s Centrality to Liking, Respecting, and Understanding Others” Social Psychological and Personality Science (2016)
Pat Ashworth “Honesty most important to all religious groups, survey finds” Church Times (7 July 2023)
Harry Frankfurt, “On Bullshit” Raritan Quarterly Review, Fall 1986
@irrational “Truth & social graces” LessWrong 22 Oct. 2011
@ChrisHallquist “White Lies” LessWrong 8 Feb. 2014
Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978)
@Eliezer Yudkowsky “Honesty: Beyond Internal Truth” LessWrong 6 June 2009
George Eliot, Adam Bede, book Ⅱ, chapter 17
@Serpent-Stare “Honest Friends Don’t Tell Comforting Lies” LessWrong 19 April 2018
Emma Levine & Taya R. Cohen “You Can Handle the Truth: Mispredicting the consequences of honest communication” Journal of Experimental Psychology (2018)
Elena Svetieva & Leanne ten Brinke “Be honest: little white lies are more harmful than you think” Psyche (10 May 2023)
H.D. Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849)
Leo Tolstoy “Patriotism and Christianity” (1894) section ⅩⅧ
Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless” (1978)
William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722)
Helga Varden, “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door… One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis” Journal of Social Philosophy 18 November 2010
@Eliezer Yudkowsky “Meta-Honesty: Firming Up Honesty Around Its Edge-Cases” LessWrong 8 Feb. 2018
Linda Qiu & Michael D. Shear, “Rallies Are the Core of Trump’s Campaign, and a Font of Lies and Misinformation” New York Times 26 October 2020
@Stuart_Armstrong “Consistent Glomarization should be feasible” LessWrong 4 May 2020
@Aletheophile “Deep Honesty” LessWrong 7 May 2024
“It is not in man’s power to promise absolutely. He can only promise as one who may be disabled by the weight and incombency of truths not then existing.” ―William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722), chapter 1
see for example Eyal Peer & Yuval Feldman “Honesty pledges for the behaviorally-based regulation of dishonesty” Journal of European Public Policy, 28:5 (2021)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Ⅳ.7
G.D. Heyman, D.H. Luu, K. Lee “Parenting by Lying” Journal of Moral Education (2009)
Leo Tolstoy, A Calendar of Wisdom (February 24), ~1910
Tolstoy was an author of fiction, however, so he must have allowed for some safely-compartmentalized uses of untruth. He had a late-life change of heart about the function of fictional literature, but did not abandon it entirely.
Hannah Arendt, “Thinking” The Life of the Mind (1971)