Eva_B

In this paper, we make recommendations for how middle powers may band together through a binding international agreement and achieve the goal of preventing the development of ASI, without assuming initial cooperation by superpowers. You can read the paper here: asi-prevention.com In our previous work Modelling the Geopolitics of AI, we pointed out that middle powers face a precarious predicament in a race to ASI. Lacking the means to seriously compete in the race or unilaterally influence superpowers to halt development, they may need to resort to a strategy we dub “Vassal’s Wager”: allying themselves with a superpower and hoping that their sovereignty is respected after the superpower attains a DSA. Of course, this requires superpowers to avert the extinction risks posed by powerful AI systems, something over which middle powers have little or no control over. Thus, we argue that it is in the interest of most middle powers to collectively deter and prevent the development of ASI by any actor, including superpowers. In this paper, we design an international agreement that could enable middle powers to form a coalition capable of achieving this goal. The agreement we propose is complementary to a “verification framework” that can prevent the development of ASI if it achieves widespread adoption, such as articles IV to IX of MIRI’s latest proposal. Our proposal tries to answer the following question: how may a coalition of actors pressure others to join such a verification framework, without assuming widespread initial participation? Key Mechanisms Trade restrictions. The agreement imposes comprehensive export controls on AI-relevant hardware and software, and import restrictions on AI services from non-members, with precedents ranging from the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Reactive deterrence. Escalating penalties—from strengthened export controls to targeted sanctions, broad embargoes, and ultimately full economic isol