There are many reasons I enjoy playing go: complex gameplay arises out of simple rules, single mistakes rarely decide games, games between between people of different skill can be handicapped without changing the dynamics of the game too much, there are no draws, and I just like the way it...
I have an extra copy of Richard Feyman's autobiography, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!": Aventures of a Curious Character, which I want to give away here. This is one of two autobiographies (along with Ben Franklin's) to actually change my life. I've seen it quoted often on LessWrong, as Feynman...
Stories are a huge way we make sense of the world. Adding a narrative sequence to the post did helped me keep track of the ideas and how they fit together.
Is histocracy compatible with a secret ballot? (And for that matter, is futarchy?)
And as a separate question, would it be a good idea to keep voters' individual reliability scores secret, too? If a voter is known to have an accurate record and her opinion is public before a vote, couldn't she get overweighted, because she'll sway others' votes as well as getting more weight in the vote sum?
It's broken for me too, in exactly the way you describe. One of the variants on the error page invites me to buy a reddit t-shirt.
I participated in the IB diploma program in 1997, in Texas. My experience was better than KPier's in several ways. I think having a skilled and experienced teacher makes all the difference. Mine wasn't a LessWrong style rationalist, but she had experience with teaching philosophy, so we got past initial naive intuitions on most of the class topics relatively soon, and I witnessed basic changes in attitude toward the nature of language and knowledge in both me and several of my classmates.
In retrospect, I think the best thing that could have been added would have been a discussion up front about how not to be confused about words. Some combo of the material in Disputing Definitions and Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory. After that, something to undermine reliance on introspection and intuition more generally, perhaps in the context of presenting basic cognitive biases.
When I came last week (hadn't checked here a while) and didn't see anybody there, I though the regular meeting was defunct. I'm glad to see it's still going. See y'all this evening!
I will attend most of the weekly Irvine meetups, at least through the end of July.
Zip code correction:
501 West 15th Street, Austin, TX 79701
Should be
501 West 15th Street, Austin, TX 78701
Isn't this already implemented, as the Anti-Kibitzer in the preferences section?
Drop the little skyline/boat grayscale image (mini-landscape.gif) that appears at the bottom of each top-level post. Original mention. Seems to have no purpose, and doesn't really fit the design theme.
There are many reasons I enjoy playing go: complex gameplay arises out of simple rules, single mistakes rarely decide games, games between between people of different skill can be handicapped without changing the dynamics of the game too much, there are no draws, and I just like the way it looks. The purpose of this article is to illustrate something else I like about playing go: the ways that it provides practice in basic habits of rationality, that is, the ways in which playing go helps me be less wrong.
I've tried to write this so that you don't need to know the game to follow it, but reading a quick introduction would... (read 1186 more words →)
I have an extra copy of Richard Feyman's autobiography, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!": Aventures of a Curious Character, which I want to give away here.
This is one of two autobiographies (along with Ben Franklin's) to actually change my life. I've seen it quoted often on LessWrong, as Feynman has a point of view on life that fits well with the ideas we explore here. In addition to his rationalist side, Feynman also exhibited a wonderfully free sense of humor. Even when working at the Manhattan Project, he joked around and never took himself too seriously. I think our community would benefit if the rationalism here were likewise leavened by some self-deprecating... (read 243 more words →)
What do you mean by "made the world a worse place"? Worse than it was before democracy and liberalism started spreading, i.e. pre-1700s? Or worse today than it would have been today if democracy and liberalism hadn't spread? The first question seems easy (we're more peaceful and prosperous than the past), the second a nearly impossible counterfactual, depending heavily on what government systems and philosophies we'd have instead.