Your discussion of Skunk Works is significantly wrong throughout. (I am not familiar with the other examples.)
For example, in 1943 the Skunk Works both designed and built America’s first fighter jet, the P80 Shooting Star, in just 5 months. Chief engineer Kelly Johnson worked with a scrappy team of, at its peak, 23 designers and 105 fabricators. Nonetheless, the resulting plane ended up being operationally used by the air force for 40 years.
The P80 was introduced in 1945; the US almost immediately decided to replace it with the F-86, introduced in 1949. The phrase "operationally used by the air force for 40 years" is only technically true because rather than scrap existing P80 production, they were modified slightly and used as training aircraft.
Our ship had a four-man crew — commander, helmsman, navigator and engineer. By contrast, a frigate doing a similar job had more than three hundred crewmen. ... Our stealth ship might be able to blast out of the sky a sizable soviet attack force, but in terms of an officer’s future status and promotion prospects, it was about as glamorous as commanding a tugboat. At the highest levels, the Navy brass was equally unenthusiastic about the small number of stealth ships they would need to defend carrier task forces. Too few to do anyone’s career much good in terms of power or prestige.
This is wrong. Their stealth ship wasn't able to "blast out of the sky a sizable soviet attack force", or to do literally anything; it was just a testbed for exploring automation and stealth hulls, totally incapable of doing anything. Skunk Works didn't actually successfully build anything here! (The stealth design was later used on the Zumwalt class of destroyers, which had unrelated issues.)
Not sure where he got the 300 crew figure from? Even beyond the fact that the Sea Shadow wasn't actually designed to do anything (and so would need more specialized crew to do so), the Sea Shadow was only a tenth of a the size of the frigates it's being compared with. (The Navy has since tried to use similar automation to reduce the crew of newer ships; the Gerald Ford class of aircraft carriers represent the realistically achievable reduction in crew via automation: 3,200 -> 2,600 or so, so ~20%.) (Note that this also trivially falsifies the claim that the Navy rejects automation to reduce crew sizes?)
"The Navy rejected our ship design because it was totally too good, you just gotta believe me, even though we've never ever successfully produced ships" is an insane thing for you to accept with zero evidence.
Yet Lockheed could barely sell [the SR-71]. As described by a CIA engineer inside the Skunk Works:
> ... But I never gave him much chance to sell a lot of those airplanes because they were so far ahead of anything else flying that few commanders would feel comfortable leading a Blackbird wing or squadron. I mean this was a twenty.-first-century performer delivered in the early 1960s. No one in the Pentagon would know what to do with it.
This is totally wrong. You are again putting forth the insane claim that people rejected Skunk Work's technology because of how good it was, with zero actual evidence of why the SR-71 wasn't mass produced.
The SR-71 (Mach 3.3, 85,000 feet) wasn't significantly better than planned contemporary planes like the B-70 (Mach 3.1, 77,350 feet) or the F-108 (Mach 3, 80,100 feet). Both of those planes were cancelled, because the development of missiles meant that flying higher and faster was no longer a viable strategy; since then, military planes like the the F-18 (Mach 1.8, 50,000 feet), and the F-35 (Mach 1.6, 50,000 feet) have often been lower and slower. This is a deliberate choice: unmanned, one-way missiles can always go faster than a manned plane. Most of the SR-71's advantages come not from it being inherently better than any possible missile, but from it being faster and higher than the planes early SAM's were intended to target; mass production and usage in other roles would inherently make this go away.
(To be clear, Skunk Works was successful and build many things successfully; it's specifically your claims and examples that are wrong. In particular, you left out most of their successful planes like the F-117.)
Well, I do think your comment quite overstates its case, but I've made some edits that should avoid the interpretations mentioned, and I do think those make the post better. So thanks for that! :)
On the P80:
It was built in 1943 and introduced in 1945. When I wrote "used operationally for 40 years" I didn't have in mind that they sent it up to join forces with F-16s in the 1980s. Rather wanted to convey that "in spite of being built ridicolously quickly, it wasn't a piece of junk that got scrapped immediately and never ended up serving a real function".
Editing to say it was used operationally "as a trainer" for 40 years.
On the Sea Shadow
This is just a direct quote from Ben Rich who oversaw that program. It's compatible with everything you mention. He's just illustrating procurement incentives in the Navy. I think he might be speaking with some rhetorical flourish and saying even if it could blast a sizable attack force out of the sky, the ship still mightn't be very prestigous.
It does seem like it could be clarified a bit, so editing to say "They also built this prototype ship that I'm including here because I really like how dope it seemed, even though it never became more than a prototype".
On selling the SR-71:
Again, this is a direct quote on procurement incentives from a guy who was involved on both the buy and sell side of the SR-71 back in the day. But yeah, agreed this wasn't the only reason the SR-71 didn't sell more! (Two air-to-air refuelings per mission? JP-7 fuel? Any takers?) Editing post to say: "Yet some of these advances also made it harder for Lockheed to sell it (though there were also additional strategic reasons it wasn't mass produced)".
There's also a more gnarly philosophical issue here, in terms of the "insane" belief you're pointing to. I find it fairly plausible that individual commanders might have incentives that are different from those of the Navy, or the Air Force, as a whole, and that this might drive procurement decisions. Whether it's insane or not depends on your priors. But this is less of a clear cut empirical question, so won't belabor it more here.
On the F-117:
This already long post has to end somewhere :) I'd love to read someone else summarising lessons from building the F-117 though!
I'm not disputing that specific people at Skunk Works believed that their tech was disliked for being good; but that's a totally insane belief that you should reject immediately, it's obviously self-serving, none of those people present any evidence for it, and the DoD did try to acquire similar technology in all these cases.
Again, this is a direct quote on procurement incentives from a guy who was involved on both the buy and sell side of the SR-71 back in the day.
This is quote from, per you, somebody from the CIA. The CIA and Air Force are different organizations; he was presumably not involved in the Air Force's decision not to acquire the F-12B. We have definitive proof that the Air Force's procurement decisions weren't necessarily opposed to high performing planes, since they had planned on acquiring different, but similarly capable, planes.
There's also a more gnarly philosophical issue here, in terms of the "insane" belief you're pointing to. I find it fairly plausible that individual commanders might have incentives that are different from those of the Navy, or the Air Force, as a whole, and that this might drive procurement decisions.
I am very confident that the book-length sequence you linked to doesn't contain a justification for the claim that "individual Air Force commanders hate fast planes". But if it does, please provide the actual justification instead of linking to a ~150 page book ("go read the sequences").
ETA: I may have misunderstood your point; if you instead meant literally just to justify the sentence you wrote, that principal-agent problems are possible, then I don't disagree; that does absolutely nothing to justify the specific claimed principal-agent problem.
Thank you, I wanted to say the same.
Furthermore:
SR-71 was not really flying above enemy territory: the high flight altitude made it possible to peek over the curvature of earth. It did not fly over the USSR like the U-2 did before the advent of anti-air missiles, but generally over allied/international borders, peeking into the forbidden territory. Interceptors were raised against it numerous times it but usually were unable to achieve a position where they could have attacked it successfully. I am not sure where the "fired at 4000 times" myth comes from, but it is nonsense. The S-200 (SA-5) systems introduced in the late 60s should have been able to shoot them down from relatively large distance, and it is recorded that Swedish JAS-37 jets were able to intercept and have a lock on it.
Turns out there's a reddit thread on the exact question of the S-200 vs. the: SR-71. Copying in the top comments so people don't have to click through:
Why the soviet union didnt use the S-200 aginst the SR-71 blackbirds?
Because the US discontinued overflights of the USSR after the shootdown of Gary Powers' U-2 in 1960.
As to why other adversaries with SA-5s didn't...well, Libya tried. The SR-71 isn't as stealthily as a B-2, but they were stealthy enough to reduce the acquisition range considerably. Combined with a closure rate of Mach 3.3, the SA-5 crews had very little time to acquire, track, and fire. And when the target is somewhere smaller than the USSR, they can be in and out of enemy airspace in minutes. The SR-71 also had a robust ECM capability to jam the incoming missile.
And if that failed they could outmaneuver the missile. With the Blackbird traveling at a mile every couple of seconds, the missile is computing a lead of several miles at launch. While the SR-71 wasn't aerobatic, missiles at Mach 6 are worse. Even if they couldn't get out of the missile's radar arc, they could get it to overshoot.
and
They may have. But the Blackbird still could have outsped the S-200. It wasn't that the Blackbird was faster than the missile. It was that it could fly just fast enough that even a faster missile could not catch up. Try and imagine the whole scenario. A Blackbird is zooming in, high and fast. It gets detected. That detection gets evaluated, passed on, until the decision is reached to launch an S-200 missile. All of that might take minutes, and the plane travels at about 80 km every minute. Now, the launch site is stationary and at ground level. The missile has to ignite, accelerate, climb, and adjust course (presumably, the SR-71 would not fly just over the launch site). All while the missile is doing all of that, the plane is speeding away (and presumably accelerating as the pilot becomes aware of the missile). When the missile gets to altitude, it would be able to catch the plane eventually, but it probably will run out of fuel.
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/rb7stm/why_the_soviet_union_didnt_use_the_s200_aginst/
I did think it was odd that the none of the 4 listed crew was a gunner, yet it supposedly had the firepower to wipe out a Soviet force.
For the Skunk Works and SpaceX examples, I did find myself wondering whether some aspects like the powerful decisive managers are strictly better or merely increase variance and so appear more often when looking at the most successful projects. I haven't done much reading of the primary and secondary sources for progress studies, how easy would it be to find details of the practices of average or failed projects to compare against?
My quick impression for the overlapping similarities:
For me this still points (yet again) towards shortening feedback loops: apart from directly being mentioned, generating the experienced leaders and workers is also possibly based on this. No one had as much experience in designing aircraft as the engineers who worked between the 40s and the 60s, just due to the sheer amount of equipment designed, both due to being less matured (lower hanging fruits), less regulated and just military spending being relatively higher during the era. I wonder though if we could replace some of the experience with simulations and games.
You may also be interested in the Transit Cost database, which compares the cost of constructing things by country.
If you're feeling down, here's a recent project that seems to have worked out.
San Diego Mid-Coast Trolley Extension:
That most developed countries, and therefore most liberal democracies, are getting significantly worse over time at building physical things seems like a Big Problem (see e.g. here). I'm glad this topic got attention on LessWrong through this post.
The main criticism I expect could be levelled on this post is that it's very non-theoretical. It doesn't attempt a synthesis of the lessons or takeaways. Many quotes are presented but not analysed.
(To take one random thing that occurred to me: the last quote from Anduril puts significant blame on McNamara. From my reading of The Wizards of Armageddon, McNamara seems like a typical brilliant twentieth century hard-charging modernist technocrat. Now, he made lots of mistakes, especially in the direction of being too quantitative / simplistic in the sorts of ways that Seeing Like a State dunks on. But say the rule you follow is "appoint some hard-charging brilliant technocrat and give them lots of power"; all of McNamara, Kelly Johnson, and Leslie Groves might seem very good by this light, even though McNamara's (claimed) effect was to destroy the Groves/Johnson type of competence in US defence. How do you pick the Johnsons and Groveses over the McNamaras? What's the difference between the culture that appoints McNamaras and one that appoints Groveses and Johnsons? More respect for hands-down engineering? Less politics, more brute need for competence and speed due to a war? Is McNamara even the correct person to blame here? Is the type of role that McNamara was in just fundamentally different from the Groves and Johnson roles such that the rules for who does well in the latter don't apply to the former?)
(I was also concerned about the highly-upvoted critical comment, though it seems like Jacob did address the factual mistakes pointed out there.)
However, I think the post is very good and is in fact better off as a bunch of empirical anecdotes than attempting a general theory. Many things are best learnt by just being thrown a set of case studies. Clearly, something was being done at Skunk Works that the non-SpaceX American defence industry currently does not do. Differences like this are often hard-to-articulate intangible cultural stuff, and just being temporarily immersed in stories from the effective culture is often at least as good as an abstract description of what the differences were. I also appreciated the level of empiricism where Jacob was willing to drill down to actual primary sources like the rediscovered Empire State Building logbook.
McNamara was at Ford, not Toyota. I reckon he modelled manufacturing like an efficient Boeing manager not an efficient SpaceX manager
I was referring to McNamara's government work, forgot about his corporate job before then. I agree there's some SpaceX to (even pre-McDonnell Douglas merger?) Boeing axis that feels useful, but I'm not sure what to call it or what you'd do to a field (like US defence) to perpetuate the SpaceX end of it, especially over events like handovers from Kelly Johnson to the next generation.
I'm not sure I follow you on the skyscrapers example.
The Burj Khalifa is about 2 times higher, and took about 3 times as much to be built ; it doesn't look like things are getting much slower. Even better, it is 2 times higher, thus it is between 2 times and 8 times bigger (depending on how scaling laws work for civil engineering), so one could argue that it was built faster.
The slowest example, the Abraj Al-Balt, also seems to be much bigger than the other ones, so it's not too surprising either (?)
I think their is a hidden assumption here that building "the tallest building in the world" is about as difficult to do in 2023 as it was in 1933. 2023 technology and economy are better, enabling a larger building, but the competition also have those advantages, so its a wash.
I feel this assumption is doing a lot of work throughout. Back in the 60's building (for example) a big passenger jet was the kind of engineering project a large company might pursue. In the modern world we might also want a large passenger jet, but in order for developing it to be worth anyone's time it needs to significantly outperform the jets already on sale on some important metric(s).
If you are engineering a new type of thing that has not come before then that requires a certain type of organisation and mindset. Maybe here its ok for the fuel efficiency to be 20% worse than it might have been if it gets the engine design finished 3 months faster.
But if you are coming into a crowded market, and you intend to make something that is fundamentally just an improvement on machines that already exist, then it is likely that you want a completely different approach. You would take the efficiency over the time saved.
I notice that (perhaps excluding the pentagon) the examples all appear to be of the first kind. A lesson that could be drawn is "doing something novel might be risky and expensive, but it is often faster than improving on an existing technology."
Although every building is "novel" even today, they're not "improvements on an existing building". It's a new site every time with a new blueprint. So your novelty point should apply, yet skyscrapers build slower now.
I do think the Burj Khalifa is also an outlier, and not representative of typical building speed, at least in the West.
I've only skimmed this, but what I read was very interesting. So thanks for writing this post!
Also, consider crossposting this on the Progress Forum.
Promoted to curated. I do think the top comments are pretty important context, in that I think some of the quotes and source material in this kind of post are probably pretty biased in how they present things, but nevertheless I find these case studies still really interesting, and I think there is a quite natural category of organizations here that deserves to be studied. I also in-general think this kind of post that tries to extract key quotes and material from longer existing works is quite valuable, and I would love to see more of that on the margin.
I really enjoyed this article. As a practicing structural engineer and manager, there are lots of take-aways that can help me and my team do better. Great summary and linking of the various programs.
Glad to hear :) If you've got any anecdotes about how the examples in the post similar/different to things you've seen in your job, I'd pretty curious
With regard to the building example and concurrent design/construction, we see this method frequently with design-build delivery projects. Unfortunately, in many cases the need for assigning financial accountability results in the usual layers of bureaucracy and slowing of the process (shop drawing reviews, etc.). IPD (integrated project delivery) attempts to solve this, and does in many ways, but is very cumbersome to set up, and is therefore effective on only very large projects. In order to take the risks inherent with concurrent design and construction, the "owner" has to be willing to fail (at least in small ways).
An aside, we tout BIM (building information modelling, usually using Revit) as a solution for better coordination and smoother construction, when it usually results in the opposite, due to increasing project complexity. Making the building simple, with repeated components (the window example was a great one) is a better answer.
Making the building simple, with repeated components (the window example was a great one) is a better answer
Yeah... I was once working on a remodeling project, and had the "clever" idea that we could save time by only selectively demoing certain sections. "Tear down this wall, but leave this window-sill, and this doorframe looks good, leave that too, oh and maybe leave this section of drywall which looks fine"...
Terrible idea. Crews got confused and paralyzed. I now believe it's much faster to just give clear and simple instructions -- "tear it all down to the studs". In the chaos and complexity of dealing with a building, simple instructions allow crews to move more independently and make their own decisions, and also makes it more feasible to deploy more labor (as it's easier to onboard and delegate).
Even when you build alone. Let's say you'll redo the tapestry in one room, with four nice regular walls, but in one corner there's an ornamental stone pillar. Then you can spend one day doing the four walls, and three days just getting the details right near the pillar.
Regularities save time. Each irregularity is a massive delay.
It is a very interesting set of case studies and thank you for digging in the historical documents!
Several thoughts:
Patrick Collison has a fantastic list of examples of people quickly accomplishing ambitious things together since the 19th Century. It does make you yearn for a time that feels... different, when the lethargic behemoths of government departments could move at the speed of a racing startup:
[Note: that paragraph is from a different post.]
Inspired by partly by Patrick's list, I spent some of my vacation reading and learning about various projects from this Lost Age. I then wrote up a memo to share highlights and excerpts with my colleagues at Lightcone.
After that, some people encouraged me to share the memo more widely -- and I do think it's of interest to anyone who harbors an ambition for greatness and a curiosity about operating effectively.
How do you build the world's tallest building in only a year? The world's largest building in the same amount of time? Or America's first fighter jet in just 6 months?
How??
Writing this post felt like it helped me gain at least some pieces of this puzzle. If anyone has additional pieces, I'd love to hear them in the comments.
Empire State Building
The Empire State was the tallest building in the world upon completion in April 1931. Over my vacation I read a rediscovered 1930s notebook, written by the general contractors themselves. It details the construction process and the organisation of the project.
I will share some excerpts, but to contextualize them, consider first some other skyscrapers built more recently:
(list from skyscrapercenter.com)
Now, from the Empire State book’s foreword:
How did they accomplish this? Here are some things that stood out to me about their process.
Designs were made in groups that had representatives from all the key parts of the domain
The team faced a tricky high-dimensional problem requiring lots of different knowledge to pull off. Here’s a quote from the 1930 issue of Fortune magazine:
In response:
For example, the mechanical engineers Meyer, Strong and Jones that noted building the elevators would involve larger installation, greater car sizes, heavier loads, higher speeds and longer travel than any previously known project. But still: “The proper simultaneous development of building, steel and elevator plans avoided the common error of attempting to fit an elevator plant into a previously fixed building arrangement and steel layout.”
The team’s effort to pull in the people with detailed object-level knowledge to surface constraints and potential blockers went really deep -- the designers even brought in metal fabricators to help consult on the drawings.
The design of the building was deliberately optimised for being fast to construct
For the building’s windows, “the aim was to standardize the elements as much as possible, creating a sort of kit of parts that would speed both fabrication and erection, Among 5704 metal spandrels there were only eighteen variations”. For other parts of the facade pieces were left rough and unfinished if they could be covered with a trim, the erection sequence was redesigned to remove the traditional complex exterior scaffolding work and instead be erectable from inside the building, and pieces were designed to have fewer intersections with other pieces in order to make installation smoother.
They made clever optimisations in storing and moving material
The team faced two key logistical problems: scheduling of deliveries and moving materials efficiently in both vertical and horizontal directions.
Since they were building in the busy center of New York, they had only very little onsite storage of supplies, yet at peak operation they received materials from about 500 trucks a day -- or about one every minute throughout the 8-hour workday!
(Funnily enough, one of the oldest known construction laws is the prohibition of daytime passage of carts bearing building materials through the streets of imperial Rome.)
They would always keep the ground floor free of temporary structures to allow trucks to drive in, then cut shafts from the top of the building to the first floor allowing them to dump have debris straight into down onto the back of trucks rather than into intermediate storage piles, and they even built a mini railway for moving material around inside the building. From the book:
The general contractor designed and optimized the work to disentangle different workers as much as they could
Design and construction proceeded at the same time
Here’s a diagram they made for tracking the steel processing: it charts 5 processes happening in parallel, with associated target dates -- drawings from the architects, mill orders, shop drawings, steel delivery, and steel erection.
You can see that the steel for the first floors is being erected before the drawings for the top floor have even been finished.
They used meticulous planning and supervision
We saw an example of the need for detailed scheduling above, in the fast-track steel erection.
This was also the case for receiving one truck delivery every minute, and general contractor Eken said “We ran trucks for that one the way they run train in and out of Grand Central. If a truck missed its place in line on Tuesday, it had to wait until Wednesday to get back in line”.
The team also set various legible speed targets: they decided to attempt to erect the building at a rate of one story a day. (p. 29)
In addition, they had a whole slew of watchmen and checkers. They would walk through the site, make notes that every man was actually on-site (they checked on each worker I think 4 times per day(!)), kept detailed track of inventory, as well as records of what got accomplished each day.
Here’s their org chart, if you want to zoom in.
Here’s an example page from a the daily job activity notes:
Overall, the construction of the Empire State is a remarkable achievement. Yet:
Pentagon
I didn't quite find the time to fully finish this section, but I care about the Pentagon example and it provides some interesting context.
The same guy, General Groves ran two of the biggest and most efficient mega-projects of the 20th Century: the Pentagon construction and the Manhattan project.
The work was stressful enough that Groves said he was “hoping to get to a war theater so I could find a little peace.”
Skunk Works
The Skunk Works was a sub-division of Lockheed, that built primarily spy aircraft between 1940s and 1970s.
For example, in 1943 the Skunk Works both designed and built America’s first fighter jet, the P80 Shooting Star, in just 5 months. Chief engineer Kelly Johnson worked with a scrappy team of, at its peak, 23 designers and 105 fabricators. Nonetheless, a modified version of the resulting plane ended up being operationally used as a trainer by the air force for 40 years.
For comparison: Boeing used more than 10,000 engineers to design the 777. And that was with the aid of computers and 3D modelling software. Kelly made diagrams by hand and calculations by slide rule.
The Skunk Works culture was all about keeping things small and fast:
They also built this prototype ship that I'm including here because I really like how dope it seemed, even though it never became more than a prototype:
As described by Kelly’s protege, Ben Rich:
But their crowning achievement was a plane so legendary that Elon Musk literally named his child after it...
(The plane was called A-12 or SR-71, which are two different iterations on basically the same model.)
Why was it so great?
Despite being a military plane that was used to overfly hostile territory, it didn’t have any guns, flares, or other defense mechanisms. Because it was so damn fast that if anyone shot at it the standard defensive maneuver was to accelerate and fly faster.
Its cruising speed was literally faster than a speeding bullet. It flew a mile in 1.5 seconds. That’s Los Angeles to Washington in 1h. In spite of being shot at over 4000 times in its history, it was never shot down, and I believe it’s the only US military plane for which this is true. It flew high enough that the Soviet fighters couldn’t even reach its altitude. They just helplessly flew up to 20,000 feet below, put in full afterbuner and pushed their planes hard enough that they permanently damaged their engines, and hopelessly fired their missiles.
Despite being built in the 1960s without the aid of computers, it remains to this day the fastest air-breathing manned aircraft ever constructed.
Yet some of these advances also made it harder for Lockheed to sell it (though there were also additional strategic reasons it wasn't mass produced). As described by a CIA engineer inside the Skunk Works:
At its peak there were 75 engineers working on its design. (At the peak of production there were 8000 workers producing one plane a month.)
The construction story itself is insane. They couldn’t use normal materials because at the speeds the SR-71 was flying, the air around it got hot enough that it would just melt normal metals used for the fuselage. So they chose to use titanium, even though no one had ever built a plane out of titanium before. They didn’t even know how to work it: it was strong enough that their tools would break just trying to cut it. They had to invent novel manufacturing methods just to work it, and teach those to their fabricators. And they had to do some crazy detective work to deal with new failure modes that cropped up: for example, after noticing that some titanium panels would suddenly fail after only six or seven weeks. They eventually realized that the titanium was super vulnerable to chlorine, and that those panels had been welded during July and August, after which they had to be washed, yet this time of year the local water system was heavily chlorinated to prevent algae growth.
The aircraft went from idea to service in 20 months. For comparison, the US most recent fighter generation of fighter jet, the F35, started development in 1995 and only started full-rate production in 2021.
Okay. So how did they do it?
One electrical engineer on the project recounts the following story:
Moreover, Kelly did us an amazing favor, in explicitly writing down his 14 rules for management. They were as follows:
[The small teams were a key component here. In order to avoid the need for lengthy documentation, Kelly would enforce a rule to “Never put an engineer more than fifty feet from the assembly area”. (p. 222)]
[JL: this contrasts with some contracts, where the air force asks the contractor to build the plane, but insists on only testing it themselves. Kelly would personally do user interviews with fighter pilots to obtain the specs for his planes, and would also insist on joining the test pilots to fly them himself, in order to iterate on the design.]
In addition to these rules, here’s how Kelly’s successor described what made the Skunk Works tick:
SpaceX
I also read “Liftoff: the desperate early days that launched SpaceX”, which chronicles the company from like 2002 to 2008, when they were still young, scrappy and closer to a size that I feel able to reason about. Elon is well known as a magnate: but what were things like when he had a 10-person team?
SpaceX are also relevant because they work in hardware, in an industry usually requiring extremely large upfront capital investments (it used to be only governments who launched rockets), and they were started in a time where the Molochian decay in America’s ability to build was already far gone. Gwynne Shotwell, SpaceX COO, said that, roughly, trying to explain to government customers how and why spaceX used an iterative design philosophy was “one of the hardest things I’ve had to work on for almost my entire career at SpaceX” (p. 104).
Judging from speed alone, doing rocketry from scratch seems harder than building skyscrapers or planes. SpaceX built their in-house engine in about 3.5 years, successfully made their first launch in 5 years, and made orbit in 6 years. For comparison, Jeff Bezos Blue Origin was founded earlier, in 2000, and has still not reached orbit after twenty years [at least when the Liftoff book was published].
Here I have collected some excerpts that stood out to me from the book, on areas relevant to current questions I’m mulling over about org structure at Lightcone.
Team size at various points
SpaceX hired their 14th employee after about one year (Elon had a personal assistant from the beginning). They also spend about a year on design before building their first prototype.
After three years, close to them finishing their first engine and getting ready for the first full launch test, they had a team of 160 people total, with about 12-30 engineers, technicians, and managers working on the little atoll in the Marshall Islands that they launched from, and about 20 people at their McGregor Texas test site. (p. 76, p. 114, p.156)
Decisions on the spot
And, relatedly:
They were able to do much of the work themselves
Some of their senior engineers were also good enough electricians to wire and iterate on avionics circuits themselves. Others weren’t, but had to learn:
“In the early Falcon 1 day we did a little bit of everything”, structures engineer Li said. “I learned how to use a rivet gun, and how to weld things together.” (p. 131)
How they dealt with life side-constraints
Another early engineer couldn’t move to Los Angeles because his wife had gotten a job at Google in SF that she really liked. So Musk spoke to Larry Page, who agreed that the engineer’s wife could be transferred to the Google LA office instead.
On ownership
And a related Skunk Works quote:
---
---
They frequently paid a lot for fast shipping
Musk would sometimes lend his private jet for shipping parts. At its peak, they spent $500k and some political favors to rent a massive military cargo plane to ship their prototype rocket to the Marshall Islands, instead of shipping it by ship for a few weeks.
According to Kevin Brogan, early SpaceX employee:
For key roles, Elon hired experienced domain experts who were willing to have their thinking molded into his operational philosophy. For their teams, he hired younger generalists
Tim Buzza, launch director:
What changed?
Why was the ability to build lost? Some relevant quotes:
Note that the F-35 was built by the *same* Lockheed that also ran the Skunk Works! :(
Here’s from Peter Thiel-affiliated defense startup Anduril (my model is that they’re sort of like Palantir, but for hardware) on changes in defense spending: