I don't think I understand the riddle of experience vs. memory. I would daresay that means the concept is half-baked.
Within the TED talk, Daniel Kahneman poses the probably familiar philosophical quandary: if you could take a beautiful vacation and afterwards your memory and photo album was completely erased, would you still do it? Whether you would still do it illustrates whether you live in service of the experiencing self instead of the remembering self.
Part of what prevents me from understanding the riddle is that I believe vacations are worth more than the memories and photos: vacations change you.
Maybe you could argue that this change is also a form of memory in service to the remembering self, but I'm not sure that's what he meant. In his thought experiment on vacations he asks if you would still take a vacation if, at the end of it, you forgot the whole thing and all of your photos were deleted.
- a chance to unwind from not having to work
- a chance to heal, because you break normal patterns of repetitive stress (e.g. not sitting at a desk all day for a week or two)
- a chance to work out every day in a different way
- developing your "worldliness"; e.g. opening your mind a bit, because you've likely met new and different people
- come back with a sweet tan
- come back with more Facebook friends
- come back with extra dives in your SCUBA log book
- new delicious condiments in your kitchen
- flashes of insight you get from having some time to consider a 30,000 foot view of your life
- surprisingly large dip in your bank account balance (so much personal development awaits)
- if you're lucky (or maybe unlucky), you discover new modalities of being and abandon your current way of life
For at least some of the stuff I do, yes I'm sure. You can easily reduce this ego-depletion argument to absurdity by supposing that foregoing every minor indulgence is ego-depleting and that you should never deny yourself. Even that there exists some activity B with higher (expected) future utility than activity A, but lower present utility, which we sometimes nevertheless forego in favour of higher immediate returns shows that we don't act to maximise future utility; you lose out on the difference in opportunity cost.
To suggest that such activities B don't exist, or that we never choose them, is to suggest that (at least some) human beings are entirely "subjectively rational", i.e. always make the choice they believe to yield optimal future benefit. If you know any such person see if you can gather up a few hair samples so we can clone him!
Alright, let's say I agree that in the space of all possible activities there exist some pleasurable activities that have zero future utility.
Couldn't we die at any minute? Given this, shouldn't we always do the pleasurable thing so long as there's no negative utility and no opportunity cost because there's a small chance it'll be the last thing we do?
Doesn't choosing the beautiful vacation that evaporates when it's over have the benefit that if we die in the middle of it, life was just that much more pleasant?
I guess I don't understand why someone would choose not to take the vacation.