Automaton
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I would essentially deny that anything is actually green, but assert that there is a mental state of "experiencing green", which is a certain functional state of a mind. You say that reductionists believe "...the green shape that you are seeing is the same thing as some aspect of all those billions of colorless atoms in motion." I do not think that most reductionsts would (or should) take this position. There is nothing "the same" in the mental state of experiencing green as in the green object, there is only some property of the green object that causes us to have a green experience. My response to "If your theory still makes... (read 421 more words →)
JJC Smart responds to people who would conflate experiences of seeing things with the actual things which are being seen in his 1959 paper "Sensations and Brain Processes". Here he's talking about the experience of seeing a yellow-green after image, and responding to objections to his theory that experiences can be equivalent to mental states.
... (read more)Objection 4. The after-image is not in physical space. The brain-process is. So the after-image is not a brain-process.
Reply. This is an ignoratio elenchi. I am not arguing that the after-image is a brain-process, but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain-process. It is the experience which is reported in the introspective report. Similarly, if
If you didn't put a colon between 0 and return, it's invalid syntax.
Thanks, fixed.
Unlike statements of fact, which require no further work on our part, lies must be continually protected from collisions with reality. When you tell the truth, you have nothing to keep track of. The world itself becomes your memory, and if questions arise, you can always point others back to it. You can even reconsider certain facts and honestly change your views. And you can openly discuss your confusion, conflicts, and doubts with all comers. In this way, a commitment to the truth is naturally purifying of error.
Sam Harris, "Lying"
For anyone trying to play this, you need to run it from terminal, running it from IDLE won't work.
I don't have any experience in medicine or expertise in writing personal statements, so take this with a grain of salt.
Overall, I'd say it needs to be more specific. In the first paragraph for example you should talk about some specific research you worked on, and how that experience makes better prepared for medical school/ to be a doctor. Even though you don't want to go into research, being specific helps differentiate you since everyone is going to write that they did a bunch of research and liked it. The same goes for writing about empathizing well. Everyone can say that they empathize well and like working with patients, but it's... (read more)
I praise you for acting rightly.
I agree that if we're only considering the person who dies and the replacement person, that preventing someone's death and creating another person are pretty much the same, but I think the pain caused to others by someone dying is usually outweighs the happiness caused by bringing another person into existence. In any case, the costs of death to the people who are still alive need to be taken into account.
Just to clarify, I don't really consider my position to be eliminative towards green, only that what we are talking about when we talk about green 'qualia' is nothing more than a certain type of sentient experience. This may eliminate what you think you are talking about what you say green, but not what I think I am talking about when I say green. I am willing to say that the part of a functional pattern of neural activity that is experienced as green qualia is identical to green in the sense that people generally mean when they talk about seeing something green. But there is no way to separate the green... (read more)