How would you apply EDT + tickle defense to decide not to show a low card when playing the counterfactual mugging poker game? It seems like the EDT agent doesn't consider counterfactuals, and thus would choose to reveal the low card when it is dealt that card, getting a higher payoff at a cost to its counterfactual selves. Maybe I'm missing something obvious about how to apply the tickle defense to this situation though.
Main question: Does EDT / "logical EDT"[1] make any wrong decisions, once the "tickle defense" is accounted for? And is there any real distinction between EDT, "logical EDT", and "logical CDT"?
Relatedly, I'm having trouble constructing any case which distinguishes logical EDT from some kind of "logical CDT" where some facts are "upstream" of others. Does anyone have an example where:
My failed attempt at this:
It also seems like EDT is not really distinct from logical EDT, unless you make some special effort to separate logical and factual uncertainty?
I'm not up to speed on the literature, but hopefully people will surface things here if they're relevant.
Where by "logical EDT" I mean "EDT, but the world-model and conditioning procedure includes logical uncertainity". I don't know if this is distinct from just saying "EDT".
The details here are a bit complicated and disputable. Imagine an agent whose decision procedure works as follows:
1. Think about the decision using EDT, and come to some conclusion.
2. Randomly ignore the conclusion X% of the time, and go with some "impulsive" decision. Otherwise follow the conclusion.
Now, it is totally possible for the agent's decision to have "weird correlations" with various other things (like the laws of physics), via the nature of the "impulsive" decision.
However, I normatively claim that the EDT reasoning should consider itself to be deciding its own conclusion, not deciding the agent's final decision.
(Thanks to Linh Chi Nguyen for previous discussion on this point.)