We might be saying the same thing in different terms. From your statement I am confused as what do you mean by the "situation allowing for rent-seeking"? and Moloch being a "power"?
When I used the term "situation" in my previous comment, situation meant the dynamic described by Seth Herd (i.e., land lords rising prices).
Moreover, if "the situation is what allows rent-seeking" but Moloch is the power that determines (when rent-seeking is allowed) that "it will definitely happen" implies that Moloch is a fundamental part of the "situation".
In other words, without Moloch the "situation" of rent-seeking would never had existed in the first place.
UBI strikes me as a much less powerful change than a 100-fold productivity increase.
This statement encapsulates what, IMHO, is the evident shortcoming of the article. UBI is a policy addressing inequality; 100-fold productivity isn't. Poverty is a social construct; inequality is not.
The social construct of poverty is built differently for every niche. The effects of wealth/income distribution directly affect the construction of the concept. Furthermore, it directly affects the health of individuals.
If you analyze the situation from a greater distance (drawing wider boundaries to the system), you can clearly observe that Moloch is the core of rent-seeking in the first place, not the action of hiking prices.
What purpose does rent-seeking serve? What greater good is society drawing from it?
If, in this case, we claim that this is allowed as a mechanism to incentivize private investment into housing development (so that the "right" amount of houses are built), we can see Moloch (i.e., the sacrifice of real value in pursuit of efficiency) very clearly.
Moreover, the construction of prices in a market is not determined wholly by one side. What allows landlords to raise the prices is the willingness of someone to pay that new price. If we assume the landlord is a kind of self-sacrificing saint and refuses to raise the prices, in the not-so-long run, he will face bankruptcy. I.e., he will no longer be able to keep up with inflation. Remember, property taxes are a thing. If the neighbors can charge higher prices, the value of the property rises. If the value rises, so do the taxes.
I share your diagnosis of the "Molochian" game theory dynamics; however, I think I can provide some nuances that have not been brought up in the previous comments.
1. It might sound petty to start by pointing this out, but please entertain my line of thought. "If football had something like 'the spirit of cricket,' maybe this behavior would be less common." This already exists; it's called "Fair Play."
2. The reason "diving" is prominent in football has to do with the de facto rather than de jure enforcement of the "Fair Play" code of conduct. The "meta-Molochian" nature of a "Molochian" law-system means that even if the rules were perfectly codified to guarantee that perverse incentives are impossible, Moloch can still be present if the cost of non-adherence to the code of conduct is perceived to be lower than the return.
3. This is best understood again through the example of "diving" and "Fair Play." As you mentioned, a consensus exists against diving, so players who dive don't fully dive. Instead, "it is not against the rules to draw attention to a potential foul by exaggerating your injury." However, a degree of acceptable exaggeration still exists, one that is guided by the tacit rules of "Fair Play."
4. Lastly, I think there are greater examples of Moloch within sports and football. I will elaborate on the tactical aspect, but many more exist, from the power dynamics within the hierarchies of institutional football to the parents fighting during their U-12 kid's match.
5. Tactics in modern football have become increasingly driven by the pursuit of efficiency (aka winning) at the expense of other crucial values (i.e., enjoyment). Since winning is easily quantifiable and enjoyment is not, Moloch asks for the sacrifice of what is essential in pursuit of the efficient. This translates into matches that have long stretches of absolute dreadful boredom, with each team carefully assessing their opponent and waiting for a mistake they can capitalize on. (If you think I'm exaggerating, look at the number of matches that went to overtime and penalties during the past Euro Cup and Copa America). This trend, plus the pre-existing primacy of defending vs. attacking (you can blame Italian calcio for that), has football in a "Molochian" race to the bottom that has the potential to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. Because let's face it, Moloch might devour the football industry, but the "most beautiful game" will still be played as long as humans have legs. A fact that evades everyone who is actively addressing the individual problems instead of the football Moloch.
Yes, the winning strategy is determined by the rules of the game, but more importantly, what constructs the definition of winning is also determined by those rules. That's why defining the boundaries of a system is crucial for exploring the nature of incentives.
I continue to struggle with your explanations because I can't understand where you are drawing the boundaries of the system.
If by "all land belonging to the state (or king)" you mean an absolutist system (i.e., assuming his power is so strong that he faces no competition from within the system's boundaries), then the nature of competition shifts the target, but the practices remain the same. A rent-seeker is someone who evaluates the system, diagnoses bottlenecks, and positions himself as a gatekeeper.
By "absolutist," I mean, in historical terms, systems that functioned as totalitarian within an artificially determined boundary (e.g., feudal lords, the USSR, slave plantations, etc.). These systems faced competition from the outside. If a king faces competition from outside his kingdom, he is obliged to maximize the exploitation of people and resources. If he doesn't, he's at risk of being conquered by outside forces that adhere to Molochian efficiency. The USSR did not have markets and prices, but it still had a system with many layers of quotas and incentives.
If what you're describing is a universal totalitarian system, then it would be a completely different system, without historical precedent, but with the same incentives. The nature of Moloch emerges when surplus creates the need for criteria to allocate the newfound scarcity. Unless true abundance exists, the natural order is for status to determine access. In such a context, competition will be Molochian competition. To my understanding this is the exact reason why governments exist in the first place. To enforce Ostrom's solution to the tragedy of the commons.