I found the question for the poll ("Who looks better to you?") to be rather ambiguous. For instance, I'm not sure if the following interpretations are correct:
Did you intend this?
Your question naturally leads to a more general one -- what is it in fact that causes people to develop beliefs that are closer to reality than the respectable consensus (which often makes them seriously disreputable)?
It is certainly not superior intelligence or knowledge. The normal modus operandi for smart people is to acquire practically useful knowledge and act on it, but at the same time, when it comes to any issues that are of more signaling than practical interest, to figure out instinctively what the respectable opinion is and converge on it, no m...
Persons A are much easier to present to the general public as generating negative utility, and thus compromise the perceived value of a wrong worldview. This makes our job a lot easier when we expose what they are doing.
Also, they are probably far less dangerous when dealing with existential risks. Let's take something that seems common (in the US, at least), say, subscribing to a premillennial eschatology. If we put one of the two in charge of a superpower:
There is a tradeoff, and it's basically a question of whether you fear the consequences of stupidity more, or the consequences of defection. I fear stupidity more; opportunities to backstab are uncommon, but opportunities to screw things up accidentally are everywhere.
The odd thing is, our genes and default psychology seem to think we should care more about defection, and less about stupidity. Perhaps because in the evolutionary environment, literal backstabbing was more common, and things like bad driving didn't exist.
While the example is basically correct, I fear it might kill more minds than enlighten then.
By doing this you basically force breach a compartment in someone's mind.
It is difficult to address the issue of sincere versus pretended socially desirable beliefs without reference to the individual consequences thereof, which needs a reference, however delicate and indirect, to particular consequences that happened to some particular individual, a reference to events that happened to a particular individual that would not have happened if socially desirable beliefs had been true.
I didn't know how to answer this question in the abstract. But I do hope that people like Descartes and Bacon acted more like Person A, so it looks like I'd admire Person A more in these cases.
Obviously I'm assuming that a real danger exists to explain the deception.
Edited because I misread the description of B the first time.
If the other people's wrong interpretation is causing them harm beyond the harm that A is risking, and if the other people could be convinced of their error if A made an effort, it would be altruistic/ethical to be candid. I don't have a strong opinion on how strong the moral obligation to help others be more accurate is on A. With that caveat, A looks better in my eyes because ey figured out something other people didn't and was instrumentally ration enough to keep quiet about it, and there's n...
What I think the two choices signal and the trade offs are
A. Sees that an interpretation of reality shared by others is not correct, but tries to pretend otherwise for personal gain and/or safety.
B. Fails to see that an interpretation of reality is shared by others is flawed. He is therefore perfectly honest in sharing the interpretation of reality with others. The reward regime for outward behaviour is the same as with A.
Most people I would guess are discomforted by sustained duplicity. Without us necessarily realizing it, our positions on matters shi...
person B, but the magnitude of the distinction I make will probably be highly context dependent.
I'm more inclined to admire B, seeing perhaps a more idealistic streak.
[Poll on the formatting]
Would it be better if I had put the meat of this contribution in a seperate article, a post in the comments as I did or hadn't separated it in any way from OP and the accompanying poll itself?
Poll for this question (Who looks better to you?).
Edit: Please only publicly comment on your choice elsewhere in the comment section. I want as little extra priming or influence on the people just about to answer the poll as possible. Thank you! :)
This is thread where I'm trying to figure out a few things about signalling on LessWrong and need some information, so please immediately after reading about the two individuals please answer the poll. The two individuals:
A. Sees that an interpretation of reality shared by others is not correct, but tries to pretend otherwise for personal gain and/or safety.
B. Fails to see that an interpretation of reality is shared by others is flawed. He is therefore perfectly honest in sharing the interpretation of reality with others. The reward regime for outward behaviour is the same as with A.
To add a trivial inconvenience that matches the inconvenience of answering the poll before reading on, comments on what I think the two individuals signal,what the trade off is and what I speculate the results might be here versus the general population, is behind this link.