Today's post, Why truth? And... was originally published on 27 November 2006. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Why should we seek truth? Pure curiosity is an emotion, but not therefore irrational. Instrumental value is another reason, with the advantage of giving an outside verification criterion. A third reason is conceiving of truth as a moral duty, but this might invite moralizing about "proper" modes of thinking that don't work. Still, we need to figure out how to think properly. That means avoiding biases, for which see the next post.
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I was just lamenting that the answer to "why truth" was not very well spelled out in Post 1. Of course EY is a step ahead of me.
The official answers: because we're curious, because it's necessary to get certain things done, and (more weakly endorsed) because it's the right thing to do. I thought this recent remark
from EY here was interesting. Did the focus on movement building and self improvement come later?
A couple of skeptical thoughts about those reasons:
Some people feel curiosity less often and less intensely than others, just as some people feel angry less often -- why truth for the uncurious? Conversely it's possible to sate curiosity by studying and accepting lies and not truths. Ron Hubbard and Saint Augustine strike me as very curious folks.
I can't dispute the instrumental value of a rational approach to building airplanes. But the instrumental value of a rational approach to religion is less clear to me.
It is difficult to estimate the instrumental value of anything when terminal values are unknown/unspecified. If one starts with absolute certainly that a particular religion is true, then rationality may have little instrumental value with regards to religion for that person (except to help them realize that absolute certainty is problematic). On the other hand, if one is deciding whether to join or leave a religion, then epistemic rationality would likely be extremely useful in making the right choice.