I originally asked this on math.stackexchange; after reading Diffractor's Unifying Bargaining sequence (Part 1 here) I'm wondering if there are more insights floating about, so I'm repeating it here.
Shapley values seem to be the standard answer to "how should a coalition split the rewards of their cooperation", but I'm curious about alternatives.
The standard characterization of Shapley values says that Shapley values are the unique coalition payments which satisfy a bunch of properties. Three of them (efficiency, symmetry, and null player) seem pretty necessary for any "reasonable" or "practical" coalition payment rule, but the last one (linearity) does not.
If I didn't care for linearity (or its close synonyms, additivity and aggregation):
- What sorts of payment rules become available?
- What other properties of Shapley values are maintained?
- What other properties would produce a uniquely characterized payment rule?
Alternatively, are any of the other properties also reasonable to drop (for instance, symmetry)? What do you end up with?
Huh, here's what looks like a survey of variations on the Shapley Value - I'll take a look!