The Doomsday Argument is premised on the idea that one should reason as if they are randomly selected from the set of all actually existent observers (past, present and future) in their reference class. If we consider ourselves as randomly placed in the birth rank, then we should expect a doomsday event soon.
However, it seems that we should include the idea that one can reason about anthropics and maybe that one actually does reason about anthropics. Also, we could consider observer moments (OM) reasoning about anthropics. If we do this, then perhaps it is not AI that will kill us but enlighten us about our future or some central question about humanity. OM reasoning about anthropics could fall simply because nobody feels it necessary with superintelligence because all these sorts of questions are better answered through AI.
I use genetic enhancement. I think it’s good to be thinking about framing around this issue. I conceived of maybe calling it “harmless eugenics” in response to the accusation. Epilogenetics evokes the thoughts of eugenics more than genetic enhancement in my view.
The reason I support a lot of epilogenetics is because it’s eugenic. If a couple chose to pick the embryo they expected to suffer the most in life, is it epilogenetics? Do you support that? I don’t. Maybe that term is a little misleading
I think Widen et al. (2022) uses actual sibling pairs/trios (unless I'm misreading?), but a few other studies use simulated embryos such as Lencz et al. (2021) [1] and Turley et al. (2021) [2].
[1] "Utility of polygenic embryo screening for disease depends on the selection strategy"
[2] "Problems with Using Polygenic Scores to Select Embryos"
I think that morality is objective in the sense that you mentioned in paragraph one. I think that it has the feature of paragraph two that you are talking about but that isn't the definition objective in my view, it is merely a feature of the fact that we have moral intuitions.
Yes, you can get new information on morality that contradicts your current standpoint. It could never say anything objectionable because I am actually factually correct on baby torture.
I don't think morality is objective, but I still care greatly about what a future Holden - one who has reflected more, learned more, etc. - would think about the ethical choices I'm making today.
I think that an ethical theory that doesn't believe baby torture is objectively wrong is flawed. If there is no objective morality, then reflection and learning information cannot guide us toward any sort of "correct" evaluation of our past actions. I don't think preferences should change realist to quasi-realist. Is it any less realist to think murder is okay, but avoid it because we are worried about judgement from others? It seems like anti-realism + a preference. There... (read 432 more words →)
I think aturchin had a similar idea where people simply lose interest in the DA.