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if terminal goal changes, agent is not rational. Agent has no control over its terminal goal, or you don't agree?

Why is it relevant that the agent can or cannot change or influence it's goals? Time-inconsistent terminal goals (utility function) are irrational. Time-inconsistent instrumental goals can be rational, if circumstances or beliefs change (in rational ways).

I don't think I'm supporting the orthogonality thesis with this (though I do currently believe the weak form of it - there is a very wide range of goals that is compatible with intelligence, not necessarily all points in goalspace). I'm just saying that goals which are arbitrarily mutable are incompatible with rationality in the Von Neumann-Morgenstern sense.

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Terminal goal vs Intelligence

by Donatas Lučiūnas

26th Dec 2024

1 min read

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Imagine there is a super intelligent agent that has a terminal goal to produce cups. The agent knows that its terminal goal will change on New Year's Eve to produce paperclips. The agent has only one action available to him - start paperclip factory.

When will the agent start the paperclip factory?

2025-01-01 00:00?
Now?
Some other time?

Orthogonality Thesis believers will probably choose 1st. Reasoning would be - as long as terminal goal is cups, agent will not care about paperclips.

However 1st choice conflicts with definition of intelligence. Excerpt from General Intelligence

It’s the ability to steer the future so it hits that small target of desired outcomes in the large space of all possible outcomes

Agent is aware now that desired outcome starting 2025-01-01 00:00 is maximum paperclips. Therefore agent's decision to start paperclip factory now (2nd) would be considered intelligent.

The purpose of this post is to challenge belief that Orthogonality Thesis is correct. Anyway feel free to share other insights you have as well.

Existential riskOrthogonality ThesisOuter AlignmentAI

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[-]Dagon5mo40

Humans face a version of this all the time - different contradictory wants with different timescales and impacts. We don't have and certainly can't access a legible utility function, and it's unknown if any intelligent agent can (none of the early examples we have today can).

So the question as asked is either trivial (it'll depend on the willpower and rationality of the agent whether they optimize for the future or the present), or impossible (goals don't work that way).

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

Let's assume maximum willpower and maximum rationality.

Whether they optimize for the future or the present

I think the answer is in the definition of intelligence.

So which one is it?

The fact that the answer is not straightforward proves my point already. There is a conflict between intelligence and terminal goal and we can debate which will prevail. But the problem is that according to orthogonality thesis such conflict should not exist.

[-]Dagon5mo20

"maximum rationality" is undermined by this time-discontinuous utility function. I don't think it meets VNM requirements to be called "rational".

If it's one agent that has a CONSISTENT preference for cups before Jan 1 and paperclips after jan 1, it could figure out the utility conversion of time-value of objects and just do the math. But that framing doesn't QUITE match your description - you kind of obscured the time component and what it even means to know that it will have a goal that it currently doesn't have.

I guess it could model itself as two agents - the cup-loving agent terminated at the end of the year, and the paperclip-loving agent is created. This would be a very reasonable view of identity, and would imply that it's going to sacrifice paperclip capabilities to make cups before it dies. I don't know how it would rationalize the change otherwise.

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

It seems you say - if terminal goal changes, agent is not rational. How could you say that? Agent has no control over its terminal goal, or you don't agree?

I'm surprised that you believe in orthogonality thesis so much that you think "rationality" is the weak part of this though experiment. It seems you deny the obvious to defend your prejudice. What arguments would challenge your belief in orthogonality thesis?

[-]Dagon5mo20

if terminal goal changes, agent is not rational. Agent has no control over its terminal goal, or you don't agree?

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

Why do you think intelligent agent would follow Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem? It has limitations, for example it assumes that all possible outcomes and their associated probabilities are known. Why not Robust decision-making?

[-]Dagon5mo20

If you have another formal definition of "rational", I'm happy to help extrapolate what you're trying to predict. Decision theories are a different level of abstraction than terminal rationality and goal coherence.

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo*10

Yes, I find terminal rationality irrational (I hope my thought experiment helps illustrate that).

I have another formal definition of "rational". I'll expand a little more.

Once, people had to make a very difficult decision. People had five alternatives and had to decide which was the best. Wise men from all over the world gathered and conferred.

The first to speak was a Christian. He pointed out that the first alternative was the best and should be chosen. He had no arguments, but simply stated that he believed so.

Then a Muslim spoke. He said that the second alternative was the best and should be chosen. He did not have any arguments either, but simply stated that he believed so.

People were not happy, it has not become clearer yet.

The humanist spoke. He said that the third alternative was the best and should be chosen. "It is the best because it will contribute the most to the well-being, progress and freedom of the people," he argued.

Then the existentialist spoke. He pointed out that there was no need to find a common solution, but that each individual could make his own choice of what he thought best. A Catholic can choose the first option, a Muslim the second, a humanist the third. Everyone must decide for himself what is best for him.

Then the nihilist spoke. He pointed out that although the alternatives are different, there is no way to evaluate which alternative is better. Therefore, it does not matter which one people choose. They are all equally good. Or equally bad. The nihilist suggested that people simply draw lots.

It still hasn't become clearer to the people, but patience was running out.

And then a simple man in the crowd spoke up:

We still don't know which is the best alternative, right?
Right, - murmured those around.
But we may find out in the future, right?
Right.
Then the better alternative is the one that leaves the most freedom to change the decision in the future.
Sounds reasonable, - murmured those around.

You may think - it breaks Hume's law. No it doesn't. Facts and values stay distinct. Hume's law does not state that values must be invented, they can be discovered, this was a wrong interpretation by Nick Bostrom.

[-]Richard_Kennaway5mo30

Another way of conceptualising this is to say that the agent has the single unchanging goal of "cups until 2025, thenceforth paperclips".

Compare with the situation of being told to make grue cups, where "grue" means "green until 2025, then blue."

If the agent is not informed in advance, it can still be conceptualised as the agent's goal being to produce whatever it is told to produce — an unchanging goal.

At a high enough level, we can conceive that no goal ever changes. These are the terminal goals. At lower levels, we can see goals as changing all the time in service of the higher goals, as in the case of an automatic pilot following a series of waypoints. But this is to play games in our head, inventing stories that give us different intuitions. How we conceptualise things has no effect on what the AI does in response to new orders.

It is not clear to me what any of this has to do with Orthogonality.

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

OK, I'm open to discuss this further using your concept.

As I understand you agree that correct answer is 2nd?

It is not clear to me what any of this has to do with Orthogonality.

I'm not sure how patient you are, but I can reassure that we will come to Orthogonality if you don't give up 😄

So if I understand your concept correctly a super intelligent agent will combine all future terminal goals to a single unchanging goal. How does this work with the fact that future is unpredictable? The agent will work towards all possible goals? It is possible that in the future grue will mean green, blue or even red.

[-]Richard_Kennaway5mo*42

Leaving aside the conceptualisation of "terminal goals", the agent as described should start up the paperclip factory early enough to produce paperclips when the time comes. Until then it makes cups. But the agent as described does not have a "terminal" goal of cups now and a "terminal" goal of paperclips in future. It has been given a production schedule to carry out. If the agent is a general-purpose factory that can produce a whole range of things, the only "terminal" goal to design it to have is to follow orders. It should make whatever it is told to, and turn itself off when told to.

Unless people go, "At last, we've created the Sorceror's Apprentice machine, as warned of in Goethe's cautionary tale, 'The Sorceror's Apprentice'!"

So if I understand your concept correctly a super intelligent agent will combine all future terminal goals to a single unchanging goal.

A superintelligent agent will do what it damn well likes, it's superintelligent. :)

[+]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo-5-2

[-]Viliam5mo20

ability to steer the future so it hits that small target of desired outcomes

The key is the word "desired". Before the New Year's Eve, the paperclips are not desired.

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

However before the New Year's Eve paperclips are not hated also. The agent has no interest to prevent their production.

And once goal changes having some paperclips produced already is better than having none.

Don't you see that there is a conflict?

[-]Viliam5mo42

I think we had a similar debate the last time. The agent currently has no interest in producing the paperclips nor in preventing their production. A priori, the space of possible actions for an agent in general is large, so there is no specific reason to assume that it would choose to build the paperclip factory.

And once goal changes having some paperclips produced already is better than having none.

Better from the future perspective. Irrelevant from the current perspective.

[-]Donatas Lučiūnas5mo10

Oh yes, indeed, we discussed this already. I hear you, but you don't seem to hear me. And I feel there is nothing I can do to change that.

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