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All of keddaw's Comments + Replies

Archimedes's Chronophone
keddaw00

I think I have a couple of suggestions:

  1. Find a current social/scientific norm that maps almost perfectly to Archimedes' time that you disagree with (e.g. the need for a strong, expansionist military; use of torture; increase in state power over citizens; existence of a political class etc.) and use the same arguments against it now, including outcomes and dangers, and they should map to decent arguments then.

  2. Find a socially wronged group and use arguments for their emancipation (women, non-whites, gays, children etc. depending on your era) and whichever

... (read more)
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6MixedNuts
No, it'll come out as arguments for then-controversial position that Archimedes already holds.
Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided
keddaw00

Correct. I made the jump of me appearing as is in 530CE as opposed to 'baby me' since I do not in any logical sense think that baby me is me. So yes, the question is invalid (in my view) but I tried to make it valid by altering the question without explicitly saying I was doing so (i.e. "If you were to pop into existence in 530 CE would you be a scientific skeptic?")

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3TimS
As I stated elsewhere, the point of the quote is that there are limits somewhere on freedom of speech. Where to draw the line is hard, and the current First Amendment doctrine is different and more speech tolerant than Schenk.
8thomblake
When the phrase was coined, they were almost certainly referring to the then-recent Italian Hall Disaster, in which 73 people were killed as a direct result of someone falsely shouting "fire". If you think that can't happen now, substitute in your imagination some other utterance that kills 73 people in short order. Like maybe, going to a police hostage standoff and mimicking the sound of a gunshot.
Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided
keddaw00

Well, the person who started typing this reply was someone incredibly similar, but not identical, to the person who finished (neither of who are the present me). It was a person who shared genes, who had an almost identical memory of childhood and education, who shares virtually all my goals, interests and dreams and is more like me than any other person that has ever lived. However, that person was not the me who exists now.

Extrapolate that backwards, becoming less and less like current me over time and you get an idea of who started learning the skills I currently have.

It's not my fault if people have a broken view of what/who they actually are.

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6TheOtherDave
Nor, by your reasoning, could it possibly ever be your fault, since my current view of what I am has causes in the past, and you didn't exist in the past. By the same reasoning, nothing else could possibly ever be your fault, except possibly for what you are doing in the instant that I blame you for it... not that it matters for practical purposes, since by the time I got around to implementing consequences of that, you would no longer exist. That strikes me as even more broken a view than the one you wish for it to replace... it destroys one of the major functions we use the notion of "a person" to perform.
asparisi130

Shouldn't that answer then result in a "Invalid Question" to the original "Would you be a proper scientific skeptic if you were born in 500 CE?" question?

I mean, what you are saying here is that it isn't possible for you to have been born in 500 C.E., that you are a product of your genetics and environment and cannot be separated from those conditions that resulted in you. So the answer isn't "Yes" it is "That isn't a valid question."

I'm not saying I agree, especially since I think the initial question can be rephras... (read more)

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Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided
keddaw20

Do you really think you're so smart that you would have been a proper scientific skeptic even if you'd been born in 500 C.E.?

Yes. "But your genes would be different." Then it wouldn't be me. "Okay, same genes, but no scientific education." Then it wouldn't be me.

As much as such a thing as 'me' exists then it comes with all the knowledge and skills I have gained either through genetics, training or learning. Otherwise it isn't 'me'.

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4TheOtherDave
So who was that person who started learning the skills that you now have?
Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw00

Okay, but what it comes down to is what is the expected reaction of reasonable people in a given situation. If people can't safely exit a theatre then we need to re-think theatres. And safety tests.

If I'm in a theatre and a patron shouts that the popcorn has been poisoned (an intentional lie) then I can't conceive of any action (assuming [s]he hasn't been near the popcorn) other than ejection and ban. don't see why their liberty has to be sacrificed.

Similarly, if the risk of injury is as low as I think it (should be) is then the intent to cause panic is... (read more)

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0TimS
Well, we don't agree that a venue where people would get injured in a panic is sub-par. We've learned a lot since the 1910s, but panics are like hundred year floods in that it does not make economic sense to constantly prepare for every possible event of that level of unlikeliness. But I agree that speech that is intended to cause harm but is unlikely to be able to cause harm (i.e. an obviously false claim that the popcorn is poisoned) is not a good candidate for criminal penalty. But it's generally quite hard to prove that one intended harm if one's acts seem unlikely to be able to cause harm.
Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw-40

Which has nothing to say on the possible, actual or long-term harm of removing the rights of free speech in a certain situation - it simply defines (quite well) the other side of the equation.

The criminalisation of free speech is a severe measure and must be as limited as is practicable in scope. All western societies are based on the free exchange and discussions of ideas. The benefit of free speech is so great (as mentioned in the Hustler case) that its restriction must prevent some great harm. As a recent example showed, the right of a Florida pastor... (read more)

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0TheOtherDave
I find it's easier to think clearly about this stuff if, when calculating the costs on both sides, I try to forget that I have a preferred answer. The cost of someone shouting "fire!" in a theatre is what it is; I'm inclined to agree with you that it's not very high, though I think you're trying to make it sound lower than it is. The cost of preventing someone from shouting "fire!" in a theatre is what it is as well. Looking at just the first-order costs I conclude that the costs of preventing it are in general lower than the costs of it happening. The second-order costs are less clear to me and can easily swamp the first-order costs, though. Mostly it becomes a question of whether there's a reliable Schelling point near shouting "fire!" that I expect to prevent that from becoming grounds for supporting higher-cost speech suppression. I'm less certain about that; and I expect it depends a lot on the specific community, so I can easily see where the "shouting fire" legal principle leads to a lot of expensive bad law, and that on balance we'd therefore do better discarding the principle. Or perhaps not. If I were actually interested in activism on this issue, I would start by refining my estimates. As for intent, I'd say it's at least theoretically relevant. For example, I consider the cost of having prevented all-and-only people who wish to shout "fire!" in a theatre for malicious reasons from doing so to be significantly lower than the costs of having prevented everyone from doing so regardless of their intent. That said, the costs of implementing such a policy given current technology are onerous, so I probably oppose (given current technology) having such a law, although various cheap approximations of it might be OK.
5TimS
The is a core part of the disagreement. The cost of preventing risk of injury from a false yell of fire is prohibitive for the owner of the theater. So it is reasonable to shift some of the cost of prevention to the person who knows there is no fire but wants to yell fire, in part because the cost of not falsely yelling fire is so low. Further, it is reasonable to expect the potential false-yeller to know that the yell will be believed, cause panic and therefore cause injury. The Koran burner receives more protection because there wasn't a knowing falsehood in that case. The relevant mental state is not intent to harm, but knowledge of the statement's falsity.
Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw00

Limiting the scope of a civil remedy is somewhat removed from the distinctions between civil and criminal, no?

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3TimS
No. If you really believe the public/private distinction is solid, then the First Amendment has nothing to do with private (i.e. civil) disputes. So Hustler should have come out the other way. In general, American law has really struggled with the public/private distinction. I would say this is because the distinction is not rigorously meaningful - although I doubt most judges would frame it quite that way. Regardless of the framing, American law recognizes that the situation of "two equal individuals before an impartial judge" includes the fact that the judge is an arm of government, exercising government power. What that means in practice is less clear. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer ("That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.") with Schiavo v. Schiavo (holding that a state judge ordering the removal of a feeding tube is not state action).
Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw-30

So close notTheOtherDave...

when it costs X to lower the risk by Y of harm Z, and X > Y Z chance of an incident, then implementing the measure is bad policy.

Is exactly the point, but you have not defined X. Given that X leads to a slippery slope decrease in all free speech rights (e.g. Gitmo torture reporting, Bradley Manning etc. etc.) then how do you quantify X?

Sometimes the direct harm of X may be less than the others, but the principle is much more important.

This is why we presume people innocent. This is why convicting no-one is preferable to convicting the wrong person. This is why, in short, we have rights!

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0dlthomas
Noting that on the one hand I don't think our actual policy recommendations would be far apart (as pertaining to the issues at hand, at least) , and on the other that I have may objections to particulars your post above, I am going to nonetheless bow out as we are straying much too deep into mind-killer territory for my liking. I notice that you are new here, and point you toward Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided and Politics Is The Mind-Killer, if you have not already seen them. Feel free to contact me privately if you would like to continue any political part of this discussion in another forum.
2TimS
He did define X. It is the cost of preventing the harm. See generally Burden vs. Cost of Injury x Probability of occurrence
Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw-20

A theater than can protect its patrons against a real fire doesn't necessarily equal a theater that can protect its patrons against a false fire.

That is a patently false statement.

I find it far more reasonable, and much of a "Schelling point" to ban spreading knowingly false information.

And thus the slippery slope becomes a teflon cliff.

That's effectively a matter of degree -- you're just saying that the punishment should be a fine instead of a prison sentence. It's not really a difference in kind.

One is criminal and the other is civil... (read more)

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2TimS
This distinction breaks down very quickly. Consider Hustler v. Falwell, which limited the scope of civil remedies because enforcement of those remedies violated freedom of speech.
4ArisKatsaris
How do you know this? In the case of a true fire, fire extinguishers may activate, fire exits might automatically open, or perhaps the theater's army of flying robots would come and carry everyone to safety. Or perhaps the theater is designed from such materials that it can't catch fire. Excuse me? The concept of "knowing lie" isn't a good enough Schelling Point for you? I'm in favour of banning the act of falsely shouting "Fire" in a theater, for the exact same reason that I'm in favour of banning the act of giving poison to other people while calling it "orange juice" I don't think you'd have any opposition to treating the latter an act of murder, why are you against treating the former likewise an act of murder? This is a legalism, a difference in labelling, nothing else. Again mere legalism. In practical terms, it's the same, at least from the point of view of the accused -- you get accused for something, someone is accusing you, if you're found guilty you get punished. Simple as that.
4dlthomas
That's not at all what I said. Basically what TheOtherDave (hmm, convenient, as I happen to be a Dave as well...) said. A bunch of frightened people moving about all at once are going to present more risk than a bunch of calm people trickling in and out; the question is what we can do to lower that risk. Any security measure is about tradeoffs, and when it costs X to lower the risk by Y of harm Z, and X > Y Z chance of an incident, then implementing the measure is bad policy. This calculus is embodied in the decisions made by the fire marshals and the local councils and regulators and whatnot as they put together the local fire code, run inspections, etc, whose goal is not to reduce the risk to zero (or even "absolutely as low as we can go at any cost").
TheOtherDave140

Even if a reasonable expectation that no-one will be harmed during evacuation exists, it doesn't follow that forcing an unnecessary evacuation has no expected costs other than inconvenience (as you originally claimed).

It might be, for example, that most experts in the field accept that theatre-evacuation technology simply isn't expected to reduce the expected cost of an evacuation below .01 deaths, and thus expecting less than that is unreasonable, and this fact is published and known to all theatre-goers, who decide that .01 * likelihood-of-evacuation is ... (read more)

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Schelling fences on slippery slopes
keddaw40

Any theatre offering access to the public should be able to evacuate all patrons safely in the event of a real fire, thus someone falsely yelling "fire!" simply inconveniences people and should be banned by the owner. There is no need to get the police involved and have this ridiculous example as legitimisation on limits on free speech in a public arena.

There are limits that should be upheld, but not necessarily by police (e.g. someone being slandered could sue rather than have the slanderer arrested.) Incitement to violence may be banned as a pragmatic measure, but that would be my Schelling point (and even then I'm not 100% sure...)

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5ArisKatsaris
A theater than can protect its patrons against a real fire doesn't necessarily equal a theater that can protect its patrons against a false fire. Nor do I find it more reasonable to ban businesses that are incapable of protecting all patrons against the repercussions of all types of lying. I find it far more reasonable, and much of a "Schelling point" to ban spreading knowingly false information. That's effectively a matter of degree -- you're just saying that the punishment should be a fine instead of a prison sentence. It's not really a difference in kind.
dlthomas100

Being able to evacuate all patrons with sufficient safety is not necessarily the same thing as being able to evacuate all patrons with perfect safety.

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Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality
keddaw20

There is a good chance I am missing something here, but from an economic perspective this seems trivial:

P(Om) is the probability the person assigns Omega of being able to accurately predict their decision ahead of time.

A. P(Om) x $1m is the expected return from opening one box.

B. (1 - P(Om))x$1m + $1000 is the expected return of opening both boxes (the probability that Omega was wrong times the million plus the thousand.)

Since P(Om) is dependent on people's individual belief about Omega's ability to predict their actions it is not surprising different peop... (read more)

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