Solomonoff's universal prior assigns a probability to every individual Turing machine. Usually the interesting statements or hypotheses about which machine we are dealing with are more like "the 10th output bit is 1" than "the machine has the number 643653". The first statement describes an infinite number of different machines, and its probability is the sum of the probabilities of those Turing machines that produce 1 as their 10th output bit (as the probabilities of mutually exclusive hypotheses can be summed). This probability is not directly related to the K-complexity of the statement "the 10th output bit is 1" in any obvious way. The second statement, on the other hand, has probability... (read more)
Of course it is still valid, unless X corresponds directly to some observable and clearly identifiable element of physical reality, so that its existence is not Platonic, but physically real. Obviously it wouldn't make sense to discuss whether someone has, say, committed theft if there didn't exist a precise and agreed-upon definition of what counts as theft -- or otherwise we would be hunting for some objectively existing Platonic idea of "theft" in order to see whether it applies.
Of course? There must be a miscommunication.
Do you think it makes sense to discuss, say, intelligence, friendship or morality? Do you think these exist either as physically real things or Platonic ideas, or can... (read more)
[...] Discussing whether some institution, act, or claim is "sexist" makes sense only if at least one of these two conditions applies:
There is some objectively existing Platonic idea of "sexism," [...]
There is a precise and agreed-upon definition of "sexism," [...]
Replace "sexism" by "X". Do you think this alternative is still valid?
Or maybe you should elaborate on why you think "sexism" gives rise to this alternative.
I am troubled by the vehemence by which people seem to reject the notion of using the language of the second-order simulacrum -- especially in communities that should be intimately aware of the concept that the map is not the territory.
Understanding signaling in communication is almost as basic as understanding the difference between the map and the territory.
A choice of words always contains an element of signaling. Generalizing statements are not always made in order to describe the territory with a simpler map, they are also made in order to signal that the exceptions from the general case are not worth mentioning. This element of signaling is also present, even if the... (read more)
Maybe I misinterpreted your first comment. I agree almost completely with this one, especially the part
(...) not relying on some magic future technology that will solve the existing problems.
What would be the point of criticizing technology on the basis of its appropriate use?
Technologies do not exist in a vacuum, and even if they did, there'd be nobody around to use them. Thus restricting to only the "technology itself" is bound to miss the point of the criticism of technology. When considering the potential effects of future technology we need to take into account how the technologies will be used, and it is certainly reasonable to believe that some technologies have been and will be used to cause more harm than good. That a critical argument takes into account the relevant features of the society that uses the technology is not a flaw of the argument, but rather the opposite.
The argument is that simple numbers like 3^^^3 should be considered much more likely than random numbers with a similar size, since they have short descriptions and so the mechanisms by which that many people (or whatever) hang in the balance are less complex.
Consider the options A = "a proposed action affects 3^^^3 people" and B = "the number 3^^^3 was made up to make a point". Given my knowledge about the mechanisms that affect people in the real world and about the mechanisms people use to make points in arguments, I would say that the likelihood of A versus B is hugely in favor of B. This is because the relevant... (read more)
I can't make it before mid-August, so waiting for me is probably not a good idea.
A mailing list is a fine idea. With the amount of traffic on the front page these days, a dedicated mailing list might be a more reliable way of contacting less active readers. Assuming, of course, that we can get them to sign up on the list :)
Unfortunately I'm unable to participate in the meetup this time, as I'll be out of the country for quite some time starting on friday.
According to the statistics, out of all the cities in the world without a Less Wrong meetup yet, Helsinki has the third largest LW readership. I know I would certainly like to get to personally know more people interested in rationality topics, and I'm sure I'm not alone in that. My preliminary suggestion was met with positive responses, so I think we're good to go.
Time: Saturday 5th of March, from 15:00 onwards
Place: Cafe Aalto in the second floor of the Academic Bookstore in the center. SEE EDIT 2.
EDIT: The meetup is getting closer, so the time and place can now be considered fixed.
EDIT 2: Cafe Aalto was too full, so we have moved to Cafe Picnic at Yliopistonkatu 5.
I have recently had the unpleasant experience of getting subjected to the kind of dishonest emotional manipulation that is recommended here. A (former) friend tried to convert me to his religion by using these tricks, and I can attest that they are effective if the person on the receiving end is trusting enough and doesn't realize that they are being manipulated. In my case the absence and avoidance of rational argument eventually led to the failure of the conversion attempt, but not before I had been inflicted severe emotional distress by a person I used to trust.
Needless to say, I find it unpleasant that these kind of techniques are mentioned without also mentioning that they are indeed manipulative, dishonest and very easy to abuse.