Jessica Taylor. CS undergrad and Master's at Stanford; former research fellow at MIRI.
I work on decision theory, social epistemology, strategy, naturalized agency, mathematical foundations, decentralized networking systems and applications, theory of mind, and functional programming languages.
Blog: unstableontology.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/jessi_cata
Huh? It seems to come down to definitions of lies, my current intuition is it wouldn't be a lie, but I'm not sure why people would care how I define lie in this context.
the kind of thing I have heard from Vassar directly is that, in the Lacanian classification of people as psychotic/neurotic/perverted, there are some things to be said in favor of psychotics relative to others, namely, that they have access to the 'imaginary' realm that is coherent and scientific (I believe Lacan thinks science is imaginary/psychotic, as it is based on symmetries). however, Lacanian psychosis has the disadvantage that people can catastrophize about ways society is bad.
more specifically, Vassar says, Lacanian neurotics tend to deny oppressive power structures, psychotics tend to acknowledge them and catastrophize about them, and perverts tend to acknowledge and endorse them; under this schema, it seems things could be said in favor of and against all three types.
this raises the question of how much normal (non-expert) and psychiatric concepts of psychosis have to do with the Lacanian model which relates to factors like how much influence Lacan has had on psychiatry. I asked Vassar about this and he said that 'delusions' (a standard symptom of psychosis) can be a positive sign because when people form actual beliefs they tend to be wrong (this accords with, for example, Popperian philosophy of science, as specific theories are in general 'wrong' even if useful; see also, 'all models are wrong, some models of useful')
overall I think further specifying the degree to which anyone is 'encouraging psychosis', or the ethics of value judgments on psychosis, would in general require having a more specific definition/notion of psychosis, and the sort of 'dramatic' relation people in threads such as this have to psychosis (i.e. moral panics about it) is contra such specificity in definition, therefore, lacks requisite precision for well-informed judgments.
I have no idea about other people lying due to JDP's influence. I had JDP look at a draft of Occupational Infohazards prior to posting and he convinced me to not mention Olivia because she was young and inexperienced / experimenting with ways of being at the time, it was maybe too bad for her reputation to say she was a possible influence on my psychosis. I admit this was a biased omission, though I don't think it was a lie. (To be clear, I'm not saying I went psychotic because of Olivia, I think there were many factors and I'm pretty uncertain about the weighting)
claims about Vassar aside, do I even have a reputation for being particularly disagreeable or overconfident, or doing so in the presence of people who have taken psychedelics? to my mind I am significantly less disagreeable and confident than high status rationalists such as Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares. I think my tendency with trips is to sometimes explore new hypotheses but have relatively low confidence as I'm more likely than usual to change my mind the next day. also, isn't the 'modest epistemology' stuff a pretty thorough criticism of claims that people should not "confidently expound in the nature of truth and society" that has been widely accepted on LW?
as another consideration, I have somewhat of a reputation for being a helpful person for people going through mental health issues (such as psychosis) to talk to, e.g. I let someone with anxiety, paranoia, and benzo issues stay at my place for a bit, she was very thankful and so was her mom. I don't think this is consistent with the reputation attributed to me re: effects on people in altered states of consciousness.
she talked with him sometimes in group conversations that included other people, 2016-2017. idk if they talked one on one. she stopped talking with him as much sometime during this partially due to Bryce Hidysmith's influence. mostly, she was interested in learning from him because he was a "wizard"; she also thought of Anna Salamon as a "wizard", perhaps others. Michael wasn't specifically like "I am going to teach Olivia things as a studient" afaik, I would not describe it as a "teacher/student relationship". at this point they pretty much don't talk and Michael thinks Olivia is suspect/harmful due to the whole Eric Bruylant situation where Eric became obsessed with Vassar perhaps due to Olivia's influence.
I don't think so; even if it applies to the subset of hypothetical superintelligences that factor neatly into beliefs and values, humans don't seem to factorize this way (see Obliqueness Thesis, esp. argument from brain messiness).
Thanks, hadn't realized how this related to algebraic geometry. Reminds me of semi-simplicial type theory.
Computationally tractable is Yudkowsky's framing and might be too limited. The kind of thing I believe is for example, an animal without a certain brain complexity will tend not to be a social animal and is therefore unlikely to have the sort of values social animals have. And animals that can't do math aren't going to value mathematical aesthetics the way human mathematicians do.
Relativity to Newtonian mechanics is a warp in a straightforward sense. If you believe the layout of a house consists of some rooms connected in a certain way, but there are actually more rooms connected in different ways, getting the maps to line up looks like a warp. Basically, the closer the mapping is to a true homomorphism (in the universal algebra sense), the less warping there is, otherwise there are deviations intuitively analogous to space warps.
I think if there were other cases of Olivia causing problems and he was asking multiple people to hide Olivia problems, that would more cause me to think he was sacrificing more group epistemology to protect Olivia's reputation, and was overall more anti-truth-seeking, yes.