Summarization Table TimelinesPre-2030Post-2030ExpectationsAGI will be built by an organization that’s already trying to build it (85%) Some governments will be in the race (80%) Compute will still be centralized at the time AGI is developed (60%)More companies will be in the race (90%)National government policy won’t have strong positive effects (70%) China is more likely to lead than pre-2030 (85%) The best strategies will have more variance (75%)There will be more compute suppliers[1] (90%)Comparatively More Promising Strategies (under timelines X)[2]Aim to promote a security mindset in the companies currently developing AI (85%)Focus on general community building (90%)Focus on corporate governance (75%)Build the AI safety community in China (80%)Target outreach to highly motivated young people and senior researchers (80%)Avoid publicizing AGI risk (60%)Coordinate with national governments (65%)Beware of large-scale coordination efforts (80%) Probability estimates in the "Promising Strategies" category have to be interpreted as the likelihood that this strategy/consideration is more promising/important under timelines X than timelines Y. Introduction Miles Brundage recently argued that AGI timeline discourse might be overrated. He makes a lot of good points, but I disagree with one thing. Miles says: “I think the correct actions are mostly insensitive to timeline variations.” Unlike Miles, I think that if the timeline differences are greater than a couple of years, the choice of actions does depend on timeline differences[3]. In particular, our approach to governance should be very different depending on whether we think that AGI will be developed in ~5-10 years or after that. In this post, I list some of the likely differences between a world in which AGI is developed before, and after ~2030 and discuss how those differences should affect how we approach AGI governance. I discuss most of the strategies and considerations in relative terms, i.e. argui