Your summary is that there might be a difference between students and adults here, but isn't the last paragraph of the quoted text saying that they considered this hypothesis, but that students were also non-hyperbolic when they tested them under the same protocol?
The students were more hyperbolic, but not much. That they advertise it that way just shows how much they wanted to find hyperbolic discounting somewhere, and makes their failure to that much more credible (unless it's all an elaborate con!).
So far as I recall, Ainslie's thesis is that the various "modules" of the brain have hyperbolic discount curves which are then composed to yield an exponential curve. Akrasia is what happens when particularly strong specific impulses spike above the exponential discount curve. Ainslie predicts what you actually see: lots of people making rational decisions punctuated by failures of "willpower" large and small.
I'm also unsure whether you're overstating LessWrong's obsession with akrasia. It's never felt over-generalized. The focus on it seems reasonable enough insofar as LeWers seem to be drawn heavily from students and techies, two groups for whom akrasia can be particularly destructive. So even if hyperbolic discounting is rarer (than I'm still not sure what), the expected negative value of akrasia may be particularly high for LeWers, leading to its perennial popularity.
This is really interesting and I find it surprising given that Glimcher's Neuroeconomics claims you can find specific neurons in monkey brains which fire hyperbolically. Looking forward to reading more on this.
Does "Glimcher's Neuroeconomics" specify exactly which hyperbolic function fits these monkey neurons? All the neural firing models I've seen are based on the sigmoid function, which at least is similar to some hyperbolics.
Also, just to point out, there isn't necessarily any association whatsoever between some complex human behaviour (such as discounting), and the firing dynamics of individual neurons.
Making that leap is similar to believing that the voltage activation functions of transistors in your latest intel processor is related to that function you keep seeing in your matlab program.
No it does not (sadly). He also claims that these firing rates/function predicts actual monkey discounting behavior quite closely.
Preface: I am explaining why this argument doesn't work that well; it doesn't say anything about HD existing.
Well, there are some shady short-term high-interest loan operations in many cases. And it has to be shady, which limits the amount pumped.
Imagine you want to open hyperbolic-discounting operation for money pumping. What can you do? For it to be profitable you have to offer people to exchange little money now for more money later. Looks like banking, so you need to be in the banking business - or be a shady operation. Some part of what banks do fits the bill here, but they can't overdo it without huge and obvious colusion between all players: because short-term interbank loans are relatively cheap, if you try to profit too much there is a huge incentive to undercut you.
Also, with short-term loans (in money or any other form) it simply looks too suspicious...
There are a lot of short-term high-interest loans, which take the form of credit card debt, payday loans, refund anticipation loans, installment plans, and so on. Refund anticipation loans are probably the closest to pure temporal discounting - that's where a tax preparer like H&R Block offers a customer who is due a $X refund from the government a choice between getting that $X later or getting $Y right now instead (in the form of a loan for $Y, which will be repaid by handing over the $X tax refund once it comes in). These examples at least suggest a high discount rate, although they don't definitively point to a hyperbolic shape.
There are a few reasons why these kinds of high-interest loans aren't more common. One is that it's hard to sell a short-term loan to someone with money in the bank, so they mostly target poor people. A second is the point that vi21maobk9vp makes: there's a somewhat competitive market so businesses need to compete by lowering their interest rate (a person who is willing to borrow at a 100% rate will still choose the loan with a 20% rate if they have that option). Also, governments try to put a stop to lending that they see as predatory; for instance, there has been a crackdown on refund anticipation loans over the past few years.
These examples only show high discount rates, not the preference reversal that is characteristic of hyperbolic discounting. But a business model that relies on getting your customers to change their minds (and explicitly reverse their prior decision) seems hard to pull off, and the profit comes from the customers' high-discounting decisions so the incentives aren't really there to try to induce a visible preference reversal.
Subscriptions to services that are cheap for an initial period then get expensive might be a case of preference reversal. People often sign up for them intending to re-evaluate after the introductory period, but when the time comes start procrastinating about it.
But isn’t it odd that for a fundamental fact of human psychology, a huge bias we have spent a ton of collective time discussing and fighting, that it doesn’t seem to lead to much actual money-pumping? The obvious examples like the dieting or gambling industries are pretty small, all things considered.
I wonder if consumer credits qualify as an example of hyperbolic discounting. Basically, people are paying more for the same TV in order to get it faster. That is, a TV now is more valuable to them than the same TV later.
Seems to be more about misapplied non-linearity of money.
TV now should be higher utility than TV later (assuming TV has positive utility and you changing TVs more often than they break down completely): some of your viewing gets shfited from worse TV to a better one. Consumer credits seem to be long enough to come into the area where hyperbolic discounting does not overweight exponential discounting that much.
What gets stressed is that "Ah well, you pay just pocket change now, just pocket change later, just pocket change a few more times later..." And the full price of TV is a big chunk of cash, of course.
I have personal experience of the following in thought experiments:
"Students, the night before an exam, often wish that the exam could be put off for one more day. If asked on that night, such students might agree to commit to paying, say, $10 on the day of the exam for it to be held the next day. Months before the exam is held, however, students generally do not care much about having the exam put off for one day. And, in fact, if the students were made the same offer at the beginning of the term, that is, they could have the exam put off for one day by committing during registration to pay $10 on the day of the exam, they probably would reject that offer. The choice is the same, although made at different points in time. Because the outcome would change depending on the point in time, the students would exhibit time inconsistency People display a consistent bias to believe that they will have more time in the future than they have today. More specifically, there is a persistent belief among people that they are “unusually busy in the immediate future, but will become less busy shortly.” However, this “time slack” is shown to be a bias. However busy you are this week is generally representative of how busy you are in future weeks. When people are estimating their time and when deciding if they will make a commitment, they anticipate more “time slack” in future weeks than the present week. Experiments by Zauberman and Lynch (2005) on this topic showed that people tend to discount investments of time more than money. The authors have nicknamed this the “Yes…Damn” effect because of the tendency to agree to do things in advance (e.g., travel to a conference), but when the time arrives you are very busy and it is inconvenient to attend.[4]""
“Beware of WEIRD psychological samples” because results derived from them may reflect the specific sample more than any kind of generalized truth. And LessWrong has generalized hyperbolic discounting out the wazoo. (See the tags akrasia and discounting.) Hyperbolic discounting is bad, of course, because among other things it leaves on vulnerable to preference reversals and inconsistencies and hence money-pumping.
But isn’t it odd that for a fundamental fact of human psychology, a huge bias we have spent a ton of collective time discussing and fighting, that it doesn’t seem to lead to much actual money-pumping? The obvious examples like the dieting or gambling industries are pretty small, all things considered. And online services like BeeMinder specifically devised on a hyperbolic discounting/picoeconomics basis are, as far as I know, useful but no dramatic breakthrough or silver bullet; again, not quite what one would expect. Like many other heuristics and biases, perhaps hyperbolic discounting isn’t so bad after all, in practice.
Ainslie mentions in Breakdown of Will somewhere that financial incentives can cause people to begin discounting exponentially. What if… hyperbolic discounting doesn’t really exist, in practice? If it may reflect a failure of self-control, a kind of teenager trait, one we find in younger (but not older) populations - like university students?
The following quotes are extracted from the paper “Discounting Behavior: A Reconsideration” (102 pages) by Steffen Andersen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, January 2011: