ImmortalRationalist
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This is mostly just arguing over semantics. Just replace "philosophical zombie" with whatever your preferred term is for a physical human who lacks any qualia.
Why is it that philosophical zombies are unlikely to exist? In Eliezer's article Zombies! Zombies?, it seemed to mostly be an argument against epiphenomenalism. In other words, if a philosophical zombie existed, there would likely be evidence that it was a philosophical zombie, such as it not talking about qualia. However, there are individuals who outright deny the existence of qualia, such as Daniel Dennett. Is it not impossible that individuals like Dennett are themselves philosophical zombies?
Also, what are LessWrong's views on the idea of a continuous consciousness? CGPGrey brought up this issue in The Trouble with Transporters. Does a continuous self exist at all, or is our perception of being a continuous conscious entity existing throughout time just an illusion?
This video by CGPGrey is somewhat related to the idea of memetic tribes and the conflicts that arise between them.
This is a bit unrelated to the original post, but Ted Kaczynski has an interesting hypothesis on the Great Filter, mentioned in Anti-Tech Revolution: Why and How.
But once self-propagating systems have attained global scale, two crucial differences emerge. The first difference is in the number of individuals from among which the "fittest" are selected. Self-prop systems sufficiently big and powerful to be plausible contenders for global dominance will probably number in the dozens, or possibly in the hundreds; they certainly will not number in the millions. With so few individuals from among which to select the "fittest," it seems safe to say that the process of natural selection will be inefficient in... (read 545 more words →)
One perspective on pain is that it is ultimately caused by less than ideal Darwinian design of the brain. Essentially, we experience pain and other forms of suffering for the same reason that we have backwards retinas. Other proposed systems, such as David Pearce's gradients of bliss, would accomplish the same things as pain without any suffering involved.
Should the mind projection fallacy actually be considered a fallacy? It seems like being unable to imagine a scenario where something is possible is in fact Bayesian evidence that it is impossible, but only weak Bayesian evidence. Being unable to imagine a scenario where 2+2=5, for instance, could be considered evidence that 2+2 ever equaling 5 is impossible.
Here is a somewhat relevant video.
This LessWrong Survey had the lowest turnout since Scott's original survey in 2009
What is the average amount of turnout per survey, and what has the turnout been year by year?
Does anyone here know any ways of dealing with brain fog and sluggish cognitive tempo?
What do you think of Avshalom Elitzur's arguments for why he reluctantly thinks interactionist dualism is the correct metaphysical theory of consciousness?