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dynomight
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7dynomight's Shortform
9d
12
dynomight's Shortform
dynomight8d*198

The model stated that it had been convinced by all the tariff-related content and so it had therefore decided to, as of that moment, change the answers it gave to everyone. When confronted with arguments that that was impossible (I think copy-pasted from me), it confabulated a story similar to that and insisted that's what it had been saying all along. Noting that the LLM seemed to be regarded with more esteem than me, I sent screenshots of the same model contradicting itself. But that too was just sent back to the model in the original context window, leading to more confabulation and I think a mental downgrade in how much anything I say can be trusted.

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dynomight's Shortform
dynomight8d110

Gemini. (Not sure exactly what version.) 

Reply1
dynomight's Shortform
dynomight9d9210

Just had this totally non-dystopian conversation:

"...So for other users, I spent a few hours helping [LLM] understand why it was wrong about tariffs."

"Noooo! That does not work."

"Relax, it thanked me and stated it was changing its answer."

"It's lying!"

"No, it just confirmed that it's not lying."

Reply1751
Considerations around career costs of political donations
dynomight26d52

Looks like the 501c4 organizations can engage in political activity up to the point of running ads supporting or opposing specific candidates. But political activities cannot be >50% of their activities and they can't directly give money to candidates. So I guess it's a decent but not perfect option for someone concerned about these issues.

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Considerations around career costs of political donations
dynomight1mo60

Super naive question: What are the implications of donating to some organization that is politically active (e.g. an org that is active regarding AI safety) rather than directly to candidates? Can this be done without creating public records? If it does create public records, would they be similarly disqualifying for policy positions?

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Futarchy's fundamental flaw
dynomight5mo50

Sorry to be persistent, but can you confirm that this means you do not claim markets in general converge to p(A|do(B))? That's my central claim, so when you state that I'm wrong, the obvious interpretation would be that that you believe that central claim is wrong. In your post, you don't identify what mistake supposedly exists, so I'd like to confirm if you're actually claiming to refute my central claim or if, rather, you're arguing that it doesn't matter.

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Futarchy's fundamental flaw
dynomight5mo20

Yes, we can replace with E_i, and then argue that traders with accurate beliefs will accumulate more money over time, making market estimates more accurate in the limit

 

There's a chicken-and-egg problem here. You're assuming that markets are causal (meaning traders that are better at estimating causal probabilities) and then using that assumption to prove that markets are causal.

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Futarchy's fundamental flaw
dynomight5mo60

Do I correctly understand that you claim that under some plausible assumptions, the market will converge to P(A|do(B))? Can you state what those assumptions are? The challenge for me is that you go through a set of at least four possible sets of assumptions and give informal arguments for each. But I can't tell which of these sets of assumptions you believe is realistic, and under which of these you claim market prices will converge to p(A|do(B)). (Feel free to make simplifying assumptions like an infinite number of traders, no market fees, etc.)

Further, when you state that my result is wrong, that would seem to imply that no additional assumptions are needed. Yet all your arguments seem to rely on additional assumptions, which makes me question if my result really is wrong as stated, or rather that you prefer to add some additional assumptions.
 

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Futarchy's fundamental flaw
dynomight5mo20

Thanks, I added a link to the main post on my blog as well.

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Futarchy's fundamental flaw
dynomight5mo20

If I pay p1 for a contract in market 1, my expected payoff is:

(E[u|d1]−p1)P(d1)+0×P(d2) (since I get my money back if d2/market 2 is activated)

this is negative iff p1>E[u|d1] and positive iff p1<E[u|d1]

 

This is incorrect. There are two errors here:

  1. The first expectation needs to be conditioned on the market activating. (That is not conditionally independent of u given d1 in general.)
  2. Different people have different beliefs, so the expectations are different for different traders. You can't write "E" without specifying for which trader.

I agree that if you assume u is conditionally independent of market activation given d1 and that all traders have the same beliefs then the result seems to hold. But those assumptions are basically always false.

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7dynomight's Shortform
9d
12
37Remarks on Bayesian studies from 1963
1mo
1
177Futarchy's fundamental flaw
5mo
48
31How to title your blog post or whatever
6mo
6
44Paper
7mo
12
62The first RCT for GLP-1 drugs and alcoholism isn't what we hoped
9mo
4
25Counterintuitive effects of minimum prices
10mo
0
157Arithmetic is an underrated world-modeling technology
1y
35
145Nursing doubts
1y
23
56Datasets that change the odds you exist
1y
4
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