kebwi

That's fine, but we should phrase the question differently. Instead of asking "Should I add my expectation that I will find myself in strange place?" we should ask "Will that future person, looking back, perceive that I (now) am its former self?"

As to the unrelated question of whether a poor or non-exact model is sufficient to indicate preservation of identity, there is much to consider about which aspects are important (physical or psychological) and how much precision is required in the model in order to deem it a preservation of identity -- but none of that has to do with the copy problem. The copy problem is orthogonal to the... (read more)

I don't mean to sound harsh below Alexey. On the whole, I think you've done a wonderful job, but that said, here's my take...

I personally think the question is poorly phrased. Throughout the document, Turchin asks the question "will some future entity be me?" The copy problem, which he takes as one of the central issues at task, demonstrates why this question is so poorly formulated, for it leads us into such troublesome quandaries and paradoxes. I think the future-oriented question (will a future entity be me?) is simply a nonsense question, perhaps best conceptualized by the fact that the future doesn't exist and therefore it violates some fundamental temporal property to... (read 552 more words →)