Do you mean Monday or Tuesday? :)
Kotrfa never turned up but another LWer did and we had a nice discussion! When is next meeting? :)
Count me in! I'm 20, also skinny and curly haired :)
You write that the orthogonality thesis "...states that beliefs and values are independent of each other", whereas Bostrom writes that it states that almost any level of intelligence is compatible with almost any values, isn't that a deviation? Could you motivate the choice of words here, thanks.
From The Superintelligent Will: "...the orthogonality thesis, holds (with some caveats) that intelligence and final goals (purposes) are orthogonal axes along which possible artificial intellects can freely vary—more or less any level of intelligence could be combined with more or less any final goal."
Should we value outside entities as much as we do ourselves? Why?
Nate Soares recently wrote about problems with using the word "should" that I think are relevant here, if we assume meta-ethical relativism (if there are no objective moral shoulds). I think his post "Caring about something larger than yourself" could be valuable in providing a personal answer to the question, if you accept meta-ethical relativism.
The very notion of something being "out there" independent of us is itself a mental model we use to explain our perceptions.
Yes, I think that's right, the conviction that something exists in the world is also a (unconscious) judgement made by the mind that could be mistaken. However, when we what to explain why we have the perceptual data, and it's regularities, it makes sense to attribute it to external causes, but this conviction could perhaps too be mistaken. The underpinnings of rational reasoning seems to bottom out to in unconsciously formed convictions as well, basic arithmetic is obviously true but can I trust these convictions? Justifying logic with logic is indeed... (read more)
I have lately come to seriously consider the view that the everyday notion of consciousness doesn’t refer to anything that exists out there in the world but is rather a confused (but useful) projection made by purely physical minds onto their depiction of themselves in the world. The main influences on my thinking are Dan Dennett, (I assume most of you are familiar with him) and to a lesser extent Yudkowsky (1) and Tomasik (2). To use Dennett’s line of thought: we say that honey is sweet, that metal is solid or that a falling tree makes a sound, but the character tag of sweetness and sounds is not in the world but in... (read 1147 more words →)
The same animation studio also made this fairly accurate and entertaining introduction to (parts of) Bostrom's argument. Although I don't know what to think of their (subjective) probability for possible outcomes.
Whether or not momentary death is necessary for multiverse immortality depends on what view of personal identity is correct. According to empty individualism, it should not matter that you know you will die, you will still "survive" while not remember having died as if that memory was erased.