I originally asked this on math.stackexchange; after reading Diffractor's Unifying Bargaining sequence (Part 1 here) I'm wondering if there are more insights floating about, so I'm repeating it here.
Shapley values seem to be the standard answer to "how should a coalition split the rewards of their cooperation", but I'm curious about alternatives.
The standard characterization of Shapley values says that Shapley values are the unique coalition payments which satisfy a bunch of properties. Three of them (efficiency, symmetry, and null player) seem pretty necessary for any "reasonable" or "practical" coalition payment rule, but the last one (linearity) does not.
If I didn't care for linearity (or its close synonyms, additivity and aggregation):
- What sorts of payment rules become available?
- What other properties of Shapley values are maintained?
- What other properties would produce a uniquely characterized payment rule?
Alternatively, are any of the other properties also reasonable to drop (for instance, symmetry)? What do you end up with?
I wasn't asking "what payment rules still satisfy the three remaining properties", I was asking "what other payment rules are there which satisfy the three remaining properties but not additivity" (with bonus questions "what other properties of Shapley values do we still get just from those three properties" and "what properties other than additivity can we add to those three properties which again pin down a unique rule").
My aim here, which I admit is nebulous, is to get a rough overview of the space of different payment rules (for example, this answer on math.stackexchange namedrops the 'pre-kernel' and 'pre-nucleolus' - I assume there's more where that came from!).
Ideally, and I know this is a cartoonish and unrealistic goal, I'd have:
I just found a presentation of linearity which motivates it as preserving expected payout before and after an uncertain event, which both adds usefulness-points to the property (for me) and vaguely suggests where you might not want that property, but no concrete example comes to mind.