Today's post, Bell's Theorem: No EPR "Reality" was originally published on 04 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
(Note: This post was designed to be read as a stand-alone, if desired.) Originally, the discoverers of quantum physics thought they had discovered an incomplete description of reality - that there was some deeper physical process they were missing, and this was why they couldn't predict exactly the results of quantum experiments. The math of Bell's Theorem is surprisingly simple, and we walk through it. Bell's Theorem rules out being able to locally predict a single, unique outcome of measurements - ruling out a way that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen once defined "reality". This shows how deep implicit philosophical assumptions can go. If worlds can split, so that there is no single unique outcome, then Bell's Theorem is no problem. Bell's Theorem does, however, rule out the idea that quantum physics describes our partial knowledge of a deeper physical state that could locally produce single outcomes - any such description will be inconsistent.
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Could you unpack that a little more? It sounds like you're saying that 'some people' are unfairly discounting the possibility that QM is incomplete and locality is violated, for reasons that are not logically required . Is that accurate?
If so, I would like to point out that computational cheapness is not a good prior. It's extremely computationally cheaper to believe that our solar system is the only one and the other dots are simulated, coarse-grained, on a thin shell surrounding its outside. It simplifies the universe to a mind-boggling degree for this to be the case. Indeed, we should not stop there. It is best if we get rid of the interior of the sun, the interior of the earth, the interior of every rock, trees falling in the forest, people we don't know... people we do know... and replace our interactions with them with simulacra that make stuff up and just provide enough to maintain a thin veneer of plausibility.
The rule set to implement such a world is HUGE, but the data and computational complexity is enough smaller to make up for it.
Don't you think?
See also: Boltzmann brains.
However, you've no evidence that you're not a Boltzmann brain. You choose to accept on faith that you are not and, desiring to be consistent and even-handed, you further choose to accept on faith that the entire visible universe is just as complex as it seems to be (which would likely be false if e.g. we're in a simulation).
You point out that adopting such priors requires biting an unpleasant bullet. This is not a reason for someone not to adopt it and indeed bite the bullet. The real reason is purely psychological: people don't ... (read more)