That does not look like a plan to me, it looks like two! One to make a lot of money and one to save the world with a lot of money. And lot of smart people look for plans to make a lot of money, lot of those same people have "throw an AI at it" as an hypothesis in their toolkit and are technically minded, competent in STEM, so it does not seem like an interesting direction to look at.
I do agree that it would be interesting to have a plan on how to effectively use a lot of money if we get it in whatever way but I would be quite surprised if "whatever way" ends up being "the community earns it" rather than "we convince some ultrarich like Elon Musk or some governments to give us a lot of money".
I think you are right! Maybe I should have actually written different posts about each of these two plans.
And yes, I agree with you that maybe the most likely way of doing what I propose is getting someone ultra rich to back it. That idea has the advantage that it can be done immediately, without waiting for a Math AI to be available.
To me it still seems important to think of what kind of strategical advantages we can obtain with a Math AI. Maybe it is possible to gain a lot more than money (I gave the example of zero-day exploits, but we can most likely get a lot of other valuable technology as well).
Be careful about someone else stealing/copying/plagiarizing your oracle.
If you're making 100B+, someone will try to do so, with very high probability. Likely many people. That's a level where I can easily see someone e.g. burning zero-days.
In my model the Oracle would stay securely held in something like a Faraday cage with no internet connection and so on.
So yes, some people might want to steal it, but if we have some security I think they would be unlikely to succeed, unless it is a state-level effort.
Eliezer Yudkowsky on Math AIs
Here are some interesting quotes from the alignment debate with Richard Ngo.
Here is a caveat and further explanation:
Should we pivot there?
In my previous AI-in-a-box success model, I argued that we may be able to get close to a pivotal act with a myopic Oracle AI.
Here is the backbone of my plan (better described here):
I called it a stupid plan to highlight that we can make the plan a lot better if we come together and think a lot harder about it.
However, the plan does seem to generalize somewhat to the case in which we have a Math AI (that generates machine-readable proofs) instead of a more general myopic Oracle.
To make things clear, I expect that for this to work we'll need a Math AI that can also answer and that has strong capabilities on computer science domains, as long as tasks are formally defined.
Making money with a Math AI
There seems to be many possible ways of using such a Math AI to make large amounts of money, either in computer science, in finance, in mechanism design, nuclear energy, theoretical chemistry, materials science, you name it!
Almost no one seems to be looking for these possible uses because:
However, we may be able to coordinate as a community so that we do start thinking about that, and so that, once Math AI becomes available, desired proofs and financial resources become available to several members of our community, who can then exploit several different areas simultaneously.
In some areas (like finance) profits may come quicker and may help fund the other initiatives.
Intelligence gathering with a Math AI
I argued previously that creating a private or multinational intelligence agency focused on dangerous AI research may be easier than it looks like.
Traditional intelligence agencies certainly are well-funded, but they do not have budgets as large as some people expect. For instance, the NSA has annual budget of 10 billion, while the CIA has an annual budget of 15 billion. A single billionaire near the top of the Forbes list would be able to fund these organizations by himself for many years.
So it is seems possible to obtain funding for a large intelligence organization dedicated to identifying and preventing dangerous AGI research. And if we can succeed at that, we may be able to make it a lot more efficient than the equivalent government agencies.
Here are some problems government intelligence agencies face:
A new intelligence agency focused on AGI existential risks will have none of these problems, and therefore I consider it possible for it to be comparatively much more effective, even in the case it has a smaller budget.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the new intelligence agency still has a Math AI!
The first and most obvious use of the AI is attempt an attack on the most widely used forms of cryptography.
By careful formal definitions, it may be possible to reduce some computer science problems to logical considerations, and allow the AI, for example, to also generate a few zero-day exploits.
Stopping dangerous AGI research
I'll freely admit that I spent much less time thinking about this last part. We most likely don't want to enforce a ban on dangerous research unilaterally.
We want to build legitimacy for a multinational or international ban on such research, so we should get international organizations on board.
Even better, we should become the international organization responsible for dealing with this problem, trying hard to obtain the same recognition that such organizations have, even as we maintain a decision structure that is de facto not very much influenced by any governments.
Once the moral authority of the bans on dangerous AGI research is more accepted, there is going to be less and less pushback to enforcement. At this point, friendly enforcement agencies will be able to stop dangerous research, even outside their respective jurisdictions in some cases. We may be able reward them politically and technologically.
At some point most problematic developments will be related either to projects from major state-level entities, or to technological development in available processing power.
For the former, the entities that need to be managed are very few in number, so it is conceivable that they can be dissuaded by political or diplomatic means.
The latter is more serious. Unless we do something, lone geniuses will eventually be able to do dangerous AGI research on their garages.
Success here depends on being able to find an agreement to maintain the status quo regarding computational resources. This will be a lot easier to do once a large multinational organization is already recognized as the major moral authority on this area.
It is also important to make sure those that need/want computational resources for purposes other than dangerous AGI research can do so easily in a way that is secure. For instance, it may be possible to require certain advanced dual-use hardware to be distributed exclusively to cloud providers that are heavily monitored.