I think it would be good to not say they‘re “severely diminished,” as an implied character trait. Rather, they are not exercising this faculty in this context, for some reason. Probably the vast majority of such interlocutors don’t actually lack theory of mind, they’re just not using it.
I think there's a protective psychological mechanism that prevents some people from adopting particulars beliefs by automatically presenting them extreme or absurd actions they'd have to take if they'd adopt it, even if that implication doesn't hold at all if you take a minute to apply reason to it. For example, I suspect that many people couldn't pick up the belief that farm animals are conscious and can suffer, no matter what evidence is presented to them (if they'd be willing to look at it at all), in order to protect their current dietary habits. Of course you could look at evidence, come to the conclusion that farm animals most likely can suffer quite badly depending on how they're treated, and as a consequence stop buying products from factory farming, without drastically changing your diet, becoming an animal rights activist, or sweeping your walkway with a broom. A feeling of needing to be extremely consistent also plays a role here, even if it's not present in most other aspects of life, and I assume it's also an irrational protective mechanism.
Especially given the fact that people are mostly moral realists in the sense that there is a correct, or at least preferred approach to what you should be doing in most or all situations (or in other words, claiming there is in fact a true/correct utility function for everyone to have) means people are going to motivatedly reason into reductio implications of beliefs that are threatening.
I agree that people often employ these types of arguments in a way that is inaccurate or unfair, but I think that when people say things like this they can be pointing to something important, albeit sloppily. I also think it is likely to be very counterproductive to lean into the "idiot" framing. It seems to me like who people make these arguments they are pointing to something very similar to belief in belief but with a lack of nuance about what people "actually" believe. From that post:
Some philosophers have been much confused by such scenarios, asking, “Does the claimant really believe there’s a dragon present, or not?” As if the human brain only had enough disk space to represent one belief at a time! Real minds are more tangled than that.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the believer's actions are in tension with their beliefs, it is sloppy to claim that this therefore means they don't believe the thing. You made this point on your quick take about hypocrisy (i.e. the problem could be on actions end, not the beliefs end). However, its worth noting the belief in belief formulation isn't particularly flattering to the believer either, even if it is more precise:
What does it mean to believe that the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is both perfectly blue and perfectly green? The statement is confusing; it’s not even clear what it would mean to believe it—what exactly would be believed, if you believed. You can much more easily believe that it is proper, that it is good and virtuous and beneficial, to believe that the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is both perfectly blue and perfectly green. Dennett calls this “belief in belief.”
And here things become complicated, as human minds are wont to do—I think even Dennett oversimplifies how this psychology works in practice. For one thing, if you believe in belief, you cannot admit to yourself that you merely believe in belief. What’s virtuous is to believe, not to believe in believing; and so if you only believe in belief, instead of believing, you are not virtuous. Nobody will admit to themselves, “I don’t believe the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is blue and green, but I believe I ought to believe it”—not unless they are unusually capable of acknowledging their own lack of virtue. People don’t believe in belief in belief, they just believe in belief.
Of course, you can accuse people of being engaged in belief in belief unfairly:
You don't believe it's actually important to prevent AI doom. You are just part of a cult that instills the idea that it is virtuous to believe it is. You have a belief in belief.
This doesn't mean that we should throw the concept out, however.
I also think the framing here and some of the suggestions on a practical level are likely to be very counterproductive and harmful to honest discussions. Take your option 2. Imagine that you suggest that donating to GiveWell might a good way to help less fortunate people. Consider this response:
Wait, wait, you’re telling me that the best way for me to reduce suffering in poor countries is to give to charity? What a wise and moral strategy! Why didn’t I think of that?
You might naturally think "WTF? That's obviously ridiculous! Even if you don't think GiveWell is the absolute best place to donate, it is obviously a reasonable, non-idiot thing to do". I agree this is correct. But remember, there are people out there who would probably say that giving to GiveWell is just a distraction from the real problem, dismantling capitalism, or that of course all foreign aid just fuels third world corruption and failing institutions and this keeps these countries in poverty long term, or some other argument. Similarly, the person you are talking to may feel that their statement actually makes much more sense than you are giving it credit for if you use this kind of response. That doesn't really seem likely to lead in productive directions to me.
Your option 2 simply isn't a robust option, anyone can deploy it, and it can easily make discussions much much worse. You need to actually address the substance of the underlying dispute not lean on portraying your interlocutor as an idiotic.
Strong-upvoted, but I'll stand up for a couple of the examples:
If you actually thought abortion was murder, you’d [...] hold funerals for miscarriages.
I think this is just a prima facie reasonable implication to draw if someone says embryos are full persons from conception.
“She called her alleged rapist the day after, therefore she wasn’t raped.”
Someone can be honestly ignorant that this happens, and if they are I don't think it's a childish, idiotic failure of theory of mind to be surprised by it.
I will personally admit that prima facie I found the rapist example to be the most surprising one in the entire enumeration (in a "wait, this inference is probably wrong but more reasonable than the other ones" sense) and now I need to introspect on that.
I think this is an oversimplification based on strawman arguments. While "If you actually believed in AI doom/Global Warming/Libertarianism/Nationalism/Socialism, you’d firebomb a Walmart." is something I've very rarely heard people say, it is perfectly valid to assert that someone's revealed preferences indicate that they are engaging in bad faith, when this is sufficiently clear.
The point of distinction is whether their actions actually prove that they don't believe what they say. If I'm an AI doomer who thinks he's doing more by raising issues internally at OpenAI than I could by being a terrorist, then there's no inconsistency. In contrast, if a spy claims that a meal hasn't been poisoned but refuses to taste it, he shouldn't be taken at his word about what he believes.
There are practical examples of this, all fairly controversial. In broad strokes:
I think the rhetorical force + underlying thing I was trying to get at with the idiot's reductio is highlighting times where people are very bad at detecting contradictions in other people's stated beliefs and revealed actions. Obviously real contradictions sometimes exist, and they are somewhat informative.
However, you have to be pretty careful with your analysis, and like the sizes of the relevant updates. Sometimes the answer is that they don't have that belief (your spy who refuses to taste the meal is a good example).
In many other examples, even when people correctly identify a contradiction, I think they update the wrong way in how it's resolved.
For example, if my Al Gore example above has him not flying to climate change conferences but instead to Malibu vacations, I think there's more of a real contradiction. Maybe a die-hard climate change advocate would only fly for work but not for vacations. So by conservation of expected evidence, this provides some evidence against Al Gore caring about climate change.
However the size of the total update is pretty small. The more parsimonious and mainline explanation to me imo is that hypothetical Al Gore both cares about climate change, and likes fancy vacations[1]. A perfectly normal and coherent set of preferences! Now it's possible to exaggerate the size of the contradiction (maybe he has a private jet, or a lot of fossil fuel investments, or privately lobbies for an oil company) until the hypocrisy is large and pointed enough for you to doubt he actually cares about climate change at all. But I think it has to be quite large. And imo most people are satisfied that they've dissolved the fork against beliefs way too early.
Back to your other examples:
If a politician supports a restriction on peoples' behavior while himself violating that restriction, he is probably not legislating based on what he thinks is best for society.
I think it depends a lot on the restriction and violation in question, but usually I think while we should correctly update that the politician is a deceitful scumbag (proportional to the size of the violation, how much the politician lies about it etc), it really does not provide that much evidence for me whether the legislation in question is good for society, or what the politicians beliefs here are.
After all, it is typically the case that legislation is against things that people want to do, but is net bad for society, rather than things that nobody wants to do.
So Gavin Newsom violating his own lockdown is evidence of scumbagness but not much evidence that he believes a lockdown is bad, a politician evading taxes is not much evidence they believe tax rates are bad, politician getting their child a draft deferral is not much evidence they think wars and/or drafts are bad, politician doing cocaine despite voting against drug decriminalization is not much evidence that they secretly think cocaine should be legalized, and so forth.
If a foreign lobbyist supports something in your country that is banned in his own, he is probably not acting in your best interests.
The foreign lobbyist example seems like somewhat more evidence though still relatively weak to me (maybe Bayes factor of 1.5-2?) I think you should just have a prior that foreign lobbyists don't have your country's best interests at heart. And whether they think a policy is good for their state interests doesn't have that much correlation with whether it's good for your country, but it also doesn't have much correlation with what their country internally does. Eg it's easy to see why a auto industry lobbyist in your county will lobby against protectionist policies against cars in your country even if they have protectionist policies back home (and indeed even if the specific lobbyist in question previously lobbied for the protectionist policies back home). Less cynically, there's an ideologically consistent narrative for why George Soros would lobby for free speech and free press in the US (and other countries) "even" when his homeland Hungary doesn't have free speech or free press -- easy to imagine how somebody losing a political fight in one place would want to continue the argument elsewhere, or even that the lack of free speech/press back home is what inspired him to improve things in his new country in the first place.
Of course Al Gore could say that the vacations relax him enough to contribute more to climate change work, but most people would rightly consider this a suspicious motivation.
The more parsimonious and mainline explanation to me imo is that hypothetical Al Gore both cares about climate change, and likes fancy vacations
This is where you have to be very careful about describing the belief that people are actually questioning, because you can talk at different levels of generality, as well as being a lumper or splitter.
A hypothetical Gore that did this could be described in terms of two separate beliefs as "cares about both climate change and vacations". But if you pick the belief that people are actually concerned about, it's more like "Gore thinks you should have a particular climate change/vacation balance" and you can observe that he in fact doesn't want that for himself.
I think the rhetorical force + underlying thing I was trying to get at with the idiot's reductio is highlighting times where people are very bad at detecting contradictions in other people's stated beliefs and revealed actions
I'd argue that you approached it the wrong way, in that case. The pithy name and suggestion that people be mocked with it sets it up as something you think is inherently invalid, and seems likely to make conversations about genuine revealed preference less productive if adopted.
There's already a fallacy[1] noting that the person making a claim being bad does not inherently make the claim bad (Ad hominem), so that ground is already covered.
A word for a heuristic that worked well enough for evolution to bake it into our brains, but which is not ironclad and can lead to wrong conclusions if treated as such.
I just think people who read my post will predictably be better at reasoning than people who don't, which is my goal. I think you have a pretty different starting point for the purposes of posts like this, which I suspect is closer to saying categorically always accurate things[1] or not having negative off-target effects, or something like that.
I continue to believe I approached it correctly and I stand by my logical and rhetorical choices, fwiw.
Note that my actual article had caveats and modifiers.
If you actually believed in the Christian Bible, you’d avoid wearing mixed fibers. Therefore you’re a fake Christian and you should either be an atheist or believe in my specific flavor of liberal Christianity with no controversial components.
I think this is conflating "belief in the Christian bible" with "belief in Christianity", and I think it's actually a perfectly fine argument to use against bible thumpers who say everyone just needs to return to following biblical law, mostly because those people aren't interested in being accurate in the first place.
I think a better example of the idiot's reduction for belief in Christianity would be:
If you actually believed in Christianity, you would sell everything you own and give the money to the poor. But you haven't, so you don't really believe in Christianity, do you?
God is the only reason for human morality. If not for Christianity, people would murder their neighbors all the time. Therefore your atheism is fake and the Christian God is real.
I'm not even sure of what belief this is an idiot's reduction. Did you just want to contrast with the previous example to not appear prejudiced? Perhaps the following would be better?
If you really believed heaven/hell didn't exist, then you would go around murdering people all the time for your own personal benefit. But you don't, so you really do believe in the Christian afterlives, don't you?
I'm not even sure of what belief this is an idiot's reduction. Did you just want to contrast with the previous example to not appear prejudiced? Perhaps the following would be better?
Well I have the hard constraint of only using examples I've personally seen, or slightly satirical exaggerations of the same.
In a Stag Hunt, I may say, "We should hunt stag!" — but if I don't believe that I've successfully convinced the other hunters, then I should hunt hare. My individual choice to hunt hare (and stay alive) does not invalidate my preaching that it would be better if we all agreed to hunt stag. Hypocrisy doesn't enter into it; my claim was never "I should hunt stag alone (and fail and die)", it was just "we should hunt stag".
Well-written article, but I feel like this is more or less a necessary implication of the appeal to hypocrisy (TM) fallacy.
Subtitle: if you truly believed that...
Every once in a while, I encounter what I call the idiot’s reductio: “If you truly believed X, you’d do Y. Since you don’t do Y, you must not actually believe X.”
A special case is when people say “I don’t believe in/feel/have X. But if you truly did believe in X, you’d do a crazy and absurd thing. Since you don’t do this crazy and absurd thing, I conclude you don’t believe in X, and also X isn’t real.”
Almost always incredibly childish and a complete failure of theory of mind. Some examples:
I’m sure you’ve encountered the same.
I used to think the core issue was a failure to appreciate human differences while modeling other people. Everybody approaches grief/fear/dread/betrayal/worries about humanity’s extinction in different ways. Perhaps people weren’t previously aware of this?
I used to think that, but I now think the explanation is too clean, and ironically overly charitable. After thinking about it some and observing more examples in the wild, I think the failure is even worse than that: most people making the idiot’s reductio don’t even have enough imagination to model *their own* minds. Or worse, they have that imagination but choose not to use it.
For example, if somebody says that God is the only reason that people don’t go around murdering their neighbors, I used to buy into the belief that those specific people have broken moral compasses and don’t understand how other people can have moral commitments without a divine arbitrator. But I thought about it just a tiny bit more, and realized that if those specific people de-converted, it seems unlikely they’d go around murdering people. So not only do they lack a plausible other-people-model, they also lack a coherent self-model.
Similarly, when people are like “if you really believed in AI doom, you’d commit mass violence,” I used to think the only people who’d say this are psychopaths who really want to firebomb a Walmart, have minimal concept of cause and effect, are just itching for an excuse, and also incapable of modeling other people’s saner reactions.
A perfectly fine, unbombed, Walmart. Photo by Zack Yeo on Unsplash
But I thought about it a little bit more, and realized that of course the same people are, in addition to having poor ability/willingness to model cause and effect and other people, also (thankfully) low-agency, nonviolent, incapable of doing real stuff, etc. They, too, will not firebomb a Walmart.
So the people who make the strange modus tollens move of “I don’t believe in/feel/have X. But if you truly did believe in X, you’d do this crazy and ridiculous and absurd thing. Since you don’t do this crazy and ridiculous and absurd thing, I conclude that not only is X false, but you also don’t believe it” sure seem off – my tentative conclusion is that they have either severely diminished reasoning faculties or severely diminished willingness to use reason, even more so than I previously thought.
I’m not sure what the best response is in those circumstances. Two good options that come to mind are:
But either way, you should mostly not waste your time. Don’t make the mistake of taking the idiot’s reductio, or the people who voice it, seriously. “The discourse” is not real life!