Without commenting on whether this presentation matches the original metaethics sequence (with which I disagree), this summary argument seems both unsupported and unfalsifiable.
Would this be an accurate summary of what you think is the meta-ethics sequence? I feel that you captured the important bits but I also feel that we disagree on some aspects:
V(Elves, ) = Christmas spirity
V(Pebblesorters, ) = primality
V(Humans, _ ) = morality
If V(Humans, Alice) =/= V(Humans, ) that doesn't make morality subjective, it is rather i...
Unpacking "should" as " morally obligated to" is potentially helpful, so inasmuch as you can give separate accounts of "moral" and "obligatory".
The elves are not moral. Not just because I, and humans like me happen to disagree with them, no, certainly not. The elves aren’t even trying to be moral. They don’t even claim to be moral. They don’t care about morality. They care about “The Christmas Spirit,” which is about eggnog and stuff
That doesn't generalise to the point that non humans have no morality. You have m...
Morality binds and blinds. People derive moral claims from emotional and intuitive notions. It can feel good and moral to do amoral things. Objective morality has to be tied to evidence what really is human wellbeing; not to moral intuitions that are adaptions to the benefit of ones ingroup; or post hoc thought experiments about knowledge.
"ANY coherent formulation of morality whatsoever could be countered with "Is it good?".
Exactly, if you think morality is different from goodness. That is why said "morally right" just means "what it is good for me to do."
That is not the same as what I want at the moment. Humans have an inherent instinct towards seeing good as objective rather than as "what I want" for the same reason that we have an instinct towards seeing dogs and cats as objectively distinct, instead of just saying "dog is what I call dog, and cat is what I call cat, and if I decide to start calling them all dogs, that will be fine too."
Saying that good is just what I happen to want is just the same as saying that dog is whatever I happen to call dog. And both positions are equally ridiculous.
Moral goodness is clearly different form, eg, hedonic goodness. Enjoying killing doesn't mean you should kill.
It might be the case that humans have a mistaken view of the objectivity of morality, but it doesn't follow from that that morality=hedonism. You can't infer the correctness of one of N... (read more)