Bacon seems to dislike "logic" and "dialectics". Why? Isn't logic the best thing ever? And what did 17th century european intellectuals mean by these words? After 10 minutes of googling I still don't understand that.
The preface says
[Bacon’s dialectica, sometimes translated as ‘logic’, refers more narrowly to the formalized and rule-governed use of logic, especially in debates.]
but this post also says
[[Reminder that ‘dialectics’ is Bacon’s term for logic.]]
Wikipedia page for dialectic#Classical_philosophy says
dialectic is a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses). The outcome of such a dialectic might be the refutation of a relevant proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing assertions, or a qualitative improvement of the dialogue.
So, (epistemic status: this is my best guess, probably at least a part of it is wrong) I imagine 17th century european intellectuals were fond of using sentential logic and maybe quantified logic when arguing with each other, and maybe they liked the notion of counterarguments and they liked thinking of propositions as proved or disproved (or not enough info for either), but didn't understand different degrees of certainty. And perhaps Bacon disliked this rigidity.
Epistemic status: I'm no expert on this, but I'm fairly confident in my understanding.
Yeah, saying that dialectica simply means logic is actually misleading and I likely should edit that note to be clearer.
I think that many of Bacon's terms are best understood with reference to Aristotle's system (after all, the whole name of the book is a reference to Aristotle's). Probably others at the time, if they'd all been reading Aristotle, would be using the terms in that way too when talking philosophy of science. Key terms are dialectical arguments, syllogism, deduction, and demonstration. SEP's explanations of these seemed clear to me in its article on Aristotle's logic.
I'll try to quote/explain a few pieces for those interested.
As I touched on in a note above, Aristotelian science involves starting with some premises about nature which are assumed to be true and then applying logic/deduction to derive new conclusions. I believe Bacon's issue isn't with logic itself, but with the way logic is being applied to what Bacon believes are wholly unjustified premises. The whole question of "where do you get your premises from?" is a big question in understanding Aristotle.
For this reason, science requires more than mere deduction. Altogether, then, the currency of science is demonstration (apodeixis), where a demonstration is a deduction with premises revealing the causal structures of the world, set forth so as to capture what is necessary and to reveal what is better known and more intelligible by nature (APo 71b33–72a5, Phys. 184a16–23, EN 1095b2–4).
Aristotle’s approach to the appropriate form of scientific explanation invites reflection upon a troubling epistemological question: how does demonstration begin? If we are to lay out demonstrations such that the less well known is inferred by means of deduction from the better known, then unless we reach rock-bottom, we will evidently be forced either to continue ever backwards towards the increasingly better known, which seems implausibly endless, or lapse into some form of circularity, which seems undesirable. The alternative seems to be permanent ignorance.
- SEP on Aristotle's science
There's specifically a section on Dialectical Argument. Dialectic arguments seem to be variations on demonstrations which involves taking different premises. There's disagreement about which exact premises Aristotle means.
8. Dialectical Argument and the Art of Dialectic
Aristotle often contrasts dialectical arguments with demonstrations. The difference, he tells us, is in the character of their premises, not in their logical structure: whether an argument is a sullogismos is only a matter of whether its conclusion results of necessity from its premises. The premises of demonstrations must be true and primary, that is, not only true but also prior to their conclusions in the way explained in the Posterior Analytics. The premises of dialectical deductions, by contrast, must be accepted (endoxos).
8.1 Dialectical Premises: The Meaning of Endoxos
Recent scholars have proposed different interpretations of the term endoxos. Aristotle often uses this adjective as a substantive: ta endoxa, “accepted things”, “accepted opinions”. On one understanding, descended from the work of G. E. L. Owen and developed more fully by Jonathan Barnes and especially Terence Irwin, the endoxa are a compilation of views held by various people with some form or other of standing: “the views of fairly reflective people after some reflection”, in Irwin’s phrase. Dialectic is then simply “a method of argument from [the] common beliefs [held by these people]”. For Irwin, then, endoxa are “common beliefs”. Jonathan Barnes, noting that endoxa are opinions with a certain standing, translates with “reputable”.
My own view is that Aristotle’s texts support a somewhat different understanding. He also tells us that dialectical premises differ from demonstrative ones in that the former are questions, whereas the latter are assumptions or assertions: “the demonstrator does not ask, but takes”, he says. This fits most naturally with a view of dialectic as argument directed at another person by question and answer and consequently taking as premises that other person’s concessions. Anyone arguing in this manner will, in order to be successful, have to ask for premises which the interlocutor is liable to accept, and the best way to be successful at that is to have an inventory of acceptable premises, i.e., premises that are in fact acceptable to people of different types.
In fact, we can discern in the Topics (and the Rhetoric, which Aristotle says depends on the art explained in the Topics) an art of dialectic for use in such arguments. My reconstruction of this art (which would not be accepted by all scholars) is as follows.
If Bacon has a similar interpretation as the above, that the premises taken are just whatever whoever you're talking with is likely to accept or just what is commonly believed or is "reputable", then it makes sense why he'd write:
29. Anticipations and dialectics have their place in sciences based on opinions and dogmas, because in those sciences the aim is to be master of •what people believe but not of •the facts.
So it's this sense of logic + unfounded premises (just what people already believe) that Bacon finds so offensive.
I couldn't quickly find examples of Aristotelian science, but here's one concerning thunder:
Premise: Sound accompanies the extinguishing of fire.
Premise: Fire is extinguished in the clouds.
Therefore, a sound [thunder] occurs in the clouds.
The logic is valid, but the conclusion is only as good the premises, which Bacon reckons are often not very good. Bacon says you can't just come up with general premises based on what seems generally correct from non-systematic, common-sense observation.
See also: Empty Labels
This is the third post in the Novum Organum sequence. For context, see the sequence introduction.
We have used Francis Bacon's Novum Organum in the version presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com. Translated by and copyright to Jonathan Bennett. Prepared for LessWrong by Ruby.
Ruby's Reading Guide
Bennett's Reading Guide
Aphorism Concerning the Interpretation of Nature: Book 1: 1–37
by Francis Bacon
1. Man, being nature’s servant and interpreter, is limited in what he can do and understand by what he has observed of the course of nature—directly observing it or inferring things ·from what he has observed·. Beyond that he doesn’t know anything and can’t do anything.
2. Not much can be achieved by the naked hand or by the unaided intellect. Tasks are carried through by tools and helps, and the intellect needs them as much as the hand does. And just as the hand’s tools either •give motion or •guide it, so ·in a comparable way· the mind’s tools either •point the intellect in the direction it should go or • offer warnings.
3. Human knowledge and human power meet at a point; for where the cause isn’t known the effect can’t be produced. The only way to command nature is to obey it; and something that functions as the •cause in thinking about a process functions as the •rule in the process itself.
4. All that man can do to bring something about is to put natural bodies together or to pull them away from one another. The rest is done by nature working within.
5. The mechanic, the mathematician, the physician, the alchemist and the magician have all rubbed up against nature in their activities; but so far they haven’t tried hard and haven’t achieved much.
6. If something has never yet been done, it would be absurd and self-contradictory to expect to achieve it other than through means that have never yet been tried.
[[Similar: not every change is an improvement, but every improvement is a change.]]
7. If we go by the contents of •books and by •manufactured products, the mind and the hand seem to have had an enormous number of offspring. But all that variety consists in very fine-grained special cases of, and derivatives from, a few things that were already known; not in a large number of fundamental propositions.
8. Moreover, the works that have already been achieved owe more to chance and experiment than to disciplined sciences; for the sciences we have now are merely pretty arrangements of things already discovered, not ways of making discoveries or pointers to new achievements.
9. Nearly all the things that go wrong in the sciences have a single cause and root, namely: while wrongly admiring and praising the powers of the human mind, we don’t look for true helps for it.
10. Nature is much subtler than are our senses and intellect; so that all those elegant meditations, theorizings and defensive moves that men indulge in are crazy—except that no-one pays attention to them.
[Bacon often uses a word meaning ‘subtle’ in the sense of ‘fine-grained, delicately complex’; no one current English word will serve.]
[[An especially good example of this point, that nature is far more "subtle" than our senses and mind, is the generally counterintuitive fact that our universe runs on quantum mechanics. In Can You Prove Two Particles Are Identical?, Eliezer points to this weird aspects of reality that one is very unlikely to discover without the empiricism/appropriate tools and methodology which Bacon is advocating for.]]
11. just as the sciences that we now have are useless for devising new inventions, the logic that we now have is useless for discovering new sciences.
[Bacon here uses inventio in two of its senses, as = ‘invent’ and as = ‘discover’.]
12. The logic now in use serves to •fix and stabilize errors based on the ideas of the vulgar, rather than to •search for truth. So it does more harm than good.
[[The next few aphorisms dealing with syllogism and axioms are made with reference to the Aristotelian 'scientific method.' In that classical approach, a few real-world examples are used to derive high-level universal rules or laws which are then operated on with logic to derive further conclusions. See this comment below for more detail.]
The leap from a few examples to high-level general principles is what Bacon is calling out when in 19 he speaks of 'swooping up' from particulars to general axioms. This is in contrast to his gradual, incremental, inductive method that starts with limited statements of rule and only slowly generalizes as more data is accumulated.]]
13. The syllogism isn’t brought to bear on the •basic principles of the sciences; it is applied to •intermediate axioms, but nothing comes of this because the syllogism is no match for nature’s subtlety. It constrains what you can assent to, but not what can happen.
[[These remarks bear resemblance to those in The Parable of Hemlock.]]
14. A •syllogism consists of •propositions, which consist of •words, which are stand-ins [tesserae, literally = ‘tickets’] for •notions. So the root of the trouble is this: If the notions are confused, having been sloppily abstracted from the facts, nothing that is built on them can be firm. So our only hope lies in true induction.
15. There is no soundness in ·our· notions, whether in logic or in natural science. These are not sound notions:
And these are even less sound:
and so on; all of those are fantastical and ill-defined.
[‘Rare’ = ‘opposite of dense’. Generation is the coming into existence of living things; corruption is rotting or falling to pieces, and so refers to the going out of existence of living things. For the next sentence: a ‘lowest species’ is one that doesn’t further divide into subspecies.]
16. ·Our· notions of the lowest species (man, dog, dove) and of the immediate perceptions of the senses (hot, cold, black, white) don’t seriously mislead us; yet even they are sometimes confusing because of how matter flows and things interact. As for all the other notions that men have adopted—they are mere aberrations, not being caused by things through the right kind of abstraction.
17. The way •axioms are constructed is as wilful and wayward as the abstractions through which •notions are formed. I say this even about the principles that result from vulgar induction, but much more about the axioms and less basic propositions that the syllogism spawns.
18. The discoveries that have been made in the sciences up to now lie close to vulgar notions, scarcely beneath the surface. If we are to penetrate into nature’s inner and further recesses, we’ll need •a safer and surer method for deriving notions as well as axioms from things, as well as •an altogether better and more certain way of conducting intellectual operations.
19. There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. (1) One of them starts with the senses and particular events and swoops straight up from them to the most general axioms; on the basis of these, taken as unshakably true principles, it proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of intermediate axioms. This is the way that people follow now. (2) The other derives axioms from the senses and particular events in a gradual and unbroken ascent, ·going through the intermediate axioms and· arriving finally at the most general axioms. This is the true way, but no-one has tried it.
[[Reminder that 'dialectics' is generally Bacon's term for logic, but he is seemingly specifically referring to the logic and processes followed in Aristotle's methods.]]
20. When the intellect is left to itself it takes the same way—namely (1)—that it does when following the rules of dialectics. For the mind loves to leap up to generalities and come to rest with them; so it doesn’t take long for it to become sick of experiment. But this evil, ·though it is present both in natural science and in dialectics·, is worse in dialectics because of the ordered solemnity of its disputations.
21. When the intellect of a sober, patient, and grave mind is left to itself (especially in a mind that isn’t held back by accepted doctrines), it ventures a little way along (2) the right path; but it doesn’t get far, because without guidance and help it isn’t up to the task, and is quite unfit to overcome the obscurity of things.
22. Both ways set out from the senses and particular events, and come to rest in the most general propositions; yet they are enormously different. For one of them (1) merely glances in passing at experiments and particular events, whereas the other (2) stays among them and examines them with proper respect. One (1) proceeds immediately to laying down certain abstract and useless generalities, whereas the other (2) rises by step by step to what is truly better known by nature.
[In calling something ‘known to nature’ Bacon means that it is a general law of nature; ‘better known by nature’ could mean ‘a more general law of nature’ or ‘a generality that is more completely lawlike’.]
23. There is a great difference between •the idols of the human mind and •the ideas of God’s mind—that is, between •certain empty beliefs and •the true seals [= ‘signs of authenticity’] and marks that we have found in created things.
24. There’s no way that axioms •established by argumentation could help us in the discovery of new things, because the subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of argument. But axioms •abstracted from particulars in the proper way often herald the discovery of new particulars and point them out, thereby returning the sciences to their active status.
25. The axioms that are now in use are mostly made so that they just cover the items from which they arise, namely thin and common-or-garden experiences and a few particulars of the commonest sorts, so it is no wonder if they don’t lead to new particulars. ·And it’s not only the axioms, but also the way they are handled, that is defective·. If some unexpected counter-example happens to turn up, the axiom is rescued and preserved by some frivolous distinction, rather than (the truer course) being amended.
26. To help me get my ideas across, I have generally used different labels for human reason’s two ways of approaching nature: the customary way I describe as anticipating nature (because it is rash and premature) [Note from the preface: throughout this work, ‘anticipation’ means something like ‘second-guessing, getting ahead of the data, jumping the gun’. Bacon means it to sound rash and risky; no one current English word does the job.] and the way that draws conclusions from facts in the right way I describe as interpreting nature.
27. Anticipations are a firm enough basis for consent, for even if men all went mad in the same way they might agree one with another well enough.
[[consent = agreement]]
28. Indeed, anticipations have much more power to win assent than interpretations do. They are inferred from a few instances, mostly of familiar kinds, so that they immediately brush past the intellect and fill the imagination; whereas interpretations are gathered from very various and widely dispersed facts, so that they can’t suddenly strike the intellect, and must seem weird and hard to swallow—rather like the mysteries of faith.
[[Bacon appears to be saying that the easy, quick, rash science is easy convince people of since it has low inferential distance owing to it being derived from a few familiar examples; in contrast, his difficult and true science built on many observations and facts has high inferential distance, causing it to seem strange and weird.]]
29. Anticipations and dialectics have their place in sciences based on opinions and dogmas, because in those sciences the aim is to be master of •what people believe but not of •the facts.
30. Even if all the brains of all the ages come together, collaborate and share their results, no great progress will ever be made in science by means of anticipations. That is because errors that are rooted in the first moves that the mind makes can’t be cured later on by remedial action, however brilliant.
31. It is pointless to expect any great advances in science from grafting new things onto old. If we don’t want to go around in circles for ever, making ‘progress’ that is so small as be almost negligible, we must make a fresh start with deep foundations.
[‘Fresh start’ translates instauratio, from the verb instauro = ‘make a fresh start (on a ceremony that has been wrongly performed)’. Bacon planned a six-part work on science and its philosophy and methods, which he called his Instauratio magna—his Great Fresh Start. There are other informal mentions of fresh starts in 38 and 129, and the Great Fresh Start is referred to in 92 and each of 115–117. Bacon died six years after publishing the present work. It is Part 2 of the Great Fresh Start, and the only Part he completed.]
32. This is not to attack the honour of the ancient authors or indeed of anyone else, because I am comparing not •intelligences or •competences but •ways ·of proceeding in the sciences·; and the role I have taken on is that of a guide, not a judge.
33. This must be said outright: anticipations (the kind of reasoning that is now in use) can’t pass judgment on my method or on discoveries arising from it; for I can’t be called on to submit to the sentence of a tribunal which is itself on trial!
34. It won’t be easy for me to deliver and explain my message, for things that are in themselves new will be understood on analogy with things that are old.
35. Borgia said that when the French marched into Italy they came with chalk in their hands to •mark out their lodgings, not with weapons to •force their way in. Similarly, I want my doctrine to enter quietly into the minds that are fit to receive it and have room for it. ·Forcing my way in with weapons, so to speak, won’t work· because refutations—·and more generally arguments pro and con·—can’t be employed when what’s at stake is a difference of view about first principles, notions, and even forms of demonstration.
36. There remains for me only one way of getting my message across. It is a simple way, namely this: I must lead you to the particular events themselves, and to the order in which they occur; and you for your part must force yourself for a while to lay aside your •notions and start to familiarize yourself with •facts.
37. Those who deny that anything can be known for sure •start off their thinking in something like my way, but where they •end up is utterly different from and opposed to where I end up. They say that nothing can be known, period. I say that not much can be known about nature by the method that is now in use. And then they go on to destroy the authority of the senses and the intellect, whereas I devise and supply helps for them.
The next post in the sequence, Book 1: 38-52 (Idols of the Mind Pt. 1), will be posted Tuesday, September 24 at latest by 4:00pm PDT.