Following up with some resource curse literature that understands the problem as incentive misalignment:

On how state revenue sources shape institutional development and incentives, Karl (1997) writes,

"Thus the fate of oil-exporting countries must be understood in a context in which economies shape institutions and, in turn, are shaped by them. Specific modes of economic development, adapted in a concrete institutional setting, gradually transform political and social institutions in a manner that subsequently encourages or discourages productive outcomes. Because the causal arrow between economic development and institutional change constantly runs in both directions, the accumulated outcomes give form to divergent long-run national trajectories. Viewed in this vein, economic effects like the Dutch Disease become outcomes of particular institutional arrangements and not simply causes of economic decline. This deeper explanation is revealed in the relentless interaction between a mode of economic development and the political and social institutions it fosters.

[...]

How are frameworks for decision-making created and reproduced in late-developing countries? I argue that determining the "structuring principle" for these countries—that is, the appropriate starting point for identifying how ranges of choice are constructed—should begin with their leading sector. This means examining the export dependence that molds their economies, societies, and state institutional capacities, and that, in turn, is either reinforced or transformed by them. My effort to understand this set of interactions begins with differentiating the asset specificity, tax structure, and other features inherent in the exploitation of one particular commodity, petroleum. It terminates by examining the state, where the impact of particular economic models and 

A central corollary of this argument is that countries dependent on the same export activity are likely to display significant similarities in the capacity of their states to guide development. In other words, countries dependent on mining should share certain properties of "stateness," especially their framework for decision-making and range of choice, even though their actual institutions are quite different in virtually all other respects. This should be true unless significant state building has occurred prior to the introduction of the export activity.

The specific mechanism for the creation of this institutional sameness lies in the origin of state revenues. It matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive activities, agricultural production, foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of revenues, whatever their relative economic merits or social import, have a powerful (and quite different) impact on the state's institutional development and its abilities to employ personnel, subsidize social and economic programs, create new organizations, and direct the activities of private interests. Simply stated, the revenues a state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to which it puts them define its nature. Thus it should not be surprising that states dependent on the same revenue source resemble each other in specific ways (and consequently so do the decisions made by their leaders)."

I'd note that Karl's argument has nearly 5,000 citations and is one of the most common (if not the dominant) explanations of the resource curse.

From Cooper (2002) Chapter 7:

"Oil can turn a gatekeeper state into a caricature of itself. Unlike agriculture, which involves vast numbers of people in the production and marketing of exports, oil requires little labor, and much of it from foreigners. It also entails relationships between the few global firms capable of extracting it and the state rulers who collect the rents. It defines a spigot economy: whoever controls access to the tap, collects the rent."

On the importance of taxing citizens to state development, Centeno (1997) notes:

"The key to the relationship between war and state making in Western Europe is what Finer (1975) calls the “extraction-coercion” cycle. [...] For the “extraction-coercion cycle” to begin, the relevant states must not have alternative sources of financing while the domestic economy must be capable of sustaining the new fiscal and bureaucratic growth. Conflict-induced extraction will only occur if easier options are not available. Even then, the relevant societies might not be able to produce enough surplus to make the effort productive. Thus, for example, the availability of Latin American silver and the willingness of bankers to risk massive sums freed the Spanish Hapsburgs from imposing greater fiscal control over their provinces as a means to pay for their wars. Conversely, the relative scarcity of such external supports drove the expansion of the early English state."

On how non-taxation revenue inhibited state development in Latin America, and therefore did not follow Tilley's pattern of "war making states", Centeno (1997) argues:

"As in the European cases, war produced immediate deficits, but with one prominent exception, the Latin American states did not respond to these with increased extractions, at least not in the form of domestic taxes. [...] If they could not borrow on international markets (as was the case from roughly 1830 to 1870), Latin American states could sell access to a commodity. Guano allowed Peru to become what Shane Hunt (1973) has called a “rentier state.” The availability of guano revenues retarded the development of the state by allowing it to exist without the remotest contact with the society on which it rested and without having to institute a more efficient administrative machine. Guano did allow the removal of the regressive contribucion (in 1855), but it also permitted the state to avoid modernizing its fiscal structure while borrowing large amounts of money. A contemporary British observer (Markham 1883, p. 37; my emphasis) noted that “a wise government would have treated this source of revenues as temporary and extraordinary. The Peruvians looked upon it as if it was permanent, abolishing other taxes, and recklessly increasing expenditure.” Much like the guano bonanza in the Peruvian case, the conquest of nitrate territories allowed the Chilean state to expand without having to “penetrate” its society and confront the rampant inequality (Loveman 1979, p. 169; Sater 1986, p. 227). By 1900, nitrate and iodine were accounting for 50% of Chilean revenues and 14% of GDP (Mamalakis 1977, pp. 19–21; Sater 1986, p. 275)."

Happy to cite some more of the literature if it's helpful.

That's a choice, though. AGI could, for example, look like a powerful actor in its own right, with its own completely nonhuman drives and priorities, and a total disinterest in being directed in the sort of way you'd normally associate with a "resource".

My claim is that the incentives AGI creates are quite similar to the resource curse, not that it would literally behave like a resource. But:

If by "intent alignment" you mean AGIs or ASIs taking orders from humans, and presumably specifically the humans who "own" them, or are in charge of the "powerful actors", or form some human social elite, then it seems as though your concerns very much argue that that's not the right kind of alignment to be going for.

My default is that powerful actors will do their best to build systems that do what they ask them to do (ie they will not pursue aligning systems with human values).

The field points towards this: alignment efforts are primarily focused on controlling systems. I don't think this is inherently a bad thing, but it results in the incentives I'm concerned about. I've not seen great work on defining human values, creating a value set a system could follow, and forcing them to follow it in a way that couldn't be overridden by its creators. Anthropic's Constitutional AI may be a counter-example.

The incentives point towards this as well. A system that is aligned to refuse efforts that could lead resource/power/capital concentration would be difficult to sell to corporations who are likely to pursue this.

These (here, here, and here) definitions are roughly what I am describing as intent alignment.

Glad you enjoyed it! 

Could you elaborate on your last paragraph? Presuming a state overrides its economic incentives (ie establishes a robust post-AGI welfare system), I'd like to see how you think the selection pressures would take hold.

For what it's worth, I don't think "utopian communism" and/or a world without human agency are good. I concur with Rudolf entirely here -- those outcomes miss agency what has so far been an core part of the human experience. I want dynamism to exist, though I'm still working on if/how I think we could achieve that. I'll save that for a future post.

I appreciate this concern, but I disagree. An incognito google search of "intelligence curse" didn't yield anything using this phrase on the front page except for this LessWrong post. Adding quotes around it or searching for the full phrase ("the intelligence curse") showed this post as the first result. 

A quick twitter search in recent shows the phrase "the intelligence curse" before this post:

• In 24 tweets in total
• With the most recent tweet on Dec 21, 2024
• Before that, in a tweet from August 30, 2023
• In 10 tweets since 2020
• And all other mentions pre-2015

In short, I don't think this is a common phrase and expect that this would be the most understood usage. 

I agree that this could be a popular phrase because of future political salience. I expect that the idea that being intelligence is a curse would not be confused with this anymore than saying having resources are a curse (referring to wealthy people being unhappy) confuses people with the resource curse.

I think "the intelligence resource curse" would be hard for people to remember. I'm open to considering different names that are catchy or easy to remember.

I agree. To add an example: the US government's 2021 expanded child tax credit lifted 3.7 million children out of poverty, a near 50% reduction. Moreover, according to the NBER's initial assessment: "First, payments strongly reduced food insufficiency: the initial payments led to a 7.5 percentage point (25 percent) decline in food insufficiency among low-income households with children. Second, the effects on food insufficiency are concentrated among families with 2019 pre-tax incomes below $35,000". 

Despite this, Congress failed to renew the program. Predictably, child poverty spiked the following year. I don't have an estimate for how many lives this cost, but it's greater than zero.