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Double Instance Paradox : In the case of some mind uploading carried out on a living patient and without destruction of the original brain, either the uploaded brain is the same person, in which case this person is now in two places at the same time, or the uploaded brain only constitutes a distinct copy possessing its own agency/consciousness in which case mind uploading cannot be used to prolong life on a computer medium or at least not in a way that doesn’t involve the gradual destruction/replacement of the brain .