The standard view of Mutually Assured Distruction (MAD) is something like:
During the cold war the US and USSR had weapons capable of immense destruction, but no matter how tense things got they never used them because they knew how bad that would be. While MAD is a terrifying thing, it did work, this time.
Occasionally people will reply with an argument like:
If any of several near-miss incidents had gone even slightly differently, both sides would have launched their missiles and we wouldn't be here today looking back. In a sense this was an experiment where the only outcome we could observe was success: nukes would have meant no observers, no nukes and we're still here. So we don't actually know how useful MAD was.
This is an anthropic argument, an attempt to handle the bias that comes from a link between outcomes and the number of people who can observe them. Imagine we were trying to figure out whether flipping "heads" was more likely than flipping "tails", but there was a coin demon that killed everyone if "tails" came up. Either we would see "heads" flipped, or we would see nothing at all. We're not able to sample from the "tails: everyone-dies" worlds. Even if the demon responds to tails by killing everyone only 40% of the time, we're still going to over-sample the happy-heads outcome.
Applying the anthropic principle here, however, requires that a failure of MAD really would have killed everyone. While it would have killed billions, and made major parts of the world uninhabitable, still many people would have survived. [1] How much would we have rebuilt? What would be the population now? If the cold war had gone hot and the US and USSR had fallen into wiping each other out, what would 2013 be like? Roughly, we're oversampling the no-nukes outcome by the ratio of our current population to the population there would have been in a yes-nukes outcome, and the less lopsided that ratio is the more evidence that MAD did work after all.
[1] For this wikipedia cites: The global health effects of nuclear war (1982), Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear-weapons detonations (1975). Some looking online also turns up an Accelerating Future blog post. I haven't read them thoroughly, and I don't know much about the research here.
I also posted this on my blog
That is a very valid critique of international relations realism.
But what specific international interests has Germany changed its position on because of the closer relationship between specific leaders? Likewise, are there any specific international positions that Russia has changed because of the closer relationship?
I suspect that Russia's geopolitical interests matter a lot more to Russia's stance on big issues (e.g. Syria) than any interpersonal relationship. In other words, just about any internal structure of government in Russia would likely be saying the same things that the current government is saying.
Like China propping up the North Korean government even though the Chinese probably doesn't like North Korea's behavior. The geopolitical consequences of reunification are not in China's interests, and that probably outweighs just about any misbehavior from North Korea, unless NK escalates a lot.
I notice that I'm confused.
The example that I would have liked to bring up was Germany's stance on the Nord Stream project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream), which serves as a direct supply with russian natural gas independent of transit countries. In Germany, the support for this project by Schröder was widely perceived as a result of his relationship to Putin and his plans after leaving politics (he is head of the shareholder's committee). I assumed this project is clearly against German national interest, since it creates an even stronger depe... (read more)