Book Review: Being You by Anil Seth
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That being said, Seth does present the reader with the good old cloning thought experiment. Seth asks the reader to imagine a machine that is capable of creating a perfect clone of someone and then asks if the clone is the same person or someone else. He completely ignores the No-cloning theorem in quantum mechanics. I don't understand the point of these "thought experiments" when physics has ruled them out. Seth criticises Chalmers' philosophical zombies but then makes the same mistake.
I think you're nitpicking here about no-cloning. Here are his exact words:
Imagine that a future version of me, perhaps not so far away, offers you the deal of a lifetime. I can replace your brain with a machine that is its equal in every way, so that from the outside, nobody could tell the difference. This new machine has many advantages – it is immune to decay, and perhaps it will allow you to live forever.
But there’s a catch. Since even future-me is not sure how real brains give rise to consciousness, I can’t guarantee that you will have any conscious experiences at all, should you take up this offer. Maybe you will, if consciousness depends only on functional capacity, on the power and complexity of the brain’s circuitry, but maybe you won’t, if consciousness depends on a specific biological material – neurons, for example. Of course, since your machine-brain leads to identical behaviour in every way, when I ask new-yo whether you are conscious, new-you will say yes. But what if, despite this answer, life – for you – is no longer in the first person?
Maybe he shouldn't have said "equal in every way" because that kinda implies "down to the last quantum fluctuation of the last quark". But in context, I think it's pretty clear that he means that the operations only need to be similar enough to get out indistinguishable-from-the-outside behavior. Most people (including me … in fact including almost everyone but Roger Penrose) think that there's no important information stored in the exact quantum state of a biological system at a particular moment. After all, everything is getting randomly knocked around by water molecules every nanosecond, which changes the quantum state in random ways, but the system still functions fine. So if you (in principle) measure the state of the brain at or near the quantum limit (but not beyond the quantum limit), and then run that simulation forward using the most accurate microscopic physics simulation currently available, I'm confident that this would be good enough to get indistinguishable-from-the-outside simulated behavior. (In fact, I think it would be massive overkill.)
On some further thought, although the quote you shared is relevant, it is not exactly the part of the book that I was referring to. I was referring to the teleportation thought experiment in chapter 8 "Expect Yourself":
One day, there’s a hitch. The vaporisation module in London malfunctions and Eva – the Eva who is in London, anyway – feels like nothing’s happened and that she’s still in the transportation facility. A minor inconvenience. They’ll have to reboot the machine and try again, or maybe leave it until the following day. But then a technician shuffles into the room, carrying a gun. He mumbles something along the lines of ‘Don’t worry, you’ve been safely teletransported to Mars, just like normal, it’s just that the regulations say that we still need to … and, look here, you signed this consent form …’ He slowly raises his weapon and Eva has a feeling she’s never had before, that maybe this teletransportation malarkey isn’t quite so straightforward after all.
The point of this thought experiment, which is called the ‘teletransportation paradox’, is to unearth some of the biases most of us have when we think about what it means to be a self.
...
Is the Eva on Mars (let’s call her Eva2) the same person as Eva1 (the Eva still in London)? It’s tempting to say, yes, she is: Eva2 would feel in every way as Eva1 would have felt had she actually been transported instantaneously from London to Mars. What seems to matter for this kind of personal identity is psychological continuity, not physical continuity.* But then if Eva1 has not been vaporised, which is the real Eva?
I think the correct – but admittedly strange – answer is that both are the real Eva.
My disagreement relating to the no-cloning theorem aside, I have another disagreement about Seth's conclusion here. Claiming that the "correct" answer is that they are both the same person really stretches the idea of selfhood. Seth doesn't justify convincingly why he thinks this is the "correct" answer.
If the teleportation paradox is physically possible (if this imaginary machine must destroy the body to clone it, then how could it malfunction and still perform the cloning?), then I find Derek Parfit's answer (YouTube version) to the teleportation paradox more persuasive.
Parfit argues that any criteria we attempt to use to determine sameness of person will be lacking, because there is no further fact. What matters, to Parfit, is simply "Relation R", psychological connectedness, including memory, personality, and so on.
The "selfhood" relation doesn't necessarily have to be symmetric or transitive, but the term is used as if it is, and I think this causes a lot of problems in discussion.
Eva1 and Eva2 likely both consider Eva0 (who walked into the machine) to be their past self, but that doesn't mean that they must automatically consider themselves to be the same person as each other. It also doesn't mean that Eva0 would agree with one or both of them.
I also think there is not any objective, external way to determine this relation: it's purely psychological.
However, if I think further into a future where people could copy themselves, and later psychologically integrate both sets of memories, behaviour, and so on, then Eva1 and Eva2 in such a world may well consider themselves to be the same person as each other, and also some future Eva3,4, and so on. The thought of this few minutes branch of herself not contributing to her future self's memories might not be so horrible, but I don't think she'd merely take the word of a technician that Eva2 actually exists to carry on her survival.
Excellent points. I hadn’t given much thought to the psychological vs external sameness of selfhood.
One is naturally lead to wonder about how such dilemma would be dealt with in legal proceedings. Your assertion about the lack of an external objective criteria for the sameness of selfhood implies that if Eva1 committed a crime then we cannot reasonably convict Eva2 for it.
As Seth justly states, immediately after the cloning, all the Eva's become different persons because they acquire different experiences. They do share a common history but they will soon start telling different stories about this history just as different people do.
Yes, legal identity is an even bigger can of worms. Even in some cases in the real world, you can already lose your continuity of "legal identity" in some corner cases. Being able to duplicate people would just make it even messier.
Do duplicates "inherit" into some sort of joint ownership of property? Is the property divided like inheritance? Are they new people entirely with no claims on property at all? What about citizenship? If Eva0 committed a crime, should we hold both Eva1 and Eva2 responsible for it? If after duplication Eva2 committed a crime that strongly benefits Eva1, but killed herself before conviction, can the prosecution go after Eva1? Do they need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intent was in the mind of Eva0 before duplication?
Being able to "merge" mind states would make it very much messier still.
Do they need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intent was in the mind of Eva0 before duplication?
That's gnarly.
Another aspect that I'm led to contemplate is the ease of collusion with your clone. It's reasonable to believe that Eva1 would collude with Eva2 more easily than with an entirely different person.
Very insightful comment, Steven. Putting it that way, I agree with you that the quantum fluctuations (most likely) don’t matter for our experiences.
I was indeed nitpicking, but the broader point I'm interested in is about the futility of thought experiments that ignore the constraints imposed by physics rather than about whether quantum fluctuations play a role in how consciousness works.
This quote from Frank Wilczek claims that we are yet to attribute any high-level phenomena to quantum fluctuations:
Consistency requires the metric field to be a quantum field, like all the others. That is, the metric field fluctuates spontaneously. We do not have a satisfactory theory of these fluctuations. We know that the effects of quantum fluctuations in the metric field are usually—in our experience so far, always—small in practice, simply because we get very successful theories by ignoring them! From delicate biochemistry to exotic goings-on at accelerators to the evolution of stars and the early moments of the big bang, we’ve been able to make precise predictions, and have seen them accurately verified, while ignoring possible quantum fluctuations in the metric field. Moreover, the modern GPS system maps out space and time directly. It doesn’t allow for quantum gravity, yet it works very well. Experimenters have worked very hard to discover any effect that could be ascribed to quantum fluctuations in the metric field, or, in other words, to quantum gravity. Nobel Prizes and everlasting glory would attend such a discovery. So far, it hasn’t happened.
The Good Regulator Theorem asserts that "every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system." Therefore, the air conditioning system must have some heat-map (e.g. via thermostats) of the building (i.e. a model). Similarly, for an organism to maintain its existence, it must have a model of the system it is trying to sustain, i.e. a model of itself and its surrounding environment. This way, the organism can remain within a narrow set of favourable physical states (the organism's attractor set) which allow it to stay alive.
This was insightful. I haven't previously thought of my consciousness as being part of the same continuum as bunch of thermostats but in hindsight it's very obvious.
I notice how my ability to conceive philosophical zombies has decreased even more.
If I recall correctly, I was first introduced to the map-territory meme via LessWrong, and I've found it a useful idea in that it has helped me conceptualise the world and my place in it more clearly (as far as I can tell). I hear with great interest that you, too, have found this perspective insightful!
[The following are speculative ramblings.]
I wonder what the limits of map-territory convergence are and what those limits tell us about the limits of intelligence. Is complete convergence possible? Or is the limit determined by computational irreducibility (the idea that you cannot model some systems perfectly, you simply have to watch them unfold to find out what they do)? Is the universe a map that perfectly reflects the territory (itself)? Or is the universe yet another map of a yet deeper reality? I guess these questions belong to the realm of metaphysics.
Well of course I was already familiar with map-territory distinction, and while insightful itself, it wasn't the insight I grasped from that paragraph.
The new insight is deeper understanding to what degree consciousness is functionally necessary for human behaviour. Literally as necessary as thermostats for air conditioning system. Also, while understanding that I have maps of reality in my consciousness, I suppose, I wasn't explicitly thinking that my consciousness is itself a map.
Indeed! The good regulator theorem certainly gives concreteness to the abstract notion of a map. I find clarity in viewing intelligence/consciousness as analogous to the processes of mapmaking—walking around, surveying the territory, recording observations, and so on—rather than simply the map. In my view, this analogy to mapmaking makes more explicit the relationship between physical processes and intelligence/consciousness and the ever-changing nature of the map. I find it a little mind-blowing to conceptualise the map as the territory modelling itself.
I recommend chapter 5 (and related chapters) of A Thousand Brains by Jeff Hawkins for a physiological explanation of the idea of a map and how it manifests in the brain's structure.
...every cortical column learns models of objects. The columns do this using the same basic method that the old brain uses to learn models of environments. Therefore, we proposed that each cortical column has a set of cells equivalent to grid cells, another set equivalent to place cells, and another set equivalent to head direction cells, all of which were first discovered in parts of the old brain.
[Disclaimer: I have not completed reading A Thousand Brains and I have not scrupulously scrutinised it yet.]
I’ve come across this idea about the similarities between brain structure and the structure of our physical environment in several places now (both K Friston and J Hawkins talk about it).
- Brains have thin and long connections between neurons, which we can compare to forces that appear to act at a distance, such as light reflecting off an object and reaching our eyes almost instantaneously or gravity acting on a falling apple.
- The deeply nested hierarchical structure of the connectome is analogous to the hierarchical nature of physical systems (composition and abstraction).
- The human brain processes whatness and whereness in different regions. If we lived in a reality where an object changed its nature every time it moved, it would be more efficient to combine whatness and whereness processing into the same region.
All this is highly speculative but hints at a map-territory correspondence between brains and their environments.
I am just about to finish Being You and had a rising frustration which I did not quite where to take ... so hope am not bothering anyone by raising it here.
Seth's hope that his account of consciousness will dissolve the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" into the "Real Problem of Consciousness" did not at all work for me. He frequently uses terms like 'causation' and 'correlation' to describe the relationship between physical states of bodies and brains, on the one hand, and mental phenomena, on the other. The more I think about it, that just has to be wrong.
Please bare with me a moment to for an analogy.
If I imagine having complete information about the physical state of a billiard ball moving toward two other billiard balls it will soon come to strike sending them off in their respective (different) directions, it is accurate to say: 1) the first billiard ball "caused" the movement of the other two; 2) the movements of the other two are "correlated"; and 3) if I also have an account of the heat generated by the collision such that all of the energy present in the state at which I had complete information is accounted for in the collision, then I have a complete description of the causal effects of the collision (and so too the resulting correlations between the objects effected by that 'causal' event).
So the same ought to be true if I had a complete description of a neuron which is about to impart an electrical charge to two other previously uncharged neurons. The activity of the two other neurons will be correlated (as between each other) because their energized states would have been 'caused' by the activity of the first neuron. And if I also account for any additional energy present at the time at which I had complete information (e.g some heat), then there can be no other causes arising from the activity of the first neuron.
The problem is, unlike in the case of the billiard balls, there can be a phenomena in the consciousness of a person whose brain houses the three neurons. The mental phenomena associated with the first neuron's activity can't stand in a relationship of causation to that neuron because all of the energy present in the state at which I had complete information has already been accounted for. Correlation also doesn't work as a term because if we assume that there is also mental phenomena associated with the activity of the two previously uncharged neurons, it would have to be a result of a prior causal effect on those two neurons, but we just said that the first neuron caused their energetic states and its energy has already been entirely accounted for.
So what is the right English word for the relationship at issue?
Up until today I thought "constitutive' was the right word to use to describe the relationship; but I just realized that doesn't quite work either, at least not in the ordinary sense. For example, if I were to see a black billiard ball standing against a white background from a distance, I might initially mistake it for a two dimensional picture of a billiard ball. Then when I get closer I would notice it is a three-dimensional object (an actual billiard ball). It's depth is a constituent part of it which I had not initially noticed. But going back to the idea of having complete information about the physical state of such an object. If I had had that when I saw it from a distance, I would never have made the mistake of treating it as two-dimensional in the first place.
But that, again, isn't what is going on with the appearance of phenomena in consciousness because, again, it is not described or anticipated by the dynamical states of the neurons any more than it would be for billiard balls.
The only way 'constitutive' seems to work as a description of what is going is if we treat the appearance in consciousness as another dimension in a similar way to how I just treated depth as an additional dimension I come to notice about the billiard ball. It is just that with the dimension of mental phenomena, it can't be a 'physical' ... because, again, all the physical consequences and correlates of the neurons' dynamical activity has already been accounted for.
That seems to be a really hard problem which Seth -- mistakenly to my mind -- believes he has dissolved.
I was disappointed to see Seth ignore Scott Aaronson's incisive knock-down of IIT.
Yes, and also, here's a different incisive knock-down of IIT that I found very compelling.
That's easier to understand for me than Aaronson's, thanks. Interestingly, the author of that blog post (Jake R. Hanson) seems to have just published a version of it as a proper scientific paper in Neuroscience of Consciousness this past August... a journal whose editor-in-chief is Anil Seth, the author of the book reviewed above! Not sure if it comes up in the book or not, considering the book was published just this September—it's probably too recent unfortunately.
I love the title of that paper. Formalising falsification for theories of consciousness is exactly what the consciousness space needs to maximise signal and minimise noise. Thank you for sharing it! I’m going to give that paper a read. I’m very curious about how J R Hanson defines “consciousness”. To falsify a theory, we first need to be precise about what it must predict.
I am fairly certain that Anil Seth did not mention either of these incisive knock-downs of IIT in the book but I could’ve missed it. The reason I’m so certain is because the way Seth spoke about IIT was of admiration and approval. I’m sure he would’ve updated.
Also, Phi is not at all poorly defined. You can analyze any system, find the spatio-temporal scale at which that system is most integrated, (the scale at which the behavior of the system is more than the sum of its parts and therefore fully analyzable only as a single whole), and then calculate using either the Kullback-Leibler divergence or the Earth Mover’s Distance (Wasserstein’s metric) - (different versions of the theory use different statistical methods) - the exact value of Phi as a measure of the amount of integrated information in a system. The fact that the theory is being “refined” is a testimony to its appeal. The original paper “A Provisional Manifesto” is still the best overall description of the theory, and one that actually goes into some (very complicated) detail about how the “architecture” of the n-dimensional information space implied by the theory maps onto phenomenology.
FWIW, I found Scott Aaronson’s analysis of of IIT intellectually uncharitable. He didn’t seem interested in understanding the theory on it’s own terms, and his main criticism, that a grid of logic gates could be conscious if IIT is correct, unconvincing. If neurons could be conscious, why not grids? There is even some neurological evidence that the brain is actually organized in grid structures, especially cortex, but the tangled and coiled up physiology of the brain obscures this fact.
Seems that Seth doesn’t understand the Zombie argument at all. Assuming Seth believes in the causal closure of the physical world (I don’t think he believes consciousness is an immaterial force “filling in” the causal gaps of indeterminate physical processes in the brain), he should take Zombies more seriously. The Zombie argument applies to any physical process no matter how “complex” since physical processes can always be conceived to happen exactly the same way “in the dark”, as a zombie. If the physical world is causally closed, all the causal “work” is done physically in the brain in a coherent, intelligible way and consciousness is only assumed because we know about it from first person experience. Zombies are a convincing way to make the Hard Problem explicit via a thought experiment. His example of imagining a A380 moving backwards is irrelevant because the incoherency there is implied by the non-controversial ontological character of the matter that constitutes it: given that matter is what is and if when I’m imagining a A380 I’m really imagining a physical object, then I can’t “actually” imagine it moving backward because it wouldn’t really be actual matter I’m imagining. (What I could imagine is the phenomenal experience of seeing something “like” that happen, like a special effect in a movie. I’m actually imagining a potential possible experience.) Zombies are a different kind of conceivability question altogether. It’s precisely consciousness’ radically different ontological nature that the Zombie argument is attempting to bring to fore. To argue against zombies you’d have to demonstrate why physical processes MUST be conscious, (probably impossible given the fundamental modality of “physical” explanation itself) or introduce a new fundamental ontology of the world such that zombies are impossible because the concept of the physical world, as implied by zombie dualism, doesn’t exist. (IIT actually veers in this direction.)
Isn't consciousness just a "read-only access thing to the world" then? Like is there some reason why dualism is not isomorphic to parallelism?
Remark: When talking about consciousness, adherence to physicalism is necessary. Information is fundamentally physical (refer to papers by R Landauer and D Deutsch).
If everything is physical , information is physical. There's no argument for information being solely physical that doesn't assume physicalism.
There is nothing magical about information, emotions, intuitions and consciousness.
Magic is a poorly defined term, but it is not the case that all these things are well understood -- particularly the phenomenal aspect of emotion.
They all obey the laws of physics. DHCA is hard evidence against the existence of an immaterial soul that leaves the body after death:
Fully detachable souls are not the only non-physicalist theory
Calling something we do not yet understand ‘emergent’ doesn’t help us understand it any better than saying nothing.
It excludes detachable soul theory, and pure idealism, if nothing else, so it has some information.
Trying to explain consciousness via introspection is like trying to explain how Google works by doing Google searches
Ignoring introspective evidence amounts to ignoring the single most central feature of consciousness, and focussing on side-issues instead.
Taking introspective evidence seriously does not amount to taking it as incorrigible, and so does not beg the question against physicalism or illusionism.
Can you imagine an A380 flying backwards? Of course you can. Just imagine a large plane in the air, moving backwards. Is such a scenario really conceivable? Well, the more you know about aerodynamics and aeronautical engineering, the less conceivable it becomes. It just cannot be done.
Seth follows this up with a knock-down argument against Chalmers’ philosophical zombies:
In one sense it’s trivial to imagine a philosophical zombie. I just picture a version of myself wandering around without having any conscious experiences. But can I really conceive this? What I’m being asked to do, really, is to consider the capabilities and limitations of a vast network of many billions of neurons and gazillions of synapses (the connections between neurons), not to mention glial cells and neurotransmitter gradients and other such neurobiological goodies, all wrapped into a body interacting with a world which includes other brains in other bodies. Can I do this? Can anyone do this? I doubt it.
That's a disanalogous analogy. In the first case, we cant imagine the plane flying backwards in terms of our knowledge of aerodynamics, because aerodynamics makes it impossible; in the second case, we don't have a theory that makes it inevitable that neural activity must be accompanied by phenomenal consciousness -- such a theory would be an answer to the hard problem.
I would define "physical" as the set of rigid rules governing reality that exist beyond our experience and that we cannot choose to change.
I can cause water to freeze to form ice using my agency, but I cannot change the fundamental rules governing water, such as its freezing point. These rules go beyond my agency and, in fact, constrain my agency.
Physics constrains everything else in a way that everything else does not constrain physics, and thus the primacy of physics.
If there were a rigid law that the wicked are punished karmically, would that count as physical?